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Foreword
The new Georgian state is approximately 15 years old - depending
on what is considered the moment of its inception. There have been
three changes of government in Georgia during this period, two of
which were unconstitutional. All three times the changes were claimed
to have been made in the name of revolutionary transformation and
the establishment of a dramatically different political system. The latest
change of government, the Rose Revolution, took place in 2003.
Enough time has passed since then to draw some general conclusions
on what the main characteristics of Georgia’s political evolution and
political system are, how they can be categorized in terms of the
fundamental notions of political science and what trends of political
system development have become discernible.
Despite heated political debate, these issues have not been raised
so broadly yet – or at any rate, no professional discussion on these
issues has taken place. The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy
and Development, together with the Ilia Chavchavadze State Univer-
sity, came forward with the initiative to launch a discussion of this
nature. In order to make the discourse more structured, we asked its
participants to supply answers to 10 questions. The initial versions of
the answers were discussed at the authors’ conference on December
8-9, 2006, but they had the opportunity to edit the draft texts after-
wards. Assessments in the book reflect the period before January 2007
– events that happened afterwards could not influence the views of
the authors.
The submitted texts vary considerably both in volume and content.
Some of the authors supplied relatively brief answers to the 10
questions asked, whereas others did not directly follow the proposed
format and turned in comprehensive analytical articles on the topics
at hand. At any rate, we hope that the material below will be of
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interest to readers. It is an attempt at a more-or-less systematic
assessment of Georgia’s recent history by a diverse group of people.
Below is the list of the 10 questions we asked. In the texts of
the authors who answered the questions in this order, only the item
number of the question is supplied as the chapter title; otherwise, we
have kept the author’s headlines.
1. What has Georgia achieved and what has it failed to achieve
following the restoration of its national sovereignty? How, if at all,
did Georgian society and culture change during this period? Which
social or cultural factors (changes) had the greatest effect on
political processes?
2. Please provide a brief assessment of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s presi-
dency. How would you formulate his political program (views)?
What were his main achievement and his main failure? If the
political regime of that period can be categorized, what innovations
did it introduce compared to the preceding regime? What was the
main reason for the toppling of his regime (the “Christmas coup”
or the popular uprising of 1991-1992)?
3. Please provide a brief assessment of Eduard Shevardnadze’s
presidency. How would you formulate his political program
(views)? What were his main achievement and his main failure?
If the political regime of that period can be categorized, what
innovations did it introduce compared to the previous regime?
What was the main reason for the toppling of his regime
(“Rose Revolution”)?
4. Please provide a brief assessment of Mikheil Saakashvili’s presi-
dency: How would you formulate his political program (views)?
What are his main success(es) and failure(s)? If the current po-
litical regime can be categorized, what innovations has it intro-
duced compared to the previous regime?
5. The opposition is objectively unable to compete with the authori-
ties. What is the main reason for this (repressions by the authori-
ties, the government’s obvious successes, lack of charismatic op-
position leaders, objective systemic problems, something else)?
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6. If the opposition gains strength in the future, what will be the
likely values/slogans/messages that will account for this (supremacy
of law and human rights, protection of social rights, preservation
of ethnic identity, tackling of corruption, etc.)?
7. What will form the structural framework for the stronger opposi-
tion of the future – the opposition parties of today or completely
new groups? If you deem the latter option more probable, where
will those new groups come from (from the ruling party after a
rift, from some social stratum which has hitherto not been a major
player in the political arena, from somewhere else)?
8. How stable is Georgia’s current political system? What is the
outlook for the development of the political system in Georgia in
your opinion (establishment of a Mexican- or Japanese-style sys-
tem with a single dominant party, gradual development of liberal-
democratic pluralism, Latin American-style perpetual revolutionary
cycles)?
9. How important is the influence of foreign political factors on
Georgia’s political evolution? Please specify how exactly this influ-
ence has manifested/manifests itself. How has this influence been
changing over the past 15 years and what types of influence do
you expect in the near future (next 3-5 years)?
10. Assuming that Georgia has the government which is most accept-
able for you, what should be the priorities of its political program
and what are the most important steps it should take?
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1.
So many major changes had to be implemented in Georgia after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union that expecting any great achieve-
ments in a short time would have been extremely unrealistic. A
completely different political and economic system was (and is) to be
established, which takes quite a lot of time, especially in a society
with an underdeveloped political culture. The first thing to be noted
with regret looking back at the last 15 years is that Georgia suc-
cumbed to provocation and failed to unite around the idea of building
its statehood. The political leaders of that period proved unable to put
national interests above their own personal ambitions. They failed to
rebuild the state institutions (old institutions were demolished, and they
did not create new ones) at least to the extent that would prevent the
country from falling into the hands of criminal “brotherhoods” – first
armed gangs and later corrupt clans. One might say that we had to
learn from the many mistakes which could have been avoided. (The
example of the civil war would suffice.)
Progress and development were out of the question amid the
blazing conflicts and civic strife in the country. Besides lost territories
and thousands of victims, the conflicts set the country back several
years – years which society should have been using to formulate the
idea of the country’s development (in other words, an idea of what
we want to build in this country and what the Georgia which we are
building should be like), instead of wasting them on endless debates
and bickering on trifling issues.
Discussion on significant achievements is possible only if we consider
the experience of the last few years. I will return to this issue later.
At the moment, let me just note that the most significant achievement
of the recent period was the risky venture undertaken by Georgian
society – changing the government – although not through elections,
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but also without violence, bloodshed and further destabilization. For a
country like Georgia, effecting peaceful change on this scale is a major
achievement, one which inspires hope that the populace is no longer
as politically inert and fatalistic as before (i.e. it better realizes its role
in the process of state governance and will not tolerate indefinitely
open derision from the government); in addition, the people drew
appropriate conclusions from the experience of the last 15 years and
realize where violence may lead, so it is now possible to talk about
the development of the political culture of society and a shift from
the emotional, affective social behavior to rational actions.
In addition, society is emerging from the cloistered and constrained
situation in which it found itself in the 1990s. Myths that were created
about everything Georgian are being gradually dispelled. Direct con-
tacts with Western culture (growing numbers of Georgians traveling to
the West to work or study, the arrival of foreigners in Georgia)
brought about more objective assessments of our own abilities and the
debunking of some existing superstitions. The new highly competitive
environment (which is very different from that of the Soviet times,
when little attention was paid to quality and it was always easy to find
someone who appreciated Georgian culture, originality and wine) has
conditioned the growth of the concepts of competitiveness and pro-
fessionalism. It is understandable that this has caused a social shock
of sorts. Hence the fear that foreign influence might wipe out some-
thing valuable and important, but this is also a great incentive for
revival and the creation of something new. Society must accept this
challenge; it should prove that it deserves to exist. The developments
of recent years inspire hope that, despite all difficulties, Georgia will
succeed. However, we should not harbor an illusion that everything
can be achieved any time soon.
2.
The worst characteristic of the Gamsakhurdia period was the
unprecedented disunity of Georgian society. Not only the government,
but all political actors (nearly everyone was involved in politics back
then) had a marked inability to reach an agreement or compromise.
This stemmed from the hitherto unseen personal ambitions of the
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political leaders on the one hand and a lack of political experience on
the other, which (together with their ambitions) prevented the leaders
from seeing that endless and merciless confrontation of that kind
would end with lamentable results and harm the common cause in
which many of them believed, perhaps sincerely. As for inexperience,
it has to be said that none of the leaders of the period had any
experience of governance (let alone state governance), and many of
them apparently thought this quite an easy job (according to the
popular opinion of the period, the main thing was to win indepen-
dence, and then we would somehow tend to ourselves). But switching
from slogans to doing the job proved not so easy. Fighting against the
Soviet regime is one thing and building an independent democratic
state is quite another.
These confrontations resulted in the tense and aggressive environ-
ment in which everyone argued with everyone else about something
and saw enemies everywhere. Democracy was one of the fundamental
slogans of the times, but in reality, no-one respected different opinions
and some even stooped to repressing them. Naturally, a society which
proved unable to find a civilized form of dialogue between political
actors acquired a bad image in the international arena. This too
kindled the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia, and in general, made
the prospects of ever building a state quite bleak.
It is interesting to note the assessments people who were actively
involved in the politics of the period (calling them all politicians would
be wrong) have made of the situation. Some are certain to this day
that negotiating was impossible, whereas others admit that they made
many mistakes due to their inexperience and youthful radicalism. Any
admission of mistakes should be welcome. It is only regrettable that
the entire country had to pay for the mistakes of people who acted
emotionally.
3.
The initial period of Shevardnadze’s presidency was spent achiev-
ing the country’s stabilization, which again took time and effort. In the
field of foreign policy, a pro-Western course was chosen and some
achievements were made too, which culminated in Georgia’s accession
11
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to the Council of Europe. At the same time, talk started about the
prospects which Georgia could only dream of (membership in the EU,
although it was described as a long-term prospect, was a strong
incentive for the country). However, the domestic situation was un-
enviable to say the least.
Unfortunately, the second period of Shevardnadze’s presidency
was not cloudless either: The regime was very secretive and all
decisions were made somewhere in the corridors (in the best traditions
of communism) and the key principle of decision making was clan
interests. The ceaseless clandestine and hushed-up distribution of power
and outright neglect for the public interest reached such a pitch that
even the extremely patient Georgian society, with its rich experience
of putting up with almost everything, found it unbearable to live in
a country like that. The state desisted from (or never started) per-
forming its most basic functions: maintaining order, providing educa-
tion, supplying electricity. Moreover, the government was not inter-
ested in how many citizens it had. The population of Georgia was said
to be “four and a half million”, and the number of those who left
Georgia – to “approximately one million”. It is clear how fair and
democratic the elections would be in a country where the exact
number of voters was unknown.
Furthermore, the state confronted the citizens and often acted
against them: policemen abducted citizens, energy sector bosses got
rich by selling the electricity which was meant to light people’s homes.
The country started to look more like several clans’ family businesses
than an independent state. And people’s attitudes were changing ac-
cordingly. International organizations and Western countries, which
were helping Georgia get rid of Russia’s influence, had similar senti-
ments. (Everyone realized that a weak and permanently subsidized
Georgia would never make it.)
The establishment of clan rule can be considered the main failure
of the Shevardnadze period. Clans were getting richer and stronger by
appropriating the national budget and grant money. The boundless
spread of conformism and hypocrisy were of no less negative signifi-
cance. Such an extent of turning a blind eye to corruption and
lawlessness gave rise to the legitimate question as to whether this
12
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society would be able to adapt to democratic principles, or rather, to
establish those principles.
The final period of Shevardnadze’s presidency also featured a
concentration of power in the hands of some of the ministers who
were not under the president’s control any more. The basic political
principle of Shevardnadze was his survival as a political figure at all
costs. Although his “balancing policy” yielded him many successes
personally, it ultimately caused all-round stagnation in the country.
However, it has to be noted that the main achievement or flip-
side of the Shevardnadze regime was that the government did not
hush up the media (despite the attempts by some heads of power-
wielding agencies) and did not or could not check the development of
the nongovernmental sector, which played an important role in laying
the groundwork for the “Rose Revolution”.
4.
Saakashvili actively set about carrying out reforms as soon as he
came to power and achieved significant success. In domestic policy,
the vigorous military reform resulted in the creation of a strong
Georgian Army. Georgia does not intend to go to war with anyone
(i.e. Russia) and attaches greater importance to diplomatic talks in
regulation of the conflicts as well, but every nation should have a
sizeable army if only to use it in emergencies (not necessarily hos-
tilities; military units are sometimes used to deal with the conse-
quences of natural disasters or to support the police if the crime
situation gets out of hand).
That the Georgian state has managed to start performing one of
the main functions of state – maintaining law and order – merits
special notice and appreciation. Following the reform of law enforce-
ment departments, the new authorities carried out effective measures
against the criminal world, which had grown extremely strong and
influential under Shevardnadze. The steps that the government took in
its fight against crime, especially organized crime, should be wel-
comed. (Together with the education reform, the law enforcement
reform instilled in the public a hope for the future, in particular, the
hope that a generation will come in a few years’ time which will be
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knowledgeable and have sound goals in life.) The abolition of the
traffic police and introduction of the Patrol Police might irritate some
people because the government tends to remind us of the change too
often, but it truly has made the lives or ordinary people easier.
Reforms were carried out in the education system, where corrup-
tion became rampant in the late 1990's and heavily eroded and
encroached on society’s ethical values. For years the impunity of the
management of higher education institutions was an important factor
contributing to the spread of nihilism in society.
The developments in Achara were an important success. There
have been some positive changes regarding the frozen conflicts, which
are manifested in more proactive approach to taking these issues to
the international arena. Prospects for joining NATO are now real and
intense talks are under way. Although relations with Russia have
become quite strained, this is largely caused by Russia’s irritation with
and reaction to Georgia’s successes and pro-Western orientation.
Despite significant achievements, there remain issues which the
government has not been able or willing to resolve yet, and in some
cases it has even carried out undesirable changes. Let me highlight
several such issues:
I. Constitutional changes broadened presidential powers; at a time
when the degree of independence of the judiciary is small and the
majority in parliament is composed of the members of the
president’s party, this heavily upsets the balance required for the
separation of powers.
II. The issue of elections remains problematic. What is striking here is
not only the unverified voters’ lists (during the latest elections, there
were much fewer irregularities and rigging on Election Day itself,
which inspires hope that this is how it will remain in the future),
but also the electoral code currently in effect, under which the
authorities wield substantial influence over the process of staffing the
electoral commissions. The procedures of staffing commissions at all
levels lack transparency, which raises serious doubts about the
electoral administration among the public. Legal amendments which
envisaged switching from the party-based principle of staffing the
14
Archil Abashidze
electoral commissions to the professional principle are already in
force, but this and a number of issues still remain on the agenda.
The flaws in the electoral code were not very manifest during the
latest elections due to the popularity of the presidential party on the
one hand and the weak degree of trust in the opposition parties in
society on the other. But more aggravations of the situation are
likely in the future due to flaws in the code.
Overall, the amendments to the code can be said to have ended the
party-based procedure for staffing the electoral commissions only for-
mally, whereas in reality, they did not eliminate the reasons for doubts
about the electoral commission. The formal switching from the party-
based to professional electoral commissions cannot yield the desired
results if the procedure of selection of candidates on a competitive
(contest) basis is biased and most importantly, lacks transparency.
According to the law currently in force, all three tiers of the electoral
administration consist of bodies whose members are appointed from
above: the chairperson and all six members of the Central Electoral
Commission are nominated by the president and appointed by parlia-
ment; district commissions, which have five members, are elected by
the Central Electoral Commission by a majority of the total number of
members; three members of the precinct commissions are appointed by
the district commission, and the remaining two members are appointed
by the parties which came first, second and third in the previous
elections. This procedure raises doubts that the commissions cannot be
free of the influence of the higher-level commissions, not to mention
the fact that this system gives the ruling party a major advantage in the
elections and effectively enables it to staff the commissions with the
candidates of its choice.
That an electoral official should have a certificate is a positive new
development of sorts in the amended electoral code. It is now required
by law that to become a member of the electoral commission, a
candidate should have a certificate, although certification too cannot be
considered particularly effective for a number of reasons. Holding a
certificate does not guarantee membership in the electoral commission
(many candidates might successfully pass certification, but the number
of vacancies in the commissions is limited). It is the Central Electoral
15
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Commission which chooses commission members from among the
certified candidates. It remains unknown to the public by which cri-
teria the Central Electoral Commission makes these decisions. What is
known, though, is that the Central Electoral Commission has not only
failed thus far to establish the criteria which guide it during selection
of the members of district commissions, but has not even recognized
the number of points the certified electoral officials scored as at least
one of the criteria for selection, which effectively makes certification
meaningless.
The public also does not have answers to a great many other
important questions: By what criteria were the Central Electoral Com-
mission members selected and by what criteria did the Central Elec-
toral Commission itself select the members of the district commis-
sions? How does the commission manage to consider several hundred
applications in a very short period of time and what specifically are
the principles and criteria guiding the commission? This is unknown
to the public, and doubts arise that loyalty continues to play an
important role in the selection of the candidates. It is known that there
were no interviews with the candidates, i.e. the documents filed must
have made it possible to reach a final decision and decisions which
lack transparency give rise to rumors. Accordingly, the impartiality of
lower-level commissions which were staffed by these commissions is
also called into question.
III. Local self-governance is still very weak and underdeveloped. The
issue of the country’s administrative-territorial system is a major
hindrance to the decentralization process. Due to the frozen con-
flicts or insufficient political will to resolve this issue, progress in
the decentralization process is slow and labored. A lot of hard
work is to be done in this direction (first and foremost, with
respect to the creation of an appropriate legal framework) and,
most importantly, postponing the issue any further is undesirable
and risky. Of course, no-one should entertain the illusion that the
devolution of power from the central to the regional level and
agreement on the revenues of the regional and local budgets will
be quick and easy, but the process of gradual devolution of some
of the central powers to the regions has to begin right away.
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Overall, however, it is noticeable that the authorities feel greater
responsibility to the public. Frequent public appearances by ruling
party members, which the opposition often labels as a PR campaign,
are also a sign that the authorities are often ready for a dialogue with
society. The shift from politics in the corridors to more open public
politics in the country is perhaps a credit to Saakashvili’s political style
and is dramatically different from Shevardnadze’s style.
5.
It is obvious that the opposition parties’ influence in Georgian
politics today is very weak. The opposition finds it hard to win the
hearts (and votes) of the voters because, on the one hand, it is difficult
for the opposition to operate in the post-revolution environment, espe-
cially when the president is successful, strong, and proactive. On the
other hand, the opposition itself is disunited; the opposition groups do
not seem to be able to join forces (create electoral blocs) even against
the common opponent. And third, the parliamentary opposition’s actions
are often amateurish and off-target. (Statements by the leaders of some
parties that the authorities are in their death throes, the debate in
parliament on the color of the newly painted facades and the tastes of
Tbilisi government officials, personal insults and fisticuffs in parliament,
the fruitless boycotting of parliament sessions are all good examples of
this.) The opposition does not discuss alternatives to the policy the
government is implementing, tries to disparage the achievements which
in fact should make every citizen of this country feel elated and
sometimes does itself more harm than it does the authorities (e.g. the
notorious wrestlers’ case, when some of the opposition leaders used
their parliamentary immunity to protect people who violated the law).1
6-7.
Opposition members would probably do best to go out of their
way to establish ties among one another. Even more importantly, the
opposition should be consistent. But if leaders of all oppositions parties
(and even lesser leaders) do not restrain their ambitions for all the
other opposition groups to rally precisely around them (“I am the
smartest/have most money”), then the Georgian opposition will con-
17
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tinue to endure failures, and achieving any major success will be out
of the question. The opposition might achieve some success in the
future elections only if they manage to move gainful issues (e.g.
uninvestigated murders) to the fore and if the authorities make grave
mistakes. The opposition will not achieve much with its current ar-
rangement of forces, nor is it likely that it will manage to rearrange
in the near future. That the opposition’s ranks will be reinforced by
defectors from the pro-government camp is also doubtful. (No matter
how harsh the confrontation between individual government members
might be, it is extremely doubtful that some political heavyweight will
leave the government and side with the present-day opposition.)
Yet another shortcoming of the opposition is the lack of new
faces. The public is quite familiar with all the opposition members.
Accordingly, people remember what positions they used to occupy
during Shevardnadze’s presidency and even before that. Others simply
do not have enough political weight to lay claims to anything major
at this stage, and most importantly, they have no “team”, a factor
which was also so conspicuous in the latest elections.
In the future, the opposition will try to use as slogans even those
weaknesses of the authorities which we discussed above (the weak
judiciary, the slow pace of local government reform, concentration of
power in the president’s hands, notorious murders). Whether the parties
manage to strengthen their positions in society with these slogans is
a different matter. The incumbent authorities are unlikely to sit and
watch as the opposition gains strength and not take advantage of the
opposition’s weaknesses.
The opposition’s refusal to hold a dialogue with the authorities is
downright unjustifiable. The opposition’s role is engaging in a heated,
but businesslike dialogue with the authorities, moving to the fore the
authorities’ mistakes and better alternatives, rather than talking about
the personal foibles of the ruling party members. The opposition
would do itself and the public good if it became more business-like.
8.
The present-day political system in Georgia features the institution
of strong president, which came into force after the adoption of
18
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constitutional amendments. The model in which the judiciary is very
weak, the vast majority of seats in parliament belongs to the members
of the president’s party and the opposition is disunited and disorga-
nized cannot be considered the best option. The argument that the
country needs to be governed with a strong hand during the transition
period is partly true, but the question arises of how long the transition
post-revolution period will continue and when the process of separa-
tion of powers will begin. This issue is particularly pressing because
Georgia has accumulated quite a bitter experience of replacing presi-
dents through strong-arm methods, and the tendency toward concen-
tration of power in the president’s hands raises concerns. In addition,
at this time all political unions (parties) in Georgia are created around
a single leader. Replacing the ruling party in the elections will be
difficult if only because these political parties do not propose any
clear-cut political programs and traditionally emphasize their leaders’
personal strengths. Accordingly, changing the government by holding
elections in which some strong political party will defeat the ruling
party is unlikely.
After the introduction of constitutional amendments which broad-
ened the presidential powers even further (e.g. the power to dismiss
parliament if the national budget or the composition of the government
is not approved within three months), the balance between the branches
of power can be described as anything but equal. The further weak-
ening of parliament is especially undesirable at a time when the
independent and unbiased judiciary is still in the process of getting
back on its feet and, as we can see, this process too is not proceeding
very smoothly. Talking about the stability of the system is perhaps a
little premature. Everything will depend on how events unfold during
the next few years: if the last three years’ course and pace of the
reforms are maintained and democratic institutions grow stronger, it
will be possible to discuss guarantees of stability. Saying this today
would unfortunately be no more than wishful thinking.
9.
Over the last decade, the influence of foreign factors over the
processes that unfolded in Georgia has been significant and intense.
19
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With the arrival of Shevardnadze, the West’s interest in Georgia
doubled. Regardless of what we might attribute this to – to the West’s
geopolitical interests (which the Georgians used to overestimate, even
when this interest was much smaller than it is now – according to the
widespread and naïve opinion of the 1990s, the West would simply
pamper us because of our advantageous geopolitical location) or to
sympathy for and desire to help a small county which is so devoted
to the idea of democracy, it is a fact that Western countries provided
substantial financial and technical assistance to Georgia during its
bleakest period. The important developments like strengthening the
media and civil society, which paved the way for democratic processes
in Georgia, were made possible precisely with Western countries’
assistance. (However, under Shevardnadze their assistance also helped
mold mafia-like clans and make them richer.) Georgia’s accession to
international organizations and the country’s prospects for the future
are also tokens of this support, not an outcome of the unprecedented
successes which we have achieved on our own.
A rapid growth of the importance of foreign factors is to be
expected during the next few years because after the Rose Revolution,
Georgia itself came up with the initiative to begin a more intensive
phase of dialogue with the West. Georgia’s ambition to join NATO
will inevitably result in even greater interest in the reforms which are
under way in Georgia. (We already receive recommendations and
advice as to which changes should take place in our political system
to make our accession possible.) Recommendations to fundamentally
reform the courts have already been voiced in Western countries, and
probably no-one doubts that there are many more to follow. Despite
the positive changes of the last three years, there is still a lot of work
to do (if only with respect to protection of religious minorities’ rights).
This is why the West is likely to become more demanding and strict
toward Georgia because Georgia too makes ambitious demands. Ac-
cession to NATO and joining the list of candidate countries for EU
membership is a tall order for a country which only recently embarked
on democratic reforms and has yet to prove that it is stable enough
and does not intend to sway from this course.
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10.
In the near future (a few years’ time), the following issues will
perhaps command most of our attention:
1. Regaining control of the lost territories. The government’s desire to
involve international organizations and Western countries in this pro-
cess and replace the Russian blue helmets should be commended.
2. Carrying out judiciary reform. The public should trust the courts.
If the mistrust which currently exists toward the court system is
unfair, the government must produce convincing proof of this.
3. Expanding the state assistance programs for socially vulnerable groups
because poverty still remains widespread. Despite the steps that
were already made in this direction, taking care of the army of the
poor and jobless which the incumbent authorities inherited from
their predecessors is no small task. It certainly is quite a burden for
the national budget, but this should be one of the priorities because
it is an important factor for the stability of the system.
4. Sustaining the achievements. First and foremost, this refers to law
and order, which is important if only to keep the recently-acquired
image of a stable country. Sustaining the achievements is of de-
cisive importance; we should sustain and build on what we already
have (here we can remember the same improved education sys-
tem, energy situation and improving crime figures). There were
examples in the past of deriving no benefits from good beginnings
(anti-corruption initiatives and reforms of the Shevardnadze era).
We should not let this happen again.
Notes:
1 Supporters of three quite distinguished athletes (wrestlers), arrested in June 2005 for
allegedly blackmailing a Greek businessman, insulted the judge and deteriorated the situ-
ation in the court room during a hearing, claiming that,. upon leaving the court, several
dozen wrestlers and other supporters went on to hold a rally on nearby Rustaveli Avenue,
effectively blocking Tbilisi’s main street. Regular police and riot police had to intervene.
Some opposition members who rushed to the scene condemned the actions of the gov-
ernment for the “excessive use of force by police”. Later, the leaders of the opposition
parties hurried to condemn the actions of the crowd in the courtroom and make good
statements made during this “criminal riot” by some opposition party members.
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This article does not claim to be scientific research. However, it
does lay claim to being no less ambitious because it is a compilation
of my personal views about Georgia’s development. Although the
article considers Georgia’s case alone, it has to be underscored that
Georgia’s case is not unique.
1. State and society in Georgia at a glance
The last 15 years in Georgia can be viewed as a struggle between
a “weak state” and a “strong society”.1  In addition, the meaning of
society, as mentioned here, is not so much “Gesellschaft” as tradition
and political culture. Despite the common fallacy that Georgia has a
3,000-year history of statehood, it is a fact that the Georgian people
have never had any experience of modern statehood. After the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, Georgia, just like all post-Soviet coun-
tries (with the possible exception of the Baltic states) found itself
faced with extremely complex challenges:
1. Transformation of political and economic systems (democratization
and liberalization) in the absence of the main determinant – the
state;
2. Development of statehood without the nationwide (universal, not
ethnical) consensus;
3. The unenviable international environment of negative Russian in-
fluence and effectively absent interest of the West (the United
States and Western Europe) in the first half of the 1990s.
In this situation, the following have become the main issues of
Georgia’s political development of the last 15 years (1991-2006):
1. Conflicts on national borders, i.e. the geographic area in which
political, economic and other processes are unfolding;
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2. Interrelations between the state (effectiveness of political power)
and democracy (separation of power);
3. Foreign orientation, mostly as a means of achieving political goals,
less as a tool of value system identity.
Upon closer consideration, the main political process revolves
precisely around these issues to this day. The effectiveness of gov-
ernances is measured against these benchmarks, and the main public
discourse is mostly dedicated to these issues. Accordingly, the struggle
between state and society also focused on three topics, which make
it possible to divide the period of independence into three phases:
1. I am a state – Gamsakhurdia2  and Shevardnadze (1992-2003)
before the adoption of the 1995 constitution;
2. The state is a façade – Shevardnadze’s presidency in 1995-2003;
3. Is the state strong? Down with state?! – after the “Rose Revo-
lution” in 2003.
The above phases are different in terms of the state’s and society’s
influence precisely on the progress regarding the abovementioned is-
sues: If in the beginning, society (tradition, culture) dictated terms to
the yet-nonexistent, or rather, embryonic state, in other words, societal
values molded political institutions, in the following phase, state (in-
stitutions) started to transform the value system (political culture),
which, especially in the third phase, shifted the balance of power in
the state’s favor. In other words, Georgia’s political history of the last
15 years is a road from the influence of political culture on the
institutions to the institutional generation of political culture.
A brief analysis of the three phases follows to support this argu-
ment. Because the process – especially the third phase – is not over
yet, discussion about the current situation will be more of a predictive
and speculative nature.
2. I am a state: Gamsakhurdia as a product of the people
By the time Gamsakhurdia came to power, the nature of rela-
tions between society and the state in Georgia was in large part
determined by the so-called “Soviet legacy”: the USSR was seen as
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“not our state”, repression was understood as the state’s function,
not one of its mechanisms, and individuals were to either “take
ownership” of the state out of considerations of personal prosperity
(become part of the nomenclature) or create their own microcosm
which would be independent of the state (become a “tradesman” or
a “crime boss”). In effect, both frames of reference created informal
networks which wielded levers of political and economic power. In
addition, in the end of the Soviet period (from the 1980's), informal
networks started to acquire increasingly clear-cut ethnic forms: po-
litical and economic ties were increasingly cloistered within ethnic
territorial entities or ethnic groups.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the state was sub-
stituted by society. Gamsakhurdia’s state was an instance of the
formalization of Georgian political subculture from the remains of
the dead Soviet state3 : Georgians’ views about governance, power
and its legitimization showed signs of a traditional political culture
– the strong leader who epitomized a paternalistic ruler who “cov-
ers up for the family’s immorality”4 . The principles of separation
of powers and individual freedoms were completely alien to Geor-
gian political culture. Accordingly, Gamsakhurdia was a product of
the people in a sense that he embodied the “father who cares
about the Georgian family”.
It is in situations like these that the role of a person who is in
a position to influence the social reality becomes particularly important.
Gamsakhurdia as a person was not an “enlightening leader”. He did
not succeed in becoming a leader like Vaclav Havel or even Lech
Walesa. In terms of his values, Gamsakhurdia was just an ordinary
person among his people, who failed to use the power concentrated
in his hands to achieve social development.
It is almost impossible to talk about “achievements” of the
Gamsakhurdia government: the logical outcome of his government put
in serious jeopardy the prospects of building the nation state, in
particular, ethnic conflicts, the so-called “Christmas coup” and inter-
national isolation. Besides the inertia of the Soviet legacy in the form
of the local Soviet military, the main reason for the “Christmas coup”
lay in the demands of the public. The putsch was a manifestation of
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the new subculture-level confrontation within society, this time not
ethnic-, but social status-based: the “elite” society in Tbilisi, whom
Gamsakhurdia confronted with “populism targeting the masses”, de-
manded that it should “control the state”, in other words, that the
head of the family must change.
3. State a la Shevardnadze: The hybrid era
The return of Shevardnadze gradually brought back the Soviet
style of governance. For the first few years, he was a captive of
the “Gamsakhurdia legacy”, although, unlike his predecessor,
Shevardnadze was more successful in gaining an upper hand over
society and imposing on it the governance system with which he
was familiar. From the mid-1990s, important changes occurred in
the international environment: The West became more active in the
region in the areas of security, energy and promotion of democratic
institutions. To Shevardnadze, political stability meant the consoli-
dation of his power, which rested on two main pillars: the revived
Soviet-style informal networks (naturally, persons changed, but the
type of governance was the same) and international (especially
Western) support. Even the anatomy of the ruling party, the Citi-
zens’ Union, reflected the merger of the two. It was also evident
in the fundamental principle of arrangement of the political system:
the influence of so-called reformers was greater in the legislative
sphere, whereas the executive levers were concentrated in the
hands of the more conservative wing. This was a direct indication
that Shevardnadze, an expert in the Soviet politics of the previous
10 years, upheld the principle of primacy of informal practice over
formal practice. To him, the practice of a (rule-of-law) state was
but a façade, behind which the Soviet government apparatus con-
tinued to operate as before.5
It has to be said in addition that this simulation did leave its mark.
In 2001, when the security service began an audit of the private and
very popular Rustavi-2 TV station under the pretext of financial
irregularities, hundreds of people demonstrated against. It transpired
that the simulation had a real effect: the façade institutions managed
to change the political culture, especially with respect to the direct
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participation of the people in political processes. The reformers’ wing,
which the system needed mostly as a façade, turned into a real force.
Thanks to international assistance in the form of grants, that group
became a force to be reckoned with economically as well.
Yet another reason for the weakening of the Shevardnadze regime
was its extreme inefficiency: As is often the case with similar regimes,
the regime’s legitimacy depended on its social (in a narrow sense of
the word) success. In this sense, Shevardnadze was successful only
until the late 1990s. The regime’s inherent firmness lasts only as long
as the leading actors are certain of the leader’s success. Precisely until
that time the regime is capable of remaining attractive to new mem-
bers. But from 2000, Shevardnadze became a center of gravity for
only intellectually excessively weak and marginalized forces.
The dynamic of the Rose Revolution derived largely from these
factors: the reformers’ wing, which had turned into a real force,
masses which were “angered” with the regime’s lack of success, and
the key figures who started to doubt the need for the regime – all
served to create a situation in which even token international support
would make political change inevitable.
4. Is state strong? Down with state?!
The struggle between state and society was renewed in 2003. For
the first time in Georgian history, state institutions perform real, not
façade, functions. The difference between the new government and its
predecessors is that, while Gamsakhurdia could not perceive the need
for state institutions at all and Shevardnadze viewed them only as
performers of the façade functions, the new government believes in
their effectiveness. The fast pace of institutional development, which
is manifested in frequent structural changes and reshuffles of person-
nel, is a prime example of this. In contrast to the preceding govern-
ment, the incumbent authorities are “not afraid any more” of strong
state institutions.
The incumbent authorities are precisely the political force which
(owing to their educational background or other kinds of frequent
contacts with the Western world) is the farthest way from the main
characteristics of the traditional political culture of Georgian society.
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First and foremost, this implies viewing the legitimacy of political
power not so much in ideological terms, as from the standpoint of its
effectiveness and participation. The new government knows well not
only the theoretical, but also the practical importance of the people as
a source of political power. By comparison, public opinion made no
difference for the Shevardnadze government, and nothing was being
done to mold or change it. In contrast to that, the new government
deems it important to keep an eye to public opinion and is trying to
shape it to promote its political goals.
The strengthening of the state under the new government brought
to light a few important problems in the field of relations between
state and society. It emerged that civil society was in effect quite
weak and its “mythical” strength could exist only in the weak
Shevardnadze state. The same is true about the mass media. The
ruling political regime today is more successful at attracting qualified
young professionals, which, given the general scarcity of qualified
human resources, puts those who counter the state in a very difficult
situation.
This is the cause of the “democracy crisis” which, at first sight,
is noticeable in Georgia. And the fastest way of dealing with the crisis
is, theoretically, weakening the state again. However, this would cer-
tainly not strengthen democracy. The current situation in Georgia once
again proves that the effectiveness of the state is a necessary prereq-
uisite for democracy.
5-6-7 Façade political institution. “Demise” of parties
If something still performs only façade functions in present-day
Georgia, it is political parties. The virtual disappearance of the oppo-
sition is one of the difficult challenges for the political system, espe-
cially at the initial stage of its establishment. In addition, it has to be
noted that this is not a fatal flaw of the country’s democratic devel-
opment. On the contrary, some studies show that in many Eastern
European countries, transformation was the fastest and most success-
ful precisely where reformers had absolute power at the initial stage.6
The reason for the weakness of the opposition in Georgia is that
the institution of the political party has not gone beyond the façade
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stage of development. The objective cause of this can be found in
society, as there exists almost no demand for political parties as
conduits of political participation. Political parties are either unions
created around a leader by groups of friends, or come into existence
with help of the Western training courses and assistance, or both. In
other words, their lack of success stems from their structural defects.
It has to be added that neither did the political parties manage to
demonstrate their importance to the public. Certain of the effectiveness
of state institutions, the new government managed to change the attitude
of the political culture toward these institutions by developing public
trust toward them. It would be excessively idealistic to demand strength-
ening of the parties, especially opposition parties, from the government
(although funding the parties from the national budget should be con-
sidered, at least in part, as a step in this direction) because it is natural
for any government to resist strengthening the opposition, especially if
the government is driven by the ambition to carry out fundamental
changes. Accordingly, the reasons for the weakness of the political
parties should be sought in their leaders’ mistakes: these mostly include
a wrong choice of political issues and tactics and a lack of pragmatism
in achieving their goals. It is inappropriate to urge the authorities for a
compromise and be uncompromising yourself at a time when the au-
thorities’ electoral advantage is undisputed.
A stable development of the political system, and especially further
liberalization of the economic system, will automatically strengthen the
opposition. However, it is hard to imagine that classical ideological
parties will emerge in Georgia. To a certain extent, the reason for this
is that the era of classical parties effectively ended before any natural
developments in this respect could possibly take place in Georgia.
It is hard to say what issues the future opposition will seek to
move to the fore. This will probably be contingent on what domestic
and foreign challenges the political and economic system will face. It
is possible, for example, that with greater convergence between Geor-
gia and the EU, the issues of national identity and expediency of
economic integration might move to the fore. Presumably, by that time
the Georgian political and economic system will have a greater degree
of stability as well.
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It is probably already possible today to predict that the composition
of the future opposition will change completely. Today’s opposition
political spectrum has failed to rise to the fast social and institutional
changes. Accordingly, neither uniting nor new regrouping are likely to
prevent the “demise” of the present-day opposition. From among the
present-day opposition, only the part of the new generation which
accumulated some knowledge of the usefulness of the institutions and
whose connections are not limited to informal ties alone stand a chance
to remain in the political arena. In addition, this group should unam-
biguously denounce their current leaders and their political tactics.
The main supplier of personnel for the future opposition will be
the ruling party of today and the new generation of politicians which
will emerge as a result of the ongoing or future changes in the
economy and education sector. In addition, such groups will be cre-
ated from the members of the ruling party not as a result of restruc-
turing of the “old” parties or groups, but through the splitting up of
the National Movement into factions. Tentatively, these developments
are expected to take place by the 2012 parliamentary elections, when
the new parliament will have been formed a year before the presiden-
tial election.7  As for the new political forces, great importance is
attached to education reform, which makes education and participation
in the political process more accessible to various social strata. The
liberalization of the economy and diversification of capital are also
important, as they rule out the possibility of controlling the economy
from a single political center; in other words, they promote political
diversification too.
8. Political system
No young political system can be stable in a classical sense, so
in Georgia’s case, I will use the minimalist definition of stability,
according to which a system is stable if it remains within the confines
of the civic framework, i.e. averts military or armed confrontation.
Perturbations and fundamental institutional changes are therefore pos-
sible in such a system.
If we take a general view of the Georgian political system as a
formalized representation of governance, it will be obvious that, com-
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pared with the 1990s, significant progress has been made towards
stability. In particular, the strengthening of state institutions at the
expense of fragile traditional institutions is obvious. Second, if we look
at the political system only as political institutions and processes in the
aggregate, we will again see the elements of stabilization, as compared
to 2003. The search for institutional modus, which was evident during
the structural changes and personnel reshuffles, is effectively drawing
to an end. The significant personnel changes in 2006 (e.g. resignation
of Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili) were an indication of stability
of the institutions, not their crisis, because they took place without any
substantial political perturbations.
If the environment is favorable, the political system will develop
towards liberalization. Education reform and the course toward eco-
nomic liberalization are part of the prerequisites of this. Only if this
holds true will the prognoses about the political parties made in the
preceding chapter also come true. This is why the establishment of
the Japanese, Mexican or Latin American models is hard to imagine
in Georgia. Presumably, the development of Georgia from now on will
follow the Eastern European pattern, especially if Georgia’s integration
with NATO and the EU continues.
9. Foreign factors
There have been numerous references to foreign factors in this
article. This is no accident. The influence of the international environ-
ment and external actors on Georgia’s development has been quite
important and at some stages even crucial.
Among the underlying causes of Gamsakhurdia’s defeat was the
presence of only Russian negative influence at that time, both in terms
of the ethnic conflicts in particular and in terms of political culture in
general.
The pretend changes of the Shevardnadze era, which were fol-
lowed by quite real transformations, were in large part the result of
the West’s interest and policy. Although these factors did not com-
pletely cancel out Russia’s negative role, they did balance it.
At the present stage of development, the key importance in the
success of institutional development and the consolidation of the political
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system is linked to the foreign factor. Accession to NATO is decisive
precisely for the establishment of a stable environment for Georgia’s
political and economic development. The defense umbrella will not
only rule out Russia’s negative influence as a possibility, but will also
make political and economic liberalization irreversible. After joining
NATO, the authorities will not be able to “taboo” different issues by
labeling them as security-related.
10. Instead of conclusion: “Keep on building?”
“Keep on building!” – this campaign slogan of the ruling party
should become a guiding motto first and foremost for the authorities
themselves. Today they are successful at strengthening state institu-
tions. At the same time, they always have to keep in mind the factor
of political culture. To some extent, this is where the government’s
quite frequent leftist populism derives from. It is important for the
authorities to maintain a reasonable balance between tactical conces-
sions to society and strategic goals. Otherwise, this type of populism
might, on the contrary, strengthen the traditional political culture.
The main challenge facing the government is strengthening those
political institutions which do not serve the purpose of consolidating
its power in the short run, namely, the local government and the
judiciary. In addition, strengthening these institutions will enhance the
stability of the political system and, as a consequence, will both help
the incumbent government be successful and create the possibility for
its members to remain in the political arena after a legitimate change
of government. It has to be noted that in both cases (especially with
local governance), the authorities again fear the prevalent political
culture, although here too greater trust is required in the socializing
influence of the institutions because the political culture can only be
changed through action.
It has already been mentioned that the authorities are not obliged
to think about the institutional strengthening of the opposition. The
liberalization of the political system and the openness of the economic
and education systems will naturally facilitate the establishment of the
institution of political opposition. In addition, the authorities should not
attempt to marginalize the existing opposition because this again might
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affect the political culture. One of the main components of the par-
ticipatory culture, pragmatism, which makes it possible to discuss
conflicts in a civilized manner and exchange information among dif-
ferent groups, is still underdeveloped in Georgian political culture.
Effectively, both the authorities and the opposition are suffering from
so-called groupthink syndrome.
Another of the principal tasks before the authorities is to not
get “locked in” and retain their ability to renew themselves. To
succeed at that, it would be desirable if the authorities better
clarified their main political values (e.g. their views of the role of
state, individual rights, territorial and court systems) and start re-
cruiting new people using precisely this value system, not solely
personal loyalty or the often difficult to comprehend criterion of
“professionalism”. This would be important first and foremost in
developing government bureaucracy, although it would prove useful
in party personnel policy as well.
Involving the conflict zones in this discourse will be extremely
difficult because Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been developing in
a different way over the last 15 years. The authorities’ attempts to
introduce a new dynamism to the conflicts are evident, first of all in
South Ossetia. Building an inclusive nation and changing the political
culture accordingly will remain one of the main priorities for the
government.
The authorities’ activities have thus far been aimed at liberalizing
the political system and making it more stable. At the same time, it
would be desirable if the authorities did not forget about the power-
reforms dilemma which is so familiar to transitional countries. Any
reform (reform could just as well be called modernization for our
purposes here) requires political power, and staying in power is often
achieved at the cost of the principles of the reforms. The young
government should understand that, however successful and long their
terms in office might turn out to be, the time will come to change
the government, and precisely a stable political system will guarantee
that this change will not require the complete disappearance of the
incumbent government from the political arena.
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Notes:
1 John Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and
State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton University Press, 1988].
2 Georgia’s first post-communist president was overthrown in the “Christmas
Coup” in January 1992.
3 What is implied here is that Gamsakhurdia did not even try to make any
substantial changes to the state machinery.
4 Compare with “amoral familism” – Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of
Backward Society (The University of Chicago, 1958); see the Georgian translation of
the term in Aleksandre Rondeli, Small Country in International Relations (Tbilisi,
2003), p. 254.
5 Gigi Tevzadze, Georgia: Simulations of Power (Tbilisi, 1999)
6 Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship,” World
Politics, Vol. 54 (January 2002): 212-244.
7 This speculation proves once again that prognoses should be avoided in political
science. The constitutional changes initiated in late 2006, as well as further possible
amendments, might give a different direction to the developments, not to mention
other, less predictable and more surprising variables.
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1.
Georgia still has a long way to go on its path toward a united,
strong and, most importantly, liberal democratic state. The latter has
no alternative for Georgia because a) liberal democracy is the most
suitable form of freedom of the individual, and in my opinion, mem-
bers of Georgian society are a freedom-loving people; and b) Georgian
statehood is greatly indebted to and dependent precisely on the sup-
port of liberal democratic countries.
At this stage, the foundation has been laid for achieving the above
objective: A noticeable portion of the population is taking a sincere interest
in issues of statehood and deems living in the sociopolitical system of
statehood as a serious and desirable endeavor. This has been particularly
apparent since 2003. The 2003 revolution would not have taken place or
would have been conducted with different slogans and had a different
nature if the sense of citizenship and statehood had not developed in a
insignificant part of Georgian society from the very outset.
The revival of Georgian statehood takes its origin first and fore-
most in the ethnic nationalism of the late 1980s. This spirit and
ideology was smoldering inside the Soviet nomenclature system latently
or, to be more precise, without organizing guidance of the state, for
decades, and took the shape of a struggle for statehood in the last
two decades of the 20th century. Despite manifestations of its naivety,
precociousness and often inhumanity by initially romantic, or ethnic
(these are not mutually exclusive), nationalism, it later paved the way
for rising civic nationalism.
Today civic nationalism dominates the official discourse. It strength-
ens and cements with patriotism the quest to establish universal im-
peratives of democratic and human rights. Without civic nationalism,
corruption and organized crime would be more widespread. Without
society’s nationalist self-identification, aspirations to prosperity would
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not entail the realization of the need to formulate independent policy
and accordingly – especially due to Georgia’s complex geopolitics -
would again encourage undemocratic tendencies. Only Russia wants a
Georgia without statehood, and now, as in the past, the processes
which are under way there are not even remotely democratic.
And yet, the Georgian project – to become an accomplished state
– is only half-way through at best. One thing that the Georgian public
and its political elite have failed to achieve is dramatically changing the
political culture and making it even somewhat similar to its Euro-
Atlantic counterparts. However, this is a boon in a certain sense: our
political culture and the values and rules of coexistence certainly have
their advantages. But in general, this widens the gap between us and
our main guarantors of security, both the EU and the United States.
The point is essentially this:
The Western people, especially the politicians and officials in the
focus of our attention, attach great importance to the established rules
of action, the planning of one’s steps, political correctness both in
choice of vocabulary and in action. In its entirety, this is a political
culture immersed in – and perhaps even tired of – centuries of
experience. It tends to be cautious about surprises. It was no accident
that the US military administration installed in Afghanistan in 2003
preferred to deal with more predictable “warlords” and “strongmen”
(leaders of armed groups) than with religious or tribal leaders with
which it was much less familiar – even if it was assumed or at least
not contested that the former might have been much more suspicious
from an ethical standpoint.
Second, the West is a stranger to viewing the world in black and
white. There is relativity in everything. The open society doctrine,
according to which no single theory or group can claim to hold a
monopoly on the truth, is Western. Human rights also derive from
here. One of the reasons for the weakening of the Bush administration’s
positions of late has been the fact that it has been oblivious to all of
this. And I will not even mention the acute sense of the supremacy
of law and conflict of interests in the West.
Unfortunately, these generally sound principles, whose benefits are
so evident in the successes of the Western political and economic
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systems, sometimes manifest themselves in a degenerately inflexible,
bureaucratic form because of human foibles and humankind’s limited
capabilities. As a result, people who implement humanitarian aid or
development and democratization projects in countries like Georgia
and who are not always the most successful and progressive repre-
sentatives of the Western bureaucracy are often unwilling to make
efforts to understand the local social and political nuances and prefer
excessively rigid adherence to instructions. They are trying to fit the
local reality into the principles of democracy, supremacy of law and
human rights as perceived through the prism of their personal inter-
pretation of the instructions. This might not be the best method for
building a viable liberal democratic system; thinking otherwise would
constitute a “black-and-white mindset” and thus, a deviation from the
Western principles of relativity and open society. At any rate, it is
clear that the pace of establishment of the supremacy of law and
democracy should stand the test of applicability to the imperatives of
national and regional security.
But let us go back to the positive aspects of our political culture.
The understanding of Western institutions and political culture is gradu-
ally improving in Georgia today, but the country has not yet rid itself
of naivety, infantilism and impatience. These are manifest in the
popularity of operating with the notions of “good” and “bad”, “right”
and “wrong”, which willy-nilly is further encouraged by the inflexibility
of some representatives of international agencies.
The view that “good” is what the person who experiences it thinks
to be good or right still prevails in Georgia. As a result, recurrences
of the ethos of the Russian saying: “[if] I am the boss, you are a
fool, [and if] you are the boss, I am a fool” sometimes occur in
politics. I will not deliberate much about Russia here, but Georgia’s
problem (and perhaps its chance too) is that “the boss” is a notional
concept here and, as such, is not directly contingent on the actual
position of power, and many people, regardless of their status, deem
themselves the epitome of truth and wisdom.
As a result, the lack of mutual support, the lack of desire or
ability to reach a compromise, the tactics of show of force, intimi-
dation and blackmail still prevail in political circles, and these are in
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no way characteristics of people in power alone. In addition, the
government has more information, a better vantage point to see the
general picture, and they even might be thinking more about the need
for a dialogue with at least some of their opponents. But ultimately,
the dialogue is taking place very slowly and painfully, if at all. Mistrust
prevails.
And the outcome of all this is that the especially tired and cautious
part of the Western world, as well as those who tend to view
international developments only as interpreted into the language of
generalized instructions and manuals, are looking for – and finding–
excuses to justify their suspicions and lack of desire to develop closer
relations.
Together with other reasons, be they derived from geopolitics or
flaws in the democratization process, this socio-psychological one is,
in my opinion, key to finding the explanation for our ignorance of
whether we will knock on NATO’s door by 2008 or if Russia closes
the doors that remain open to us by that time.
The only way out is this: social anthropologists, historians and
representatives of other branches of social sciences know that values,
symbols and words are determined historically and culturally. The
same events, facts, verbally expressed notions and principles acquire
different meanings in different historical periods and cultures. Accord-
ingly, there is a need to “conquer” the depths of social culture and
social psychology to lay a solid foundation for both Georgian-Euro-
pean and internal Georgian dialogue and mutual understanding.
2.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia1  was certainly not uneducated or completely
deprived of political intuition and logic. Otherwise, although he would
still be able to become popular (mass psychoses are a possibility in
preindustrial – and not only preindustrial – cultures), he would not
have been able to create the Round Table electoral bloc and would
not have been able or willing to run in and win the elections while
the Soviet Union still existed. A number of recollections, notes and
reports show that the next political generation’s much-coveted idea of
the Eurasian energy and communications corridor was not at all alien
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to him. He managed to consolidate the Georgian ethno-nationalist
energy and focus it in a direction which was both detrimental to the
Soviet nomenclature and favorable for building independent statehood.
Unfortunately, his disregard for the interests and perceptions of ethnic
minorities, lack of desire or ability to start a political or social dia-
logue, and the influences of the Soviet central power – which remain
a factor to this day – led the Gamsakhurdia regime to suffer a fiasco.
The Gamsakhurdia regime was too short-lived to take any sort of
clear-cut shape. A joke gained currency later on: Q: What is the
difference between Gamsakhurdia’s and Shevardnadze’s presidencies?
A: We let the latter take his time, but not the former. But judging
by emerging trends, his regime was taking the shape of a populist,
infantile, and accordingly, extremely unstable political system.
Gamsakhurdia proved unable to create and control loyal and ef-
ficient security and law enforcement bodies. At the same time, against
the backdrop of rising ethno-socialist populism, he alienated not only
late-Soviet bureaucracy – which had by that time started to evince the
signs of bourgeoisie – and the criminal underworld, but also academic
and student circles, which traditionally advocated individual freedoms.
In this situation, offending sensibilities of a number of political parties,
which mainly consisted more of clienteles rallying around several
leaders than of substantial segments of a clearly defined constituency,
was a relatively minor problem.
The fact that Gamsakhurdia’s immediate entourage was mostly
incompetent and/or self-interested also played an important negative role.
In short, Gamsakhurdia managed to dangerously diminish his social
support base in a matter of a few months. He mainly relied only on
the “court camarilla” and the ambivalent, less-knowledgeable lower-
class masses. Against him were his political opposition: liberal intellec-
tual circles, diverse groups engaged in commercial activities, the young
“street elite”, criminal world, and the organized part of ethnic minority
communities. These groups had nothing in common, nor were they
connected with the Kremlin. But the toppling of the Gamsakhurdia
regime by Russian-backed armed people was more of a result of
Gamsakhurdia’s erroneous domestic policy than of the conspirators’
professionalism.
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Neither should it be forgotten that Gamsakhurdia’s drama unfolded
in an environment unfavorable for Georgia’s political development:
neither the EU nor the United States were inclined to facilitate the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Their active support for independence
of the Baltic States was an exception of sorts.
3.
The second Shevardnadze era – his “second coming” to Georgia2
– which spanned from 1992 until 2003, was divided into several
distinctive phases. Initially, until approximately mid-1995, he was busy
with the problem of consolidation of power. In this period, Shevardnadze
combined cooperation with “warlords” with democratic impulses of
giving numerous political parties equal chances. Accordingly, he main-
tained the status of a more or less acceptable figure for the diverse
political forces which toppled Gamsakhurdia. But each of these groups
had their interests and views, and balancing them out could not
continue endlessly. As it became clear in time, Shevardnadze too had
his interests and vision.
At that time, Shevardnadze was seen as an indispensable option
because the majority of citizens were not particularly fond of either
Gamsakhurdia’s supporters, who were fighting the civil war, or Tengiz
Kitovani’s and Jaba Ioseliani’s armed units,3 who were on the other
side of the barricades; neither side inspired hopes of stability, democ-
racy and solution of the country’s problems. As for getting one’s
bearings among the myriad of political parties, it was objectively
difficult. There were several more or less reputable political groups,
but their professional and electoral prospects were never promising.
Shevardnadze had his foreign political charm too. His arrival
coincided with Georgia’s recognition as an entity under international
law, which was an outcome of the formal dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Shevardnadze was known in international circles as the liberal
foreign minister of the perestroika era. This afforded both material
dividends in the form of foreign political assistance and social and
psychological comfort and reassurance that he would sooner or later
return to normalcy a country which was embroiled in ethnic and civil
conflicts.
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And in 1995, that time seemed to have come – although at the
cost of handing control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia
and accession to the CIS, which was considered a step back toward
Russia, but Shevardnadze did manage to end the civil war and check
the rampage of the unruly armed groups.
The new constitution put the president, i.e. Shevardnadze, beyond
the reach of efficient parliamentary control, but at the same time the
president could not dismiss parliament or fully control and consolidate
the political spectrum. The adoption of a number of laws and giving
the police its functions ushered in a hitherto unprecedented good
business environment, which was important.
But from approximately 1999, the country entered a different
period, which was also not free of paradoxes. That year, Georgia
withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty and joined the
Council of Europe, a move which was preceded by a number of law
enforcement reforms. The ex-Russian army generals at the Defense
Ministry were replaced by pro-Western figures. A little before that, a
dream came true: Georgia was declared a corridor for transporting
Azerbaijani oil to the West.
But at the same time started the perturbations of the new consti-
tutional system and the atrophy of the vital functions of the young
Georgian state. Parliament’s transformation into an informal trading floor
for private or state-owned company stocks became increasingly notice-
able. Simultaneously, the increasingly strong police assumed the function
of racketeering or “protecting” businesses, which before was done by
illegal armed groups. The courts and the Bar were gradually becoming
submersed in the bog of corruption. Most importantly, organized crime
also got involved in the process of establishing clan-based governance,
which is usual for fragile and corrupt political systems. Gradually, it
became hard to understand whether it was high-level police officials and
influential politicians who sometimes resorted to criminal kingpins’ ser-
vices or vice versa. At the dawn of the new millennium, about two
thirds to three quarters of the businesses operated in the “gray” sector.
The country got close to the “mafia-dominated state” model, which is
known to political scientists and in which citizens go to criminals, not
the state, for protection and guarantees.
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As for the paradox, the following considerations can be cited as
its tentative explanation:
a) Society had only the desire to attain real statehood, but lacked the
relevant experience to do so. In that situation, everything would
easily revert to the swamp of chaos and corruption unless the
ruling elite itself would take political responsibility and demonstrate
a strong will to build appropriate institutions not only on paper;
b) Shevardnadze proved to lack strategic vision and the ability to
carry out long-term plans. If democratic stability were to have
evolved in Georgia on its own, he would not have minded. But
these things do not happen on their own. After he consolidated his
power, Shevardnadze apparently lost interest in further work and
struggle. His family members became an inseparable part of the
newly established clan.
There remained yet another significant unresolved problem which
prevented Shevardnadze from forming his idea of the inherent qualities
of the main consumer and creator of the Georgian state – the Geor-
gian nation. Against the backdrop of unresolved Abkhazia and South
Ossetia conflicts, Shevardnadze vacillated both between the civic and
ethnic concepts of the nation and between the pro-Russian and pro-
Western foreign political orientations. The more displeasure grew in
the West with Georgia’s unaccomplished statehood, the more
Shevardnadze, who turned out to have exhausted his ability to reverse
the negative dynamic, instinctively leaned toward Russia.
However, as the years passed, civic consciousness and the ability
to realize the existence of problems grew in society. The pluralism of
political life and the media facilitated the process, as did the growing
number of civil organizations – one more, this time around positive
– characteristic of the Shevardnadze regime. As a result, these factors,
or forces, which Shevardnadze himself fostered, toppled the ageing
president as he betrayed their ideals.
4.
According to the official and already accepted – including interna-
tionally – definition of the November 2003 events,4  it was a peaceful,
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democratic, so-called color revolution – a term denoting the process
of transformation of some of the communist/authoritarian regimes. Of
course, there are opponents of these definitions too, mostly among the
votaries of conspiracy theories and/or supporters of previous regimes.
Essentially, assessments may vary because social developments mainly
take place or are reflected in the mind and consciousness. Even
abstracting from personal political sympathies as much as possible, I
would still call those events a revolution.
According to the definition from the theory of revolutions, these
sorts of events are characterized by mass frustration with the existing
social and economic situation; the revolution is associated with imbal-
ance among components of the social system, namely, political, cultural
and other subsystems, resources and demands; a revolution means
overthrowing a political regime by a mass movement in an extra-
constitutional way; revolution implies not only mass mobilization and
change of regime, but also fundamental social, economic and cultural
changes; revolution is also associated with a fast transformation of
government and class structures of society, which take place amid the
conflict between the elite and the lower classes. Modern studies focus
increasingly on ideological and cultural components of revolution as well.
Revolutions can be relatively peaceful or bloody. Revolts and
coups are different in that they do not transform institutions and are
less concerned about finding a legal or ideological vindication for the
change of government.
Of course, none of the actual historical events unfolds in full
accordance with the ideal abstract presumptions of any theory. The
Georgian Rose Revolution was unique among both revolutions in
general and so-called color revolutions. But it was a revolution be-
cause the Shevardnadze regime had incurred ultimate mass displeasure;
his opponents proved strong and capable enough to mobilize tens of
thousands of people for days; the change of government could not be
contained within the constitutional limits; transformation of both insti-
tutions and the social structure of society started and continues; both
the constitutional balance between state institutions and the composi-
tion of the political elite has changed. The fact that there are repre-
sentatives of the old regime among the political and economic elite is
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not in conflict with the change. If nothing else, the roles of these
particular individuals are quite different now. And finally, changes in
the official rhetoric, symbols and education system clearly point to
cultural and ideological transformation.
It has to be said that, besides the political opposition, several civil
organizations also played an important role in the revolution. The
process was guided by not merely organizational, but ideological lead-
ership which had its vision and knew what fundamental changes were
to be launched in the country and how.
The new Georgian political regime, which is justly associated first
and foremost with the figure of President Saakashvili, is both revo-
lutionary and transitional. The principle of supremacy of law is not
rejected: there is strong consensus among the ruling elite on building
a liberal democracy and integrating into the Euro-Atlantic area, and
supremacy of law is a prerequisite for this. But in practice, transfor-
mation is tinged with revolutionary colors and is affected by the
problematic impact of the imperatives of state security and the combat
against counterrevolution and organized crime. This is manifested in
the disproportionately growing political weight of individual institutions
and persons and in extra-legal actions.
The contention by the opponents of the revolutionary regime that
all this is taking place solely on account of the elite’s love for money
and power is moot. In many cases, Georgian law turned out to be
powerless to redress damages to the budget that were caused by
corrupt or criminal dealings by dismantling the illegal networks or
“triangles” behind these dealings. As a result, the executive had to
shoulder the burden of combating lawlessness instead of the judiciary.
Of course, this is risky, as is the insignificant representation of the
opposition to Saakashvili in parliament and local governments – as the
old maxim goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely. The rule of just people has never been enough to uphold
justice – appropriate institutions are required. But the kind of balance
among the institutions and political forces which results in impossibility
to reach a decision or revenge by criminal or xenophobic forces is no
less dangerous; precisely these types of forces were influential in the
final period of Shevardnadze’s presidential tenure.
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This circle of problems – finding a balance between authoritarianism
and supremacy of law, between liberalism and democracy – is the
main dilemma facing the Saakashvili government. The situation is
further aggravated by the complicated foreign political background to
this dilemma. The Russian authorities are making no secret of their
desire to topple “the Saakashvili regime”. It is also clear that the
Kremlin’s desire could not be stirred up by selfless loyalty to democ-
racy; and if it does attain what it wants, the project of building a
stable liberal democratic state in Georgia, which is currently being
implemented, albeit with difficulties, will be postponed indefinitely.
The successes of the Saakashvili government are the following: He
revived the public’s belief in its ability to build a state and that there
is an opportunity to do so. Crime and corruption no longer reign with
impunity, and it is hard to overestimate not only the structural, but
also the cultural significance of this. Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-
Ossetian relations have gained a promising, if risky, dynamics. The
government managed to enter the Intensive Dialogue phase of talks
with NATO and to secure new multi-million dollar assistance pro-
grams. Of course, the process is neither completed nor irreversible –
I discussed the reasons above. Hopefully, the ruling elite fully realizes
the threats of the aforementioned dilemma and the next two years will
be spent on consolidating the rule of law.
What should be noted with particular emphasis are the new develop-
ments in the education, cultural and ideological spheres. For the first time
since restoration of national sovereignty, the state education system and
newly founded Public Broadcaster are beginning to introduce the principles
of open society. The new national curriculum, the Public Broadcaster’s
code of ethics, revamped faculties at the two leading universities and new
programming on the Public Broadcaster channel attest to this.
5.
The self-evident weakness of the opposition is in part an outcome
of the revolution itself. By supporting the revolution and its leader, a
large part of the population denounced those who denounced the
revolution. But this is not, and cannot be, the only reason. What’s
more, the revolution happened four years ago. The new opposition is
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incipient within the revolutionaries themselves. The number of disen-
chanted ordinary citizens is growing too, because no revolution or
simple change of government can meet everyone’s expectations.
Presumably, the opposition’s approval ratings should gradually rise
in this situation. However, unless the authorities themselves make
dramatic mistakes, the current balance in the political arena is unlikely
to be upset for the following reasons:
a) Saakashvili has established himself as a charismatic leader. Despite
his sometimes emotional tone and aversion to criticism, he remains
the most popular politician. He has proven that he has a talent for
reversing/changing rush actions or statements and finding a way
out of critical situations with minimal losses. Until recently, he
managed to find a balance between populism, nationalism, and a
rhetoric befitting the builder of a rule-of-law state in a manner
which maintained for him support from social circles with different
interests and views. It is unlikely that he will lose these skills in
the foreseeable future.
b) It seems that Georgian society wants a strong and popular leader
during the transition stage. The social demands of a large number
of people are law and order and economic growth. Despite prob-
lems in both areas, society takes note of positive changes com-
pared to the “dark ages” of the Shevardnadze period.
c) The existing constitutional model and electoral system encourage
the establishment of the “winner takes all” principle. In conjunc-
tion with the popularity of the ruling party leader, the Georgian
electoral system and broadness of presidential powers decrease the
opposition’s chances.
d) The opposition finds it hard to formulate a clear-cut electoral platform
which would cater adequately to the social and economic demands
of a large part of the population. Some opposition parties have
managed to make some progress in this regard, but they are not
strong enough individually, whereas a platform for joining their forces
does not exist. In addition, the opposition chose the path of extremely
radical criticism of the government. They seem to emulate Saakashvili
in this respect, who was irreconcilable in his confrontation with
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Shevardnadze. However, this tactic can be justified only against an
extremely unsuccessful and unpopular government. Most of the op-
position spectrum is made up of old familiar faces, and it is unlikely
that these people will manage to become more popular than they
already are. The newcomers who appear from time to time among
the opposition’s ranks are unable to compete on par with not only
the authorities, but even with the long-standing opposition.
The opposition usually cites intimidation of its supporters (espe-
cially from among business circles), an electoral system that serves the
purpose of strengthening the already strong, and the rigging of elec-
tions as the explanations for its lack of success. The latter argument
is least convincing, as it is not endorsed in any international or local
election monitoring report since the revolution. Of course, there have
been, and still are, irregularities during the elections, but they certainly
have not played a decisive role in the opposition’s weakness.
The second reason, however, is worth taking into account. Neither
the seven percent barrier in the parliamentary elections, nor the mixed
system of elections to the Tbilisi city council cultivate pluralism in the
elected bodies. But neither can it be said that these systems are
downright undemocratic. As mentioned above, these sorts of rules
demand more efforts and unity from the opposition.
As for the intimidation of the pro-opposition business circles by
the authorities, the accusation certainly merits an independent inquiry.
If it is established that there have been instances of intimidation/
blackmail, which would require civic courage and cooperation with the
court from the aggrieved businessmen, the authorities will not be able
to shun responsibility for this. But the problem here might lie not only
in legal, but also systemic social, political and psychological aspects:
most Georgian businesses come from the gray sector past. Accord-
ingly, they are institutionally interested in being close and loyal to the
authorities in order to avoid losing the influence they attained in a
less-than-legal manner. In this situation, any government would be
greatly tempted to take unfair advantage of businesses’ political weak-
ness. This is a major problem for the country’s liberal democratic
development, but it is doubtful that uprooting it will not take years,
even if there is the necessary political will to do so.
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A similar problem exists in relations between the law enforcement
and judiciary systems. The latter was until recently staffed with corrupt
and incompetent people. There were exceptions, but their existence only
proved the pattern. The young elite who came to the executive branch
quickly purged the law enforcement system and started to fight orga-
nized crime. Several guilty judges were also exposed. This resulted in
confusion and fear in the court system, and the judiciary ended up
under the political authorities’ informal influence. The year 2006 saw
both debates on this problem and new systemic changes to make the
courts independent. These changes show that many people in the
government realize the risks that the weak judiciary poses to efforts to
build a liberal democratic Georgia. However, changing the situation
radically takes time, and 2007 is decisive in this respect.
6-7.
The opposition might gain strength if the authorities prove unable
to address the flaws in the process of the establishment of the
principle of rule of law and, at the same time, to enact efficient
market mechanisms of social security. The former worries the West,
local human rights organizations, and the part of the general public
which has civic consciousness; the latter concerns all socially vulner-
able strata, which constitute a very large number of people in Georgia.
The opposition should naturally keep focusing on these issues, al-
though currently it is in a disadvantageous position because the au-
thorities do demonstrate that they act on these problems and remain
popular, whereas the opposition chose the tactic of engaging in radical
confrontation and seeking to totally discredit the government. This
tactic of the opposition is in conflict with its own declared values
because precisely the government, however many flaws and mistakes
there might be in the process, is seen as a promoter of precisely these
values. It is the government which has to make dramatic mistakes,
desist from addressing social and legal problems and transform into a
self-centered, exclusive elite in order for the voice of the opposition
to reach hundreds of thousands of people.
There is a theoretical chance of emergence of the opposition of
a different type – the “red-brown”, i.e. national-socialist one. There
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is some potential support base for this in society, especially if such
groups enlist financial and political support from abroad or from the
local criminal underworld. The 2006 developments and arrest of Igor
Giorgadze’s supporters showed, however, that in practice, the possi-
bilities of forming and strengthening this type of the political opposition
are limited: the strength of the government and pragmatism of a large
part of the population are the most effective deterrents against the
emergence of national socialism.
Unless the political processes are accompanied by sudden perturba-
tions, only relatively fringe groups will exist in Georgia besides the ruling
force. However, another serious political force may emerge from part
of the present-day opposition and one of the groups within the ruling
party. But this is not very likely, at least until the next parliamentary
and presidential elections, because this would require Saakashvili’s assent
and support, or a major fall of his approval ratings.
8-10.
The current Georgian political system is not stable if we decree
the supremacy of law and other principles of liberal democracy as
prerequisites for stability. For now, the country heavily depends on
several leaders of liberal democratic views, including Saakashvili
himself. They have their social support base – of which the dy-
namic young generation merits special mention as their views com-
bine patriotism and openness to the inevitable realities of globaliza-
tion. The leaders have the support of middle-age and older genera-
tions too, although these groups tend to be more amorphous in
their views and values. However, among youth and other age
groups there are both people who want a faster pace of democratic
transformation and nationalist and xenophobic circles. The activity
of these is contained by the strength of the government and their
own philistine inertness. But for the liberal democratic processes to
become irreversible, there is a need for firm institutional support:
stable and strong liberal parties as an organizing force, which
should rally people with civic consciousness, courts, professional
civil service, networks of community organizations, and strong and
independent media.
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Of course, significant progress has been made in these directions.
The police, universities, the Georgian Public Broadcaster and public
schools are all different today. But these and other institutions have
not stood the test yet in terms of how well they would be able to
continue to develop and serve the purpose of the modernization of
society in case of a change of government.
As noted above, the short-term prospects for a stable multi-party
system are dim. If the government manages to find an effective continu-
ation for its course toward the country’s modernization, Georgia will be
governed by a single dominant party. At best, its top tier will remain
united and emphatically reform-oriented, but locally, at the middle and
lower tiers, careerism and favoritism will begin to flourish. This is dan-
gerous, and it is why the Georgian political project is paradoxical: reforms
are difficult without a dominant political force, but the existence of a
dominant political force is systemically conducive to the creation of a
social stratum which is against the reforms. The way out of this paradox
is the existence and proper functioning of strong and independent social
institutions like universities, media and non-governmental organizations. As
for the political elite, who on no account want to artificially weaken their
own positions (and perhaps they should not), they should spare no effort
to reform the judiciary and make it independent in order to firmly
establish the principle of supremacy of law. If this proves successful, if
the dominant rule of Saakashvili and his team does not transform into
multi-party pluralism, but brings about a strong and authoritative judiciary,
a powerful network of civil organizations and private business organiza-
tions, a higher education system which is integrated into the leading
Western academic circles and a secondary education system which cul-
tivates critical and independent thinking – then the country will have a
chance to remain a member of the community of civilized nations when
the Saakashvili government is eventually replaced.
The desirable prospect of this kind is threatened from inside the
country by the eternal instinct of “zest for power”, which is especially
noticeable at the lower and middle levels of government – at least
while the high-level officials sincerely (if with excessive self-confi-
dence) remain reform-oriented. But a no less dangerous threat which
is to be reckoned with comes from outside: there is plenty of evidence
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that the failure of the Georgian project is one of the main goals of
Russian foreign policy. It is unlikely that anything will change in the
next three years. This makes the tasks facing the Georgian political
system very difficult; on the one hand, this necessitates further con-
solidation of power and the growth of its influence, and on the other
hand, this makes Georgia an object of criticism of its allies given the
weakness of its democratic institutions.
Will the Saakashvili government be able to prove to its own citizens
and the international community that the strong president, strong law
enforcement system and the “winner-takes-all” electoral system are all
needed precisely for the country’s modernization and democratization at
the current difficult transitional stage? Yet another paradox is that the
president alone does not – and cannot – supply an answer to this
question: for the successful completion of the country’s modernization
phase, support is needed from the seemingly fringe opposition, moni-
toring and advocacy nongovernmental organizations and the media too.
In order to accomplish the project of modernization of the country and
stay the course toward liberal democracy, more efforts should be made
to ensure mutual understanding and to reach an agreement on the “rules
of the game” between the strong government and much weaker demo-
cratic circles outside the positions of power. The weakness of the latter
is neither immense nor particularly desirable.
Notes:
1 A nationalistically colored dissident in Soviet times, after first multiparty elec-
tions, Gamsakhurdia became chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet (in 1990) and
the president of Georgia (in 1991). Under his leadership, the Georgian government
organized an independence referendum and declared secession from the Soviet Union.
Following an armed coup in December 1991, Gamsakhurdia was ousted. His support-
ers continued to put up armed resistance to the successive Shevardnadze’ regime until
Gamsakhurdia’s death in 1993.
2 From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s he was the first secretary of the
Georgian Communist Party.
3 Warlords of the late 1980s-early 1990s. The latter was also famous for having
an extensive criminal past and a moderately successful career as a novelist.
4 After parliamentary elections of November 2, mass protests took place, led by
opposition leaders and civic activists, condemning the alleged falsification of the elec-
tion results. Eventually, the protests grew into the so-called “Rose Revolution”.
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1. Problems and achievements after independence
The major problem and difficulties that we have encountered in
Georgia since gaining independence have had to do with the establish-
ment of the statehood mentality among the Georgian people.
Georgia was not a political agent when it was one of the republics
of the Soviet Union with a puppet government at the top. Conse-
quently the Soviet period Georgians had almost no statehood mental-
ity. All that brought the population together around the term
“Sakartvelo” was culture, literature, history with its past heroic nar-
rative and among all of these was sports too. (Everyone remembers
how sincerely patriotic the support of “Dynamo” Tbilisi, the major
soccer team, was.) True, there was also a dissident movement; how-
ever it was not overwhelmingly popular among people before
Gorbachev’s perestroika. Any effort to extend the cultural patriotism
to the political dimension was extremely risky. One of the attempts
resulted in shooting at a demonstration in 1956.1 The student dem-
onstration of 1978 for the defense of the Georgian language’s official
status as state language was successful, though extremely risky.
The events described above were more of an exception rather
than a rule. After gaining independence, the movement which was led
by politically inexperienced romantics (being a dissident and coura-
geous does not automatically make a person a politician), Georgia,
without any clear political views or rigid political course, turned out
to be unprepared in the world political arena. It was clear that
achieving independence (which was a natural outcome of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the tragedy of April 92  was not something
necessary for reaching this goal) was not an aim in itself and there
were more complicated challenges to face. It has become clear that
the population of Georgia remained politically immature and inert even
after achieving the much desired independence. The example for the
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above-mentioned is that after being disappointed in the previous can-
didates the new leader was elected by the vast majority of votes. (90
percent voted for Gamsakhurdia; the same number voted for
Shevardnadze too, although he had a radically different political course,
and the same happened in the case of Saakashvili.) This indicates that
it is easy to gain the trust of Georgian people, who choose to make
decisions based on emotions rather than on sober reflection. (For
example, we can remember the emphasis put on Z. Gamsakhurdia’s
handsome appearance by his supporters.) It is a usual habit among the
Georgian populace to entrust their fate to a charismatic individual
rather than examine the political program presented by this individual
and his party. (On the global scale, however Georgia appreciates
European and Western values. The evidence for that is the ousting of
Z. Gamsakhurdia, who went against the general tide.)
I think it is an achievement that the political perception of Geor-
gians, which did not exist at all, was eventually born. As any infant,
it is very weak as yet. The criterion for successes and shortcomings,
in my opinion, depends on how fast the statehood mentality grows.
Having one’s own flag in the UN is of big symbolic as well as real
importance. This does not mean, however, that our statehood is
established. Georgia should realize, as in the famous fable, that it is
yet like a frog fallen in sour cream that must fiercely struggle in order
to feel under its feet the rigidity of the butter that is accomplished
statehood.
Police reform is to be taken as success in the process of building
a state. Although the fact is that the crime rate has not decreased but
rather increased. Still, it is not only crime statistics that matter, but
the police’s reputation as well. It is a victory already when the streets
are cleansed from the corrupted, easily-bribed policemen. Presently,
the new police recruits have quite a good salary and they have no
incentive to take bribes, and this ugly habit has been quickly disap-
pearing among the population as well.
It is impossible to create a state without respect for law. Before
becoming independent, laws in Georgia were perceived as something
alien and hostile and violating them was a cool, “macho” thing to do.
The private and state sectors were quite far from each other (one of
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the results was the amount of litter thrown in public places). This
attitude has not changed much, though there are some promising
improvements. And bringing under control the taxation system and
requiring businesses to install cash registers were painful but necessary
changes. Without extracting mandatory taxes from the population on
a regular basis, the previous vicious circle will still remain: the state
budget does not receive income from taxes, so, the state cannot pay
salaries, and if there are no salaries why (and how) should I pay
taxes, etc.
With respect to politics, Georgia has not yet reached the satisfac-
tory security level. The territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are
lost and there will always be threat of insecurity from the northern
neighbor unless we join NATO. The membership procedure seems
pretty difficult and problematic, though. It is sort of an insurmountable
predicament: the situation within Georgia is not secure, the territories
are lost, and the inner conflicts still remain to be resolved. These are
the reasons why NATO is not eager to admit Georgia as a member
country. Without becoming a member, however, it is almost impossible
to resolve the conflicts mentioned above.
The unequivocal orientation towards the West that began during
the period of Shevardnadze is still to be evaluated as an accomplish-
ment. The clear political course, though risky, is better than being
politically unresolved and spineless. Georgia cannot remain on the
sidelines of the struggle of the great political powers. Georgia has to
take risky moves in this universal political “poker”. Therefore, it was
a good decision for Georgia to join the anti-terror alliance and sent
its military contingent to Iraq. These prove that in the international
arena we are a small, less vital, but still active player that is able to
bear responsibility.
The education reform and joining the Bologna process are, in my
opinion, necessary measures to take. Notwithstanding the fact that it
proved to be too severe for some professors and had some shortcom-
ings when described in detail, strategically it was the correct thing to
do. It is not a success yet but a step taken towards it. There is one
vitally important thing: students should be motivated by the belief that
after graduating from university and receiving education very similar
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to western standards, they will be able to start working and earn their
livelihood independently. Otherwise the reform cannot overcome the
apathy that existed throughout years in Tbilisi’s universities.
With respect to employment in Georgia, the situation is quite
dismal: thousands and thousands of Georgian citizens live abroad
hunting either for legal or even illegal jobs to sustain their families
back home. The prospects for finding a solution to this major problem
in the near future are rather gloomy.
2. The three presidents
Zviad Gamsakhurdia
The gaining of independence and starting of the process of for-
mation of Georgia as a responsible political agent is the only achieve-
ment made at the time when Gamsakhurdia held the office of presi-
dent. At least formally, democratic institutions were established and a
democratic constitution was drafted. By “formally”, I mean that the
democratic system did not really function and Georgia was ruled by
the “Round Table Independent Georgia” (which was ironically called
the “Rock Band ‘Dictatorship’”). The authoritarian rule persisted all
over: there was no freedom of media; free expression was stifled
everywhere, including in parliament; appointments to positions within
the institutions that are supposed to be self-regulating, like the televi-
sion or the cinema studio, were dictated from above.
The hallmark for the downfall of the regime and the reason for
the loss of popular support was its separation from the intelligentsia.
Since the government was still weak and the political repressions did
not have mass character – there were only few political prisoners, like
Jaba Ioseliani and Gia Chanturia – the situation could be described as
“comic dictatorship”. In fact, the abuses of the government roused
public indignation and derision rather than fear and terror. Because the
intelligentsia formed the informal ideological backbone of society, the
government, through its alienation from the intelligentsia, lost chances
for gaining ideological hegemony and public trust. The ideology advo-
cated by government authorities – Guram Petriashvili, Mzia Bakradze
– was not tolerated by society.
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What was this ideology? It was “neo-nationalism”. The prefix “neo”
signifies that before Gamsakhurdia such an ideology was held only by a
certain segment of Georgian society which never was a major voice.
Although, Georgia was theoretically oriented towards the West even
during Gamsakhurdia’s time, in practice a model very different form the
Western one was getting established. The idea was promoted that Georgia
is special (unique, exceptional), it bears a particular divinely set spiritual,
messianic mission for the rest of the world3 , the “Georgian spirit should
be clothed in a Georgian chokha (national costume)”, etc. According to
Gamsakhurdia’s ideology, Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907), the acclaimed
father of the modern Georgian nation, was highly cherished and re-
spected. However, the emphasis was made more on his nationalistic
aspirations rather than on the no less essential part of Ilia’s mentality –
liberalism and Europeanism. The Georgian nationality was proclaimed as
a more important, mystical phenomenon than Western civilization and its
liberalism and emphasis on the rights of an individual. Everyone remem-
bers how the philosopher Merab Mamardashvili4  was heckled at the
meeting of the National Forum when he stated: “Nationality is of a great
value, however the truth is still of a greater value”; this he stated to
oppose the national, or ethnocentric hysteria, which came to the fore after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gamsakhurdia’s government did all it
could to encourage this pseudo-mystical national hysteria. During
Gamsakhurdia’s regime the pro-European tide that represented the main-
stream of the Georgian aspirations receded. On the contrary, the Georgian
folklore was artificially being brought to fashion by purposefully extend-
ing the time allotted for it on television. For example, the famous TV
program “Iluzioni”, which showed masterpieces of Western cinematogra-
phy and introduced European civilization models to Georgian society, was
cancelled. The essentially anti-European national program that Gamsakhurdia
tried to institute was unacceptable for the vast majority of Georgian
society and the ideology of Gamsakhurdia’s administration lost ground
even before its removal from power.
One important point to be highlighted with respect of Gamsakhurdia’s
national program: this program was of an extremely ethnocentric
nature. “Georgia for the Georgians” was the slogan that clearly
reflects its essence. In another words, the real hosts in Georgia are
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only the ethnic Georgians. As a result of the unbearable ideological
climate, many ethnically non-Georgians left the country. Under this
particular state of affairs the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia
was terminated and transformed into “Samachablo”. This was fol-
lowed by an armed conflict, which in turn made Georgians and
Ossetians enemies in general when there was no ground for it (as
opposed to what happened in Abkhazia, where ethnic tensions had
been escalating since at least the 19th century). The flight of ethnic
Ossetians from towns of Bakuriani and Kareli was an outcome of
this armed conflict. In one of his interviews to a Russian newspaper
Gamsakhurdia called Ossetians “A wild, illiterate nation”.5  Such poli-
tics served to strengthen Abkhaz separatist sentiment. The separatists
had a good chance to become the main, and later even the only
voice in Abkhazia following the logic: “Why should we desire inte-
gration with a country where we are acknowledged as guests and
qualified as second-rate citizens?” At one meeting Gamsakhurdia
insisted that the words “Apsua” (the name Abkhaz call themselves)
and “Abkhaz” mean different things and that the real “Abkhaz” were
a subgroup of the Georgians while the “Apsua” were a North
Cacuasian tribe that migrated to Georgia later – which was a suf-
ficient reason for considering them as guests and not autochthons.
It is because of this ethnocentrism that Andrey Sakharov call Georgia
“a small empire”. This was a mistake, but only because the term
“empire” has since ancient Rome been based on supra-ethnic politi-
cal categories. The terms “ethnocentrism” and “empire” appear to be
a contradiction.
The main causes of the fall of the Gamsakhurdia regime, as I
have already outlined, are: (1) alienation of the government’s socio-
political program from the intelligentsia6  and from the greater part of
society; and (2) the neo-national ideology that the government offered
to its citizens.
Yet the immediate reason for the downfall of the regime was the
Yanaev coup in 1991 that aimed to restore the USSR. The alarmed
President Gamsakhurdia abolished the Georgian National Guards and
reduced them to a status of a police division. This was caused by his
great fear that in case the coup succeeded, and in case the Georgian
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military units bore the name of “National Guards”, the Soviet troops
would invade Georgia; however, reducing them to the status of “mi-
litia”, could avoid major military action from the north. The coup
failed. It played however a devastating role for the reputation of the
president among the Georgian military. “That is how easily he gave
up the independent Georgian army! While simultaneously on the TV-
live he calmed down the population saying that the Moscow coup was
not reason for any fear,” they said. One unit of the National Guards,
headed by Tengiz Kitovani, disobeyed a presidential order and with-
drew the soldiers subordinated to him to the Tbilisi Sea. Soon after,
he came to Rustaveli Avenue and besieged parliament. After a few
days of fighting, with numerous casualties from both sides, the gov-
ernment fell and Gamsakhurdia managed to escape from Georgia first
to Armenia and later to Chechnya.
How can we qualify this? For some, as for Shevardnadze – who
arrived in Georgia shortly afterwards – it was a “democratic revolu-
tion”, for others, supporters of Gamsakhurdia, a brutal coup with no
legal foundation at all. I cannot say that the truth lies exactly in
between those two extremes, however it shares the aspects of both:
it truly was a democratic revolution in the sense that it toppled the
antidemocratic authoritarian rule. Moreover, after the armed confron-
tation began, the largest part of the intelligentsia supported the Kitovani-
Sigua-Ioseliani triumvirate – in other words, military takeover; the
latter was also supported by most of the rest of society as well.
Everyone feared that tyranny and oppressions would become more
intense and ruthless if Gamsakhurdia were victorious, thus the “comic
dictatorship” would turn into a real one. However, it is another issue
whether if before the shooting started the public at large wanted to
get rid of Gamsakhurdia at the cost of the civil war. I think the
answer would have been “No”! Kitovani’s radical measure left no
alternative to the society but to take sides. This was a great tragedy
for Georgia and it could have been avoided. In my opinion, the
Gamsakhurdia regime and his ideology had to be gotten rid of, though
it could have happened through a longer, more tedious, but less violent
process, surely not through Georgians shooting at each other. The
ancient Greeks adage “Violence begets violence”, proved its validity in
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Georgia, and I think, one of the key reasons the war in Abkhazia was
lost was that the Georgians had their fellow Georgians, followers of
Gamsakhurdia, as a threat from the back.
Shevardnadze
Eduard Shevardnadze’s term in office played a key role in the
process of the establishment of Georgia as a state. His popularity and
reputation throughout the world and friendly relations with major
Russian, European and American political figures were an asset for
Georgia at that time. Even ardent opponents of Shevardnadze agreed
that he should be president. This greatly helped stabilize the situation
in the country.
Eduard Shevardnadze came to power during a very difficult, turbu-
lent period, when actual power was in the hands of Jaba Ioseliani7  and
Tengiz Kitovani (partially Tengiz Sigua as well). Jaba Ioseliani’s personal
initiative played a key role in bringing him to Georgia. Therefore,
Shevardnadze had to take him and the other heroes of the “democratic
revolution” into consideration whether he wanted to or not.
Shevardnadze came as a democratic ruler. This created a great
opportunity for uniting Georgia, since the accent was made on liberal
values and not on ethnocentric ones. Hence, the separatists in Abkhazia
and Ossetia were left without their main arguments – that Georgians
are narrow-minded, chauvinistic people who wished to portray them
as second-class citizens. Unfortunately, the invasion of Sokhumi under
the leadership of Kitovani and the initiation of war brought this
process to a close. I do not think that Kitovani was following Kremlin
orders and was given money for this. I believe that this has to do
with his personal irresponsibility and lack of sober state of mind;
however, whatever the reasons are, the outcome was the betrayal of
Georgian strategic interests8 . I do not share the assumption that Kitovani
acted in accord with Shevradnadze and did not pursue personal as-
pirations. Shevardnadze can be accused of many flaws but not of
extremism. I think it is impossible that he could have undertaken
anything like that, especially when he did not feel yet solid enough
as president.
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The great success on the initial stage of the Shevardnadze rule is
pacifying the country after the loss of the war in Abkhazia and reining
in military groups, especially the Mkhedrioni. There is a list of virtues
such as courage, wit and brains that Jaba Ioseliani apparently had,
though he was not a progressively thinking person, not a person fit
to be a statesman. This is evidenced by the fact that he did not join
the Mkhedrioni to the Georgian national army even after Gamsakhurdia’s
government was succeeded by that of Shevardnadze. The Mkhedrioni
became an armed gang bearing narrow clan interests. Jaba Ioseliani
could not fall even under the definition of “a repenting criminal”, for
even after becoming a professor he still clung to the old, criminal
doctrines and they seemed to be quite dear to his heart. It is true that
the Mkhedrioni did temporarily limit the power of criminal authorities
(“thieves in law”), however it itself was infected with the same
mentality. Shevardnadze contributed a lot to the process of building of
the Georgian state by terminating the Mkhedrioni and other criminal
factions.
I think progress was made on the international level when a direct
course towards the West was chosen without exacerbating the uneasy
relations with Russia. Another step forward was getting rid of the
romantic and impractical attitudes that existed in the Gamsakhurdia
period.
No matter what happened afterwards, the establishment of the
Citizens’ Union, which was founded on European values, was a
progressive endeavor as well.
The reason for the collapse of Shevardnadze’s government, how-
ever, was corruption and the extreme poverty in which the people
lived. Representatives of the Shevardnadze government were not only
helpless in eliminating corruption, but also played an important role in
it. The critical mistake that Shevardnadze made was when he sur-
rounded himself with submissive, easily manipulated people and not
with a professional and spirited entourage. Democratic values were
infringed upon as well: evidence for the latter was the rigging of the
elections to give the majority of the votes to the Citizens’ Union in
the Georgian parliament. Before the elections began, Shevardnadze
used the Aslan Abashidze9  factor too: as a president to a subject, he
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asked Aslan Abashidze to release Tengiz Asanidze, Abashidze’s political
rival – from prison knowing from the outset that Abashidze would
refuse to obey. With this he alarmed the Georgian populace against
Abashidze. Therefore the issue of rigging the elections, with the pre-
text that “let us tolerate the violation of the laws, lest Abashidze
prevails”, was indisputably a great drawback for democracy. During
Shevardnadze’s term as president democracy was applied to the free
speech and mass media, which, of course, is good, though nothing
basically changed: the newspapers and some TV channels criticized the
violations by state officials and shortcomings of the state policy openly,
though for a long time, no actual changes followed. It is worth
mentioning that the freedom of media, this high merit of democracy,
played one of the key roles in putting an end to the regime.
Shevardnadze failed to execute in Georgia what Putin had done in
Russia in terms of clamping down on the media. He gave it a shot
though – everyone can remember the security services’ raid on “Rustavi-
2” in 2001. The public, however, vigorously defended this democratic
value. The TV show “Dardubala”10  gravely affected the reputation of
the president (although this TV show was funny, I still did not like
it because of the reason that often it had a clearly destructive message
against the state and its system); it seems that the president’s admin-
istration was ineffective and useless since he was not able to win back
his name and authority. The background of the success of the “Rose
Revolution” was in following: a disastrous government that is not able
to undertake any constructive modifications is neither loved nor feared
any more. In my opinion, it was wise for Shevardnadze to resign and
“go home” and not to use weapons against the demonstration. Had
he chosen the latter, the enraged people might have later demanded
his execution (such threats were already audible). Fortunately, the
Ceausescu scenario did not reoccur – this sin still bothers the Roma-
nian people, thank God it did not happen to us.
Saakashvili
The political convictions of Saakashvili do not differ greatly from
those of Shevardnadze. The removal from power of Shevardnadze
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is in this respect entirely different from the situation with
Gamsakhurdia: the reason why people came into contradiction with
Gamsakhurdia was that they disagreed with him on the general-
ideological level. In Shevardnadze’s case, however, the public went
against him because he violated those democratic principles that he
himself claimed to be advocating, and the phony elections were clear
evidence of this.
The main reason for the “Rose Revolution” was not the social
dilemmas; the basis that gave rise to mutiny was the abuse of political
belief and democratic principles. The latter undoubtedly means ad-
vancement in people’s socio-political self-awareness, though I am still
not sure whether the faked elections would have caused revolution
had the government provided better social conditions for people and
not created such frustration and disillusionment.
The international line remained the same: we strive for integration
with the West and NATO. The difference, however, is that there is
more emphasis on antagonism towards Russia.
I have already discussed the achievements of Saakashvili’s govern-
ment: the police and education reform, making cash registers manda-
tory and regulating the tax system. Another very impressive success
was bringing Achara under the jurisdiction of the central administra-
tion. The energetic fight against corruption is also a very positive
development, but not as positive when it bypasses the legal proce-
dures. The government that claims to have chosen a course towards
a free market economy should not use the cheap method of attaining
popularity by “taking away from the rich and giving to the poor”.
Such Robin Hood-esque methods of “stripping off” the corrupted
would help in placating people’s passions up to some point, though in
the long run they are hardly efficient. First of all, the social conditions
of the people must be improved, the new government must provide
new opportunities for employment. As a result of the “stripping off”
policy, business representatives might get scared and avoid making
large investments, which is critical for the development of the country
(maybe this is why one of the world’s wealthiest Georgians, Bidzina
Ivanishvili, finances almost exclusively charity enterprises and shuns
making serious investments in Georgia).
61
10 questions on Georgia’s political development
In my opinion, the activities undertaken by Saakashvili against
criminal authorities (“thieves-in-law”) are vital; the previous govern-
ment was not so determined in eliminating this powerful anti-social
institution.
The legal reform is rather ambivalent: on the one hand, corrupt
judges are dismissed, which is good; on the other hand, the latter
are replaced by judges loyal to the government, which makes it
very unlikely that the judiciary will operate independently. There
were hasty changes made by the legislature – in particular, decreas-
ing the minimum age of judges from 35 to 28 – in order to ensure
that the new vacant positions could be filled by judges whom the
government finds suitable. Such changes introduced in the legisla-
tion for the sake of dealing with minor, temporary situations are
tokens of authoritarian rule.
The relatively minor achievements, like renovations of roads and
highways, painting the façades of houses, building fountains, are quite
conspicuous. The grand statue of Saint George on Freedom Square (I
am not considering the aesthetic value of the statue here) is acceptable
as a general symbol of victory of good over evil and as an artistic
means for spurring optimism of the people, regardless of what reli-
gious confession they belong to.
However, if the statue is meant to indicate that the Rose Revo-
lution has a heavenly guardian in the person of St. George – since
both the “Rose Revolution” and the Achara upheaval happened on the
days of the saint’s commemoration (November 23 and May 6) – then
it rather bears witness to the government’s lack of self-confidence and
feeling of insecurity than to the opposite.
3. The opposition
What are those values that the reinforced opposition should come
together around? (Or, to put it otherwise, what are those values to
gather around that will enable the opposition to become stronger?)
A powerful opposition is necessary for strengthening the demo-
cratic structure that as a result is vital for developing the country.
Therefore, the President Saakashvili was sincere in his expression of
disappointment at the opposition’s total failure to make an impact.
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Around which principles should the opposition unite in order to
become more powerful and influential among society at large? –
Around those ideas, of course, that are popular among the people and
admired by the ordinary citizens. I shall try to list them here:
• First of all, the idea of promoting the statehood mentality. To this
end, the opposition should prove that it is not a constant enemy of
the government, but rather a practical and beneficial body, in other
words, it is a constructive and not destructive opposition. It might
seem utopian, but the opposition should put the interests of Georgia
above its own aspirations for power and should support the leading
party in those enterprises that are objectively useful for our country.
For example, if I am a teacher and there is another teacher less
qualified applying for a vacancy appropriate for me, I should not
be happy that the latter gives poor lessons, because after he leaves
I am left with totally unprepared students. So, the opposition does
damage to itself when it tries to use any way possible for criticizing
the government. For example, the cases of Kvitsiani mutiny or the
wrestlers’ demonstration11 . At the time when the Sandro Girgvliani12
process was taking place, the private interests and political concerns
of the opposition were obviously gaining the upper hand. So the
criticism, resulted in less practical, more emotion-based actions and
not in denouncing the clear violations of legal rights, like introducing
a new law especially adapted for the case mentioned above, accord-
ing to which the defendants in the same case of the same trial could
be placed in the same cell.
• In order to be well-liked, the opposition should demonstrate that
it has high morals and virtues and seeks to serve the people. The
opposition should clearly demonstrate to people that it is con-
cerned with the fate of the country and is not overwhelmed by
clan interests, is not striving for power to become wealthy. This
is no less important than the liberal democracy and principles of
the free market itself, since under conditions when rapaciousness
comes to the fore the principles mentioned above might undergo
devaluation, while, on the contrary, demagogy and reactionary
ideas might gain the upper hand among the population. Adducing
an example from the middle ages: corruption among the Catholic
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clergy propped up the popularity of the heretics among the people
(as vividly depicted in Umberto Eco’s famous “The Name of the
Rose”). Even though contradicting the traditional doctrines, the
heretic preachers demonstrated a great sense of sincerity and
uprightness. After all, is it not possible for a person to be a
monarchist and of a high moral standing, or, to be a liberal-
democrat and a reprobate? The best of all is the mixture of both
– the progressive socio-political ideas as well as high morals, since,
I think, the intellectual participation in the Hegelian development
of the socio-political ideas and the adequate sense of orientation
amidst the modern ideological climate is tightly connected with the
dimension of morality.13  Progressive, fashionable ideas possess
objective power in their own virtue. Therefore, those ideas might
be used by those politicians whose only goal is to seize power
through them. If there will be many candidates with the same up-
to-date liberal-democratic platform, the main principle through which
people will make their choices will be the personal features and
moral stature of politicians rather than their programs.
• As mentioned above, for the opposition to be successful it should
support, next to honesty, the most famous ideology: nowadays this
is liberal democracy, appreciation of law as a supreme authority,
etc. It is also necessary to emphasize the doctrines of traditional
Christianity: loyalty and support for the Church, devotion to the
traditions of Georgian family. These are crucial factors, since
liberalism in Europe has become practically post-Christian, which
is not the case with Georgia, where Christianity and liberalism are
envisaged in a peaceful and synergic co-existence. In the Georgian
political discourse liberalism should be connected with the idea of
serving one’s nation – just in terms of Ilia Chavchavadze’s nation-
building program – on the level of rhetoric at least. In sum, the
course should be firmly set on Europe, which, however, does not
mean a blind replication of the European models, but a critical and
reflective approach. In case of idolatrous and heedless imitation,
there is a danger that people will get disappointed with the West-
ern liberal values and distrust them as a “Masonic conspiracy” or
“Soros’ intrusion?”
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• The opposition should place emphasis on civil society; ethnocen-
trism should be gradually balanced out with the idea of supra-
ethnic citizenship with guarantees that every ethnicity has an equal
opportunity to participate in the country’s political-economic life; to
gain the minority votes the opposition should present a practicable
program for full-scale involvement of ethnic minorities in the
country’s affairs. Along with discourse of intensification the supra-
ethnic civil idea, the opposition should not also forget the impor-
tance of the traditional national ideals of Georgians: these ideals
should be preserved and developed, yet with a better sense of
openness towards the other ethnicities – just in terms of Ilia
Chavchavadze’s motto: “Nothing national has value unless it has
value also for humankind as a whole”.
• The opposition should also work out a clear foreign policy, even
if it involves risky steps. Taking a risk is better than being
undecided. It is also very important to be aware of one’s own
strengths: in the Realpolitik, power dominates over objective jus-
tice. Unfortunately the principle: “You’re up and I’m down” still
rules. This is especially true with Russia. Will the West confront
Russia because of Georgia? Making an enemy idol from Russia
was not a successful enterprise before, though nowadays it has
been more or less successful. I am not sure what benefit it will
bring. The Georgians deported from Russia showed an enviable
degree of patriotism and political alertness, when they did not
direct their anger towards the Georgian authorities, as Russia hoped,
but towards Putin. Nevertheless, hysteria and radicalism is hardly
an option in relations with Russia.
• Another vital point for the opposition is to have a charismatic
leader. Without a leader like that victory cannot be achieved in the
Georgian reality. The possible reason for that is the lack of
political culture of our residents, or, put in another words, the
continuation of the “Bazaleti Lake”14  complex.
• In terms of staffing the government, it is important to focus on
hiring professional cadres rather than people who are just loyal to
those in power.
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• Promoting business – neutralizing the fear factor of local business-
men and laying the groundwork for foreign investment. Lately, the
latter issue has been a subject of a special attention for the
opposition: that the government oppresses businessmen and the
opposition is ready to represent their interests.
Notes:
1 In March 1956, as a response to Khrushchevian condemnation of Stalin’s “cult
of personality”, which Georgians took as an oblique attack on Georgia, Georgians
(mostly students) demonstrated on the pretext of defending Stalin’s memory. However,
during the demonstration slogans like “glory to independent Georgia” were now and
then shouted. The shooting of the demonstration claimed approx. 100 civilian lives.
2 On April 9, 1989 a demonstration calling for Georgia’s independence from the
USSR was held in Tbilisi. Soviet troops armed with military spades routed the dem-
onstration killing 19 – mostly women and girls.
3 Actually, Gamsakhurdia’s ideology was a mixture of Christianity, nationalism and
some sort of mysticism that involved tenets of both Christianity and theosophy. It
remains only a riddle how he and also his fellow dissident Merab Kostava could
combine Christian tenets with those of German mystic and founder of anthroposophy
Rudolf Steiner, whom both Gamsakhurdia and Kostava held in high esteem. For
instance, Steiner held the idea of souls’ transmigration believing that he himself was,
in fact, the incarnation of Thomas Aquinas, while traditional Christianity since the fifth
century expressly denies the teaching of souls’ transmigration.
4 Merab Mamardashvili (1930-1990), – Georgian philosopher, one of the most
original and influential thinkers during the Soviet era. He became famous through his
lectures on Kant, Descartes and Marcel Proust, where he created an alternative
philosophical discourse in opposition to the Marxism-based philosophy of the Soviet
academia. By the end of his life he returned to Georgia and besides his regular
lectures also participated in the dramatic events of 1989-1990. Another famous motto
of Mamardashvili, for which he was harangued by the nationalists was: “If my nation
chooses to follow Gamsakhurdia, I will go against my nation”.
5 “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, January 1991
6 Including its hysterical Russophobia and close relationship with Chechen resis-
tance leader Jokhar Dudaev based on ideals of chivalry and romanticism.
7 Jaba Ioseliani (1926-2003). A former criminal authority in Soviet Union times,
who later changed his ways and became a professor of drama and a writer. Later,
after Georgia gained independence, he formed a military organization called the
Mkhedrioni (“Horsemen”), which played an important role in the civil war against
Gamsakhurdia and later fought in Abkhazia. “Mkhedrioni” and Ioseliani later spun out
of control and no longer obeyed the official government under Shevardnadze. It was
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for this reason that he was imprisoned under the pretext of having attempted to
assassinate President Shevardnadze.
8 When asked whether Kitovani was to be called a traitor for not having con-
sulted with the president on the invasion of Sokhumi, Shevardnadze avoided giving a
direct response, though he did evaluate Kitovani’s action as an “irresponsible act”.
When Kitovani was about to do the same, however, he was arrested and there was
no necessity for such euphemisms any more.
9 Aslan Abashidze was appointed leader of the Achara Autonomous Republic of
Georgia by Gamsakhurdia. After Shevardnadze became president, Abashidze was
formally/legally subjected to him, though in reality he was the sole sovereign in his
realm, not obeying the central government when he did not wish to.
10 A series of animated cartoons caricaturing Shevardnadze and his regime broad-
cast by Rustavi-2 TV.
11 Both Kvitsiani and the professional wrestlers were involved in unlawful activi-
ties and were justly checked from the side of the state. Thus, supporting them, as
some members of the opposition did, was not the most prudent thing to do.
12 Most probably, out of personal vengeance, high ranking police officials ordered
the kidnapping of Sandro Girgvliani so that he could be “taught a lesson”. He was
brutally beaten to death by several Interior Ministry personnel. Due to the lack of
evidence, those who gave the order escaped arrest, and only the actual perpetrators
were sentenced. At least this is the version that is generally believed by the most of
the Georgian public.
13 Dimitri Qipiani is good example of this: morally upright, extremely honest, he
turned out to be the only one who Ilia Chavchavadze respected in the “Generation
of Fathers”. In his socio-political attitudes, however, Qipiani was a retrograde: for
example, he was against the abolition of the serf system.
14 According to a legend, under Bazaleti Lake there is a golden cradle with a
mysterious child, who will grow up and save Georgia from all its ills. The “Bazaleti
Lake” complex indicates thus an attitude of personal passivity and irresponsibility for
one’s own future.
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1.
Since independence, Georgia has achieved the status of a universally
recognized entity under international law and become a member of
organizations (e.g. the World Trade Organization) to which even Ukraine
and Russia have not yet acceded. Some, though in my opinion insuf-
ficient, steps have been taken towards integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community. A more or less stable national currency has been introduced,
and a number of reforms have been carried out, which, in principle,
should pave the way for the transition to a market economy.
Failures are incommensurately more numerous; I will list them in
order of political, socio-psychological and economic aspects.
Political sphere:
• A real separation of powers and uprooting of authoritarian tenden-
cies still has not been achieved.
• Change of government by elections still has not been achieved.
• Georgia remains a typical developing country with all the flaws
and shortcomings of such countries (underdeveloped local gover-
nance, absence of a truly independent judiciary, etc.)
• Territorial integrity has not been restored.
• The problem of the lack of competent personnel in positions of
authority to develop the strategic course in their respective areas,
still has not been resolved.
• Society still has not realized that its problems can be resolved only
by itself, not some messiah who will alone shoulder the burden
of doing the job which the entire society has to do.
• Society has not tackled its ambivalent Freudian complex of sorts
toward Russia; Russia is simultaneously viewed as a kindly – if
only potentially – paternal figure (the solution to our territorial
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problem depends on Russia, our economy needs its market, it
supplies us with natural gas and electricity) and, at the same time,
as an “evil stepfather”.
• The population is infantile; the public has not yet realized what
independence means.
• The economic growth which appears in official statistics has no
influence whatsoever on the living standards of the majority of the
population.
• Georgia has yet to break its dependence on Russia for energy
resources.
• Clans and the system of “protection” still exist in the economy.
Despite steps in the right direction, a Western-style market economy
remains a distant dream.
All these factors have great influence (usually proportionate to one
another) on the political processes in Georgia. Hence the answer to
the first question: Georgian society and culture (I understand that the
first question mostly refers to the political culture) essentially have not
changed for the better. There is a minor progress, for example, in the
non-governmental sector and the media, which is free (but usually
under-qualified and incapable of analysis). But talking about any sig-
nificant level of development of our society or substantial rise of the
political culture seems unfounded to me.
2.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s political belief system can be described as an
attempt to restore a medieval-type political system in Georgia (of the kind
depicted in the novels of his father, Konstantine Gamsakhurdia). This is
where his traditionalism and skepticism toward – and at times outright
rejection of – classical Western liberal values took their origin. Among his
main achievements, the inclusion of the broad masses of the population
in the political process merits mention (it is doubtful that anyone has ever
managed to mobilize such huge masses of people to attain political goals
in Georgian history). However, aside from positive aspects, this has had
associated risks too. Another undisputable achievement was holding on the
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entire territory of the country, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the
referendum on the country’s independence, which prevents even the
present-day ill-wishers of Georgia (Zatulin and his ilk) from claiming that
South Ossetia and Abkhazia supposedly split off from Georgia before the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. One more achievement of the
Gamsakhurdia regime was that the escalation of the confrontation in
Abkhazia into an armed conflict was prevented. No matter how much
some people might talk about the “apartheid law” (under which more
seats in the Abkhaz legislature were delegated to ethnic Abkhaz than
ethnic Georgians despite the fact that the latter far outnumbered the
former in the general population), it is clear that thanks to that system,
we temporarily averted what happened later under Shevardnadze. Another
improvement over the preceding regime was of course Gamsakhurdia’s
anti-Communist attitude. His was the first anti-Communist government
(which the government of the First Republic patently was not) in modern
Georgian history. To boot, his anti-Communism was so effective that, in
contrast to a number of other post-Soviet republics (Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova), it drove the nail into the coffin of Communism as more or
less influential political force in the country. In addition, Gamsakhurdia’s
anti-Western, or at least non-Western, attitudes need to be underscored
here. He was the only influential politician in Georgia who would not
allow Western domination in the region. In this sense, the ouster of
Gamsakhurdia by Russia was tantamount to a political hara-kiri; this made
it obvious that Russia was no longer capable of either planning or
implementing its imperialist policy.
Now let us discuss the negative aspects of Gamsakhurdia’s politi-
cal activities. The following should be highlighted among them:
• Radicalism of political methods;
• Failure to achieve a full public consensus, which was necessary in
that situation. Although Gamsakhurdia’s opponents’ contribution to
the failure to achieve such a consensus was not any less than his,
the degree of his responsibility was incomparably high compared
to, say, Irakli Tsereteli, because Gamsakhurdia was in power;
• Unsound personnel policy, as attested to by the fact that the vast
majority of Gamsakhurdia’s officials simply abandoned him. Of
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course, statements that he should have kept the Soviet-era “profes-
sionals” in their posts were absurd – how professional they were
became evident during Shevardnadze’s presidency. But it is also true
that the Gamsakhurdia government did nothing, or almost nothing,
to create a professional corps of officials for independent Georgia;
• There was no people’s revolution. I think that the term “Christmas
coup” is much more appropriate for what happened. The reasons
for the coup stemmed from the conflicts which are inherent to a
newly independent state if it cannot manage to embark on the
road toward liberal democracy. There are countless examples of
this. Setting aside the most conspicuous and typical colonies (in
Asia or Africa), let us take Greece in the 1820-1830s or Ireland
in 1920-1930s as examples. In both countries, winning indepen-
dence did not result in liberal democratic regimes; what happened
instead was that in both countries, winning independence was
followed by a whole series of bloody civil wars.
3.
In contrast to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze had no
political beliefs, realistic or utopian, whatsoever. His objective was
power for power’s sake, not as a means of attaining any positive
goals. Perhaps Shevardnadze would have been very surprised if some-
one had asked him why he needed to be the country’s top official.
His goal was coming to and staying in power. All of his successes or
failures should be viewed in this context.
Restoring relative law and order, checking the rampage of criminal
“brotherhoods”, achieving international recognition of Georgia, declar-
ing the Euro-Atlantic course by the end of his presidential tenure and
taking steps, albeit minimal ones, toward pursuing that course – all
these should be noted as Shevardnadze’s successes. The introduction
of the national currency and adoption of the not-too-useful constitution
also merit mention. I deem promotion of new people at the beginning
of his rule a positive development too. I have to note, however, that
by the end of his presidential tenure, Shevardnadze completely shifted
emphasis to communist-era officials. The relative freedom of the
media should also be noted. The withdrawal of the Vaziani military
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base by the Russians was also a success. As for the failures, their
number is incomparably greater. Namely:
• Leaving the South Ossetia crisis unresolved and “freezing” it to
the extent that it cannot be “defrosted” to this day;
• Starting the war in Abkhazia, ending it in a fiasco and signing
agreements which were against Georgia’s national interests;
• Deliberately avoiding reaching consensus with Gamsakhurdia. There
is a theory that Shevardnadze ceded Ochamchire and Gali to
Ardzinba to prevent the strengthening of Gamsakhurdia’s positions
(let me underscore that this is only a theory which has currency
mostly among the military);
• Involving the Russians, namely, Admiral Baltin, in the regulation
of Georgia’s domestic conflict;
• Establishing a communist-style system of governance, especially by
the end of his presidency;
• Creating a stagnant, so called “zastoy”-type regime (this too mostly
refers to the end of his presidency, although in my opinion, the
tendency existed from the very outset);
• Making deceit a tool of politics;
• Bequeathing pathological heritage to the successor regime; failing
to train officials and civil servants for the time when they would
no longer be in their government jobs;
• Implementing a vague foreign policy, so-called “balancing”, which
essentially achieved nothing.
This is only a short list of negative aspects of the Shevardnadze
rule. Compared to preceding regimes, he introduced falsehood, a com-
plete lack of political principles and everything else which falls under the
definition (incidentally, unfairly) of Machiavellianism. Besides these,
Shevardnadze had no strategy whatsoever; he used to deal with all tasks
using the principle “let us put this aside for now and see what happens
later”. The result of this pseudo-strategy, which in reality was a tactic
elevated to the status of strategy, was the Rose Revolution. Because of
gaps in his education, Shevardnadze simply turned out to lack the
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intellectual capacity to develop a strategy which would correspond to his
objectives. He remained a tactician with a Communist background,
which is precisely why he lost the battle with people whom he raised
himself and who were strategists, albeit perhaps bad ones.
4.
Saakashvili’s political credo can be defined as a modernization project
which employs elements of nationalism and populism. Among his main
achievements should be listed the bloodless end of the Rose Revolution,
the bloodless toppling of the Aslan Abashidze regime in Achara, and
restoring government control in the Kodori Gorge in a (almost) bloodless
fashion. The development of political will in the government, the neu-
tralization of Shevardnadze’s corrupt style of governance, and reforms
in a number of sectors were also positive developments. Compared to
the preceding government, he introduced a more energetic style and
more effective and intensive use of PR technologies. Some of the steps
that were made in the direction of Euro-Atlantic integration should also
be considered a success, although it has to be said for objectivity’s sake
that the failure to develop a complete systemic bloc of reforms resulted
in the postponement until 2008 of giving to Georgia the status of a
candidate country for NATO membership. The relative stabilization of
the domestic political activity and its operation in a routine mode is also
a positive process. Now let us discuss the failures. Just like under
Shevardnadze and Gamsakhurdia, they outnumber successes during
Saakashvili’s presidency too. Namely:
• The problem of Georgia’s territorial integrity is still unresolved;
• The political system is of an unstable nature; I mean so-called
government carousels – continual movement of ministers from one
post to another with very short intervals, which hinders the country’s
sustainable development. For example, Georgia now has its fifth
(!) defense minister and third chief of the General Staff of the
armed forces since 2003. Other ministers often change just as
quickly, which is certainly not good for the country;
• Incompetence. Similar to the preceding two regimes, the integration
of competent persons into the governance system still does not
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happen. The falling average age of officials is good, but it does not
provide any guarantees of competence (it has to be noted, however,
that it largely depends on the particular minister in question, chair-
man of the respective parliamentary committee, etc.);
• Unresolved relations with Russia, stemming not only from the
Russians’ imperialist aspirations, but also from our authorities’ policy;
• The effectively nonexistent independence of the judiciary. The
same is true about local governance, but the weakness of the
latter is caused not only by trends in the government, but also
by the opposition’s weakness – more on this in the answer to
the next question;
• Complete domination of the executive branch over all other branches;
• Absence of a government strategy for a number of sectors. For
example, there is endless talk about an army of NATO standards,
but there is no decision at all on what the army should be like
(Anglo-Saxon, German, French, Turkish models, some hybrid of
these or something altogether original). And in this situation, where
we do not know what type of an army we are developing, we
pass the law on reserve troops, which is in itself nonsensical
because the type of the reserve troops is contingent on the type
of the army. Under the Saakashvili government, roofs are often
built where the walls still do not exist.
5.
The opposition’s weakness is first and foremost the opposition’s
fault. In general, our opposition has a knack for causing irritation
among the public. This can be accounted for by lack of culture both
in society (which still does not understand that the reason for the
existence of the opposition is pointing at the government’s shortcom-
ings, something which does not at all mean that the opposition “hin-
ders the government from doing its job”) and among politicians, who
cannot manage to get their message across to the people in a com-
prehensible manner. Let us recall the population’s irritation with the
opposition’s actions during the Shevardnadze government in 1993-
1995. I doubt that the population is much more sympathetic toward
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the opposition now than it was back then. It is also significant that
governments were changed by groups which split off from the ruling
force (Sigua and Kitovani from the Round Table, many National
Movement members from the Citizens’ Union). This is why repres-
sions by the authorities cannot be cited as the reason for the opposition’s
weakness. There certainly are individual instances of such repressions,
but they are clearly not so frequent or large-scale as to attribute the
opposition’s weakness to them.
Neither can the opposition’s weakness be explained by the
government’s successes. No-one would argue against the statement
that there are large social groups which are displeased with the au-
thorities, but these groups do not form the opposition’s support base.
This should not come as a surprise either if we take into account the
fact that politics is not a zero-sum game and the weakening of one
of the sides does not necessarily mean the strengthening of the other.
The absence of a charismatic leader among the opposition is a
conspicuous shortcoming, but the point here is not only charisma, but
also the leader’s ability to persuade the people that their lives will be
better than they are now when the opposition comes to power.
This is why the main reason for the opposition’s weakness is to
be sought in the opposition itself and in the current environment. The
opposition failed to join forces in the run-up to the local elections of
October 5, 2006, which quite a few voters expected them to do. The
opposition failed to persuade the people that it is better than the
government (the sentiment of the average Georgian on the street is
that “they are all the same”). The opposition failed to come up with
a comprehensive program which, into the bargain, would have to
persuade the people that the program was feasible and that its imple-
mentation would benefit the public at large. The opposition failed to
generate leaders whose charisma would rival that of the government
leaders. This is a short list of the main reasons why the opposition
cannot rival the government.
6.
The future strengthening of the opposition, if it happens at all, is
unlikely to occur with any one slogan. Given its current situation, our
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society pays little attention to slogans and policy statements. As was
noted in the preceding answer, the opposition’s weakness stems not
from the absence of slogans, but from other causes. The main pre-
condition for the strengthening of the opposition is persuading the
public that they are better than the government and keeping the
promises that were given to the population. In addition, the opposition
needs to have a charismatic leader. The opposition should persuade
the public that it will stay the course toward Euro-Atlantic integration,
which is supported by the majority of the population, and at the same
time settle relations with Russia and regain in some form access to
the Russian market (even the most incorrigible optimists do not expect
the natural gas price to fall). Of course, before coming to power, the
opposition will need to persuade people that it will resolve the Abkhazia
and South Ossetia problems, substantially improve standards of living
and curb unemployment. As for slogans, the opposition will try to use
a whole package of them. They will talk about the authoritarian
tendencies of the government, lack of separation of powers, violations
of human rights, social rights and Georgian identity. However, priority
here will be given to modality, in other words, to how the population
perceives the politicians’ promises, not the meaning of individual slo-
gans. It is clear, though, that the modality also hinges on what specific
slogans and messages are used.
7.
A strong opposition will emerge only when there is strong public
demand for it and the opposition meets the requirements which I
discussed in the previous section. This will be a process which, so to
speak, will create itself. Therefore, making accurate prognoses about
the forms and methods of creation of the strong opposition is virtually
impossible. That the oppositions which toppled governments used to
be born within the authorities thus far cannot be a logical argument
in support of the statement that this is how it will stay in the future.
The only thing that can be said with certainty is that this type of the
opposition will emerge as bifurcating processes within the government
grow (if, that is, the abovementioned conditions are met), and it is
quite probable that it will have the form of a coalition. The more or
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less influential traditional opposition groups (I mean those whose
nationwide approval rating is around at least 5%), groups that split off
from the ruling party, as well as new potential forces whose only
possible source is the increasingly displeased middle class (if, that is,
such a thing will exist in Georgia) would join the ranks of the new
opposition. However, even if all implied ifs and buts prove true, the
opposition will still find it hard to unite given their ideological differ-
ences and ambitions, as well as technical problems.
Theoretically, another option is also possible: A relatively small
group rallies around a charismatic leader and, although it does not win
the elections, it comes second so definitively that the other political
parties simply sink. If this happens, we will end up with a classic two-
party system, but for this the difference between the political forces
which came second and third places should be not tenths of one
percent (like in the local elections), but around 15-20%.
8.
In one of the previous publications by the Caucasus Institute for
Peace Democracy and Development, I used the terms “stable insta-
bility” and “unstably stable” to describe the Shevardnadze regime
(after his victory in one of the elections). Despite the fact that there
are many differences between the incumbent and Shevardnadze re-
gimes (we discussed some of them above), for instance, incomparably
stronger political will or incommensurately stronger state institutions,
the description still applies. It applies for the simple reason that only
liberal democratic regimes are stable in the true meaning of this word.
Henry Kissinger noted in one of his articles that one of the peculiari-
ties of the post-Soviet political systems was that people in power there
are either in power or in jail. The government in Georgia will become
stable only when its members will no longer be afraid of going to jail
after stepping down. And to achieve this, the government system must
acquire the form of a liberal democracy and the government must take
the appropriate steps which I have discussed so extensively.
Now let us turn to the model of political development. Although
typologically it is possible to discern some similarities between the
decades-long domination of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in
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Mexico and the decades-long domination of the Liberal Democratic
Party in Japan, there is a fundamental difference between them. The
domination of the Liberal Democrats in Japan derived from successes
which they achieved when they were in power: economic progress,
improvement in the standard of living, the strengthening of Japan’s
position in the international arena – in a word, everything that allowed
the party to deliver the country from its post-war shock. The reasons
for the domination of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico
were completely different. They were predicated on the desire of the
population to see some stability after years of revolutions, civil wars,
and foreign policy failures (in this respect, the Mexicans had the same
expectations for this party as the Georgians had for Shevardnadze), on
top of which came the party’s anti-Americanism and declared social-
ism (granting asylum to Trotsky would suffice), which was in har-
mony with the public sentiments of Mexico of that period (mid-20th
century). Later the party consolidated its positions to the extent that
the underdeveloped society turned out to lack the resources to replace
it with some other political force. In addition, due to a number of
reasons, no such new political force existed till a few decades ago
(compare with the weakness of our opposition). If we compare the
effectiveness of our ruling party’s actions with the two above parties’,
there can be no doubt that, taking into account the weakness of the
Georgian opposition, Georgia is destined to follow the Mexican model.
Latin American-style revolutionary cycles are practically out of the
question in Georgia. There are neither the social nor military resources
for this. If developments follow this scenario, Georgia will simply
disintegrate into its constituent parts (This did not happen during the
Latin American revolutionary cycles for the simple reason that the
national borders (at any rate, by the 1890s, after the end of the
Paraguay and Pacific wars) were already demarcated, and the regional
states, despite their flawed political systems, already established (with
the only exception of the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Para-
guay in the 1930's). In addition, the struggle for geopolitical domina-
tion was not so intense there. Owing to these and a number of other
factors, revolutionary cycles are unlikely in Georgia. They would be
hindered both by the aforementioned factors and by the low, but still
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sufficient level of civil consciousness of society, which will realize the
potential threat of these sorts of revolutions. In addition, it is doubtful
against the backdrop of the frustration that has followed the exces-
sively high expectations for the Rose Revolution that any political
force will manage to persuade the public of the need for a revolution,
not to mention a series of revolutions.
In my opinion, the most realistic scenario is gradual establishment
of liberal democracy as the degree of the country’s Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration will increase. But this requires two domestic factors (we will
discuss foreign factors in the following section). These are the
government’s good will and the existence of a strong and responsible
opposition. Otherwise we will end up with the Mexican scenario which,
given Georgia’s geopolitical, social, cultural, economic and strategic re-
alities, will be detrimental for the country. We will become the European
Venezuela at best (it does not matter who will play the role of Chavez)
or a mitigated version of Cuba (economic difficulties, strained relations
with the large neighbor country, although a dictatorship of the Cuban
style cannot set in due to Georgia’s closeness to Europe).
9.
The influence of the foreign factors on Georgia’s political evolution
is immense. It is manifested by growing US influence and the pro-
gressive weakening of Russia’s influence (let us remember that just a
decade ago, ministers in Georgia were appointed on the basis of
Russia-issued directives, and 10 years is a minuscule period from the
historical perspective). Naturally, we do not believe that everything
that happens in Georgia has been written in some foreign research
center. But it is clear that the West, and first and foremost, the United
States, can greatly influence the evolution of the political processes in
Georgia. In addition, the West has two options: to turn a blind eye
to those deviations from democracy (to put it mildly) which take place
in the country because of Georgia’s geopolitical location or to wield
its influence and compel the authorities to take steps as quickly as
possible toward building a liberal democracy. The recent develop-
ments, for instance, Daniel Fried’s comment on President Bush’s
speech at the Riga summit, show that the West is increasingly inclined
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toward the latter option. Over the next 3-5 years, I expect more
vigorous influence of the US policy on the processes which are under
way in Georgia to stimulate real steps toward liberal democracy,
intensification of the EU political efforts (both in terms of support for
democratization, economic support, and peaceful resolution of the
conflicts), and persistent tensions in relations with Russia.
10.
Ideally, I see Georgia as a country of liberal democracy which is
integrated with NATO and the EU and has the following characteristics:
• Real separation of powers and absence of authoritarian tendencies;
• Change of government only through free and fair elections;
• Strong system of political parties;
• Status of a developed country and part of the “golden billion”.
Establishment of a real middle class;
• Restoration of territorial integrity;
• Responsible and competent government and responsible society;
• Developed civil sector. Free media and real nongovernmental sec-
tor instead of the media working in the self-censorship mode and
quasi-nongovernmental organizations;
• Western-style market economy.
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1.
Georgia’s greatest*  achievement since the beginning of the 1990s
has been gaining and sustaining independence, although at the expense
of the temporary loss of territories and economic decline.1  Among the
achievements, the most striking are the rise of statist identity, the
establishment of political institutions, the deepening of democratization
and modernization, increased integration into the international commu-
nity, and the overcoming of ethnic nationalism.
The most outstanding among the failures of Georgia are the loss
of control over the territories of Abkhazia and the former South
Ossetian Autonomous Oblast2  and the weakening of the economy.
I will try to characterize both achievements and failures separately
in the remainder of the chapter.
During the last 15 years, in spite of several civil wars, economic
destitution and social and ideological crises, it is the recognition of the
necessity of national sovereignty and political independence by the
majority of population of Georgia that must be deemed a historical
achievement. The gradual waning of the mistrust towards the state
(especially after 2003) and the recognition of the need to include
national minorities are sure signs of the rise of statist consciousness
and the establishment of civic national identity. These signs of sur-
mounting narrow ethnic nationalist attitudes indicate that Georgia has
the potential to emerge as a modern state.
The establishment of a political system (however weak), which
sustains political processes within legal frames, the emergence of basic
bureaucratic structures and their growing professionalism show the
extent of the progress made towards modern statehood. Moreover, this
* I will answer the question briefly in the beginning of every chapter and then
elaborate on the main aspects of the brief answer.
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process is reinforced by the establishment of security machinery which
is not at the disposal of any single ideological force.
The greatest achievement of Georgian democracy is placing elec-
tions in the center of the country’s political system. However, the
weak structure of the political system (first of all, the political party
system) after 15 years of independence poses many questions about
the irreversibility of democracy in Georgia.
The success of the modernization process in Georgia is reflected
in the unanimous and unchallenged choice of the Western (primarily
European) political and economic model. This success, however, has
reflected less on the economic and social development of the country.
As in the case of political independence, choosing a Western orien-
tation (not only in terms of geopolitics but also values) is a formidable
achievement for Georgia.
Nationalism – the most outstanding aspect of Georgian political
culture – fulfilled the most influential role in the formation of inde-
pendent Georgia. Although ethnic nationalism hindered the integration
of national minorities into the common national state, it has simulta-
neously led Georgia to choose independence and, to a certain extent,
pro-Western orientation.3
The main failure – disruption of territorial integrity – has been a
combined result of the realities of the international environment as well
as the excesses of Georgian ethnic nationalism. Also, the economic
collapse was caused, on the one hand, by objective conditions (the
implosion of the Soviet Union, increased liberalization of the world
economy as well as Georgia’s limited resource potential ), and, on the
other hand, by the absence of a clear economic policy in the 1990s.
2.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s rule was the source of a host of prob-
lems in Georgia, including the most acute of them – the problem
of territorial integrity. However, it was during Gamsakhurdia’s rule
that the consensus on independence and pro-Western orientation
of Georgia finally emerged. Gamsakhurdia, as the first president
of Georgia, initiated the problematic relationship between Georgia
and Russia.
82
George Khelashvili
The achievements of Gamsakhurdia’s government are limited to
the establishment of this ideological and foreign political pattern.
However, the merits of Gamsakhurdia’s rule for the future of Geor-
gia must be sought not so much in Gamsakhurdia’s policies per se,
but in the side-effects of these policies. Gamsakhurdia’s excessive
ethnic nationalism immunized Georgians against the nationalist dis-
ease and pushed them towards a more civic and liberal understand-
ing of nationalism.
The list of the problems left behind by Gamsakhurdia can be quite
extensive – the major ones of them being the radicalization of society
and the marginalization of ethnic minorities. The successful resolution
of these problems, especially of the latter, has proved to be impossible
until now and seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Two major factors contributed to the downfall of Gamsakhurdia
– excessive emphasis on nationalism and the consolidation of the
political elite against him. Gamsakhurdia mistakenly assumed that the
ethnic nationalistic mobilization of Georgians would prove sufficient
not only for him to maintain power but also for the country’s political
and economic development. But this mobilization of nationalism was
not enough for either of these tasks and, as it became clear later,
proved also insufficient for the forceful resolution of problems of
territorial integrity.4
The mobilization of the Georgian elite against Gamsakhurdia was
the second reason behind the latter’s downfall. In 1991, the Georgian
elite was still intimately connected with Russian ruling circles and had
enough levers for mobilizing domestic and external forces against
Gamsakhurdia. However, I think, Russia’s role in Gamsakhurdia’s
downfall is overestimated – the decisive role was played by the
Georgian elite (among them Eduard Shevardnadze), which effectively
used Russian political and military resources to their advantage and to
Gamsakhurdia’s peril.
3.
The modern Georgian state was created during Shevardnadze’s
rule. This must be counted as the major achievement of the period
of his governance. During his rule, Georgia found its first niche in
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international politics and the international economy. In Shevardnadze’s
time, Georgian democracy and political institutions emerged and liberal
values started to spread in society.
The major failures of his 12-year rule were the loss of control
over Abkhazia, the weakness and inefficiency of the state machinery,
the stagnation of economy and the demoralization of society.
In Shevardnadze’s time, the most striking departure from previous
regimes was the drastic increase in the impact of external factors. On
the one hand, this increase was related to the weakening of Russia
and growing Western involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
However, on the other hand, the increase of international influence
was linked to the readiness of the Georgian political class to embark
on liberal reforms from the mid-1990s.
The main result of the growth of influence of international factors
was not so much what Shevardnadze had hoped for most – the
restoration of territorial integrity and the end of the economic crisis
– but rather the emergence of more liberal mass media, an energetic
civil society and new ideas regarding the arrangement of the state.
These societal institutions and ideas played a decisive role both in the
downfall of Shevardnadze and in determining the future government’s
ideology and policies.
Shevardnadze’s rule rested on two basic principles – state sover-
eignty and the sustainability of Shevardnadze’s personal grip on power.
Shevardnadze hoped that his pro-Western policies starting in 1995
would help him to fulfill both these tasks. It is difficult to say
decisively which of the two principles had primacy. In fact, by ex-
pounding his pro-Western rhetoric, Shevardnadze denied himself the
chance to retreat. When his rule and the state’s development came in
contradiction with each other, Shevardnadze proved unable (or unwill-
ing) to substitute the West for Russia, as provider of political support,
and thus saved his own regime from demise.
As in Gamsakhurdia’s case, the most important legacy of
Shevardnadze’s period – the establishment of political institutions, the
emergence of civil society, and the spread of liberal values – was a
side effect of Shevardnadze’s primary objective (maintaining power
and manipulating Western support).
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Shevardnadze failed to formulate the ideational and economic
principles of the development of the state and to consolidate the
necessary institutions. Accordingly, his governance style was limited to
balancing between rival political factions, which would not continue
forever. Thus, the downfall of Shevardnadze’s regime was, first of all,
caused by his own ideological omnibalancing and unawareness of the
essence of modern statehood.
4.
Mikheil Saakashvili has further strengthened some of the tenden-
cies that had been in place during Gamsakhurdia’s and Shevardnadze’s
rule. In this respect, Saakashvili is less of a revolutionary than an heir
to his predecessors. The main tendencies set in motion by Gamsakhurdia
and Shevardnadze have become state policies under Saakashvili –
national independence and sovereignty, pro-Western orientation and
distancing from Russia – this political line had existed before him, but
has acquired a much more prominent character in the last four years.
A novelty that Saakashvili indeed brought with him is the absolute
monopolization of organized armed forces by the state. Thus, one
could argue that state-building is the most outstanding aspect of
Saakashvili’s governance.
However, on the other hand, the concept of state building for
Saakashvili’s government manifested itself mainly in the strengthening
of enforcement agencies and the centralization of power. The other,
longer-run aspects of sustainable statehood (economic development,
democracy, societal consensus, integration of secessionist minorities
into the overall society) take a backseat or take the form of political
campaigning for improving the government’s image.
The greatest failure of Shevardnadze remains a challenge in
Saakashvili’s time as well – territorial integrity has not been restored.
However, the problem has now acquired a different dimension –
external support does not count any more as the sole instrument that
the government seeks to exploit for the resolution of the problems in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Among the problems inherited by Saakashvili, economic crisis
looms large, and the energy problem has emerged as a major com-
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ponent of it. Along with the conflicts, the energy deficit determines
Georgia’s continuous dependence on Russia.
Unlike his predecessors, Saakashvili’s government has an economic
policy which is rather minimalist and envisages hastened privatization.
Such minimalism of economic policy can be called the “Frankenstein
mode” – the government conducts textbook liberal reforms through
privatization and awaits the moment when the lightning breathes the
life into the dead body of the Georgian economy. Despite such
minimalism, Saakashvili was the first Georgian leader to have defined
an economic policy and, to a certain extent, carry it out.
In the modern history of Georgia, Saakashvili was the first to
unify the ideas of civic nationalism, economic liberalism and statist
republicanism and, to a certain extent, carry this task out in practice.
However, in conditions of limited economic resources, increased pres-
sure from Russia and the scarcity of qualified management personnel,
the merger of these three elements for the advancement of state
interests occurred only partially.
5.
Political opposition in Georgia has always looked weaker than the
government, hence, the acquisition of power in the past happened
either through armed rebellion (expulsion of Gamsakhurdia) or by
means of mass popular protests (Shevardnadze’s forced resignation).
In neither case did the opposition look formidable enough to change
the government.
Accordingly, the weakness of the opposition in Saakashvili’s times
does not necessarily indicate that the government’s base is unshakable.
Despite the strengthening of the state machinery, government cannot
yet provide security from either external or internal threats.
There are a few basic reasons behind the weakness of the
opposition under Saakashvili’s governance, among them the absence
of a solid ideological base and the deficit of economic and human
resources.
The majority of opposition parties do not have a solid ideological
base. The ideological platform of any given party, in the best case
scenario, is merely declarative and does not correspond to political
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actions. This discrepancy between ideas and actions breeds a certain
apathy and distrust towards the opposition on the part of population,
which then is reflected in the results of elections.
The scarcity of resources in the hands of the opposition is deter-
mined both by generic economic crisis as well as the exploitation of
so-called “administrative resources” by the government. Despite the
government’s liberal-economy rhetoric, the majority of economic ac-
tors depend on government’s regulatory policies or tend to perceive
themselves as dependent on them. This hinders the private sector
from funding the opposition even in cases where it is in the best
interests of private companies.
The authorities have managed to monopolize the majority of popular
themes among the population – nationalism, a firm position in relation
to Russia, economic liberalism, independence and unification of the
state. All these themes are spiced up with social rhetoric, which leaves
the opposition with little to exploit. Therefore, most of the rhetoric of
the opposition is limited to the criticism of isolated incidents and,
sometimes, makes it look more Catholic than the Pope (e.g. by
adopting a more intransigent approach towards Russia than the gov-
ernment does).
In addition, due to its ideational poverty and inconsistency, the
opposition has failed to harness Western sympathy (that of govern-
ments, aid organizations, international NGOs), unlike the “young re-
formers”, who managed to do so under Shevardnadze. These deficien-
cies create conditions under which more energetic and educated youth
move more towards the government than to the opposition.
Sometimes opposition parties look more like social unions than
power-pursuing hierarchical organizations. Thus, sometimes the oppo-
sition rejects the main principle of politics – the readiness for a
power struggle.
Ultimately, the opposition’s tactics for political struggle is inexpe-
dient as well, as it rests on three basic methods – reliance on a hope
for government blunders, attempts to unite the opposition, and the
capitalization on popular discontent towards the government’s policies.
In the first place, government’s mistakes would not necessarily trans-
late into popular support for the opposition, second, the unification of
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unpopular and weak parties would not increase their popularity and
power, and third, permanent emphasis on criticizing the government
and the absence of its own political views would hardly make the
opposition more politically influential.
6.
As in most parts of the former Soviet Union, in Georgia too, the
most acute political problems are those of a social character. Despite
this, capitalizing on this problem has proved to be almost impossible
in Georgia. The only two political forces who exploit this issue more
or less effectively, are the ruling party and the opposition Labor party.
While social issues play a mere rhetorical role in the ruling party’s
policies, Labor uses them as a source of cheap and ephemeral popu-
larity. None of the parties have a consistent, ideologically sound ap-
proach towards the social issues.
During its 15-year development, the political center in Georgia
consolidated around the liberal right. This development has had quite
a linear progressive trajectory – from Soviet feudalism to Gamsakhurdia’s
conservative nationalism, then to Shevardnadze’s social conservatism,
and, in the end, to Saakashvili’s economic liberalism and state-centrism.
The next step should be a liberalism that is oriented towards social
justice and relatively devoid of the tenets of nationalism and state-
centrism.
Right-wing criticism of Saakashvili’s government is, in the context
of current economic and social conditions, a choice of only marginal
political forces. Accordingly, effective criticism may come only from
the left. Moreover, with the passage of time, Saakashvili’s primary
task will become not so much the modernization of the state but
rather maintaining power, which will make the ruling regime more and
more conservative and, consequently, help to reveal more vulnerable
spots on the government’s political body.
7.
A successful political party in Georgia should pay attention to
ideological consistency and the development of effective political tech-
nologies. The majority of the opposition is the remnant of Soviet
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society and, therefore, it is difficult to imagine that it can produce a
viable political force.
A realistically viable future opposition may take shape from among
the politicians of the new generation. Needless to say, the majority of
the new generation politicians are either already members of the
incumbent government or, potentially, will become its constituent part.
Therefore, the future opposition must occupy that very niche of
political ideas and spectrum that Saakashvili’s government failed to
seize – social issues.
With the development of the economy and the rise of welfare,
two changes may occur – first, the economic resource base necessary
for political struggle will expand and, secondly, the currently ignored
theme of social justice will rise in prominence, which will create
conditions for the emergence of political forces of the new type.
It is entirely possible that a new, viable opposition will emerge
as a result of the split of current government. However, the question
is what will split the government – or, in other words, around which
insoluble problem will the intra-governmental consensus be disrupted.
It is entirely possible that this split will be related to the issue of
conflict management (like Israel, where inter- and intra-party dynam-
ics often evolve around the different groups’ policies towards the
Palestinians). This may be organically connected to the nationalist
theme. I think that a split in the current government may result from
the disagreement over long-term national priorities. These contested
priorities may include conflict resolution, the level and pace of
democratization, social issues (a trade-off in the distribution of re-
sources between social programs and business), and economic prob-
lems (a trade-off in the distribution of resources between security
and welfare).
It is not likely that a split in the government will occur as a result
of doubts expressed by any single political faction over foreign political
priorities or territorial integrity.
8.
The sustainability of political stability5  depends on what the
basis of government’s legitimacy will be. It would be desirable for
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such a basis to rest on societal consensus about ordering the state
and division of resources, not merely on the benevolent political
will of the government, however democratic it may be. The
benevolent political will of the incumbent party (even more so for
a group endowed with great power) can degenerate into banal
corruption. In such case, again, a rather banal epoch of semi-
authoritarianism based on sheer force emerges, which, in weak
countries like Georgia ends in a change of the government (in the
best case, through a velvet revolution, or, in a worse case, through
an armed rebellion). The creation of political institutions and the
building of societal consensus is an absolute necessity for long-
term stability.
However, the main threat that can endanger political stability is
foreign intervention (like Finland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia), which
may follow a resumption of hostilities in the conflict areas or any
particular provocation.
One more threat to stability is economic crisis, which may bring
social unrest and, consequently, the descent of the political system into
authoritarianism.
In a short-term perspective, Georgia’s political stability is likely to
be determined by the dominant role of the ruling party. In the coming
years, it is difficult to imagine any other party capturing power through
elections. The struggle for power between the ruling party factions (to
put it more precisely, between the factions of the government party)
will continue and result in tacit alterations in the distribution of power
within the government. This may continue up to the point where,
against the backdrop of a growing economy, conditions will emerge for
the formation of new parties and factions. Then the political process
will come to resemble to an open political struggle between political
parties, not a Byzantine “bulldog fight under a rug” within the gov-
ernment circles.
The temporary preservation of political stability under single-party
dominance is very much plausible, though not through the establish-
ment of an authoritarian regime, but rather through factional rivalry
within the government party.
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9.
In this section I will touch upon the mechanisms through which
the international environment has influenced Georgia and the conse-
quences of this influence.
Three broad and basic aspects have determined the influence of
the international environment on Georgia. First, the new wave of
democratization after the dissolution of the Soviet Union largely de-
termined Georgia’s ideological climate. Secondly, the process of glo-
balization increased the pace of Georgia’s inclusion into the world
economy (of course, with its positive and negative effects). And
thirdly, the contemporary international milieu created friendlier condi-
tions for the survival of weak states like Georgia than had been the
case any time during or before the 20th century.
However, it should also be said that the foreign factor (as in
the case of many other countries) did not play a crucial part for
Georgia in the last 15 years. The readiness of society for change
and domestic political shifts were the leading forces in the devel-
opment efforts.
Apart from the purposive policies of foreign countries (and, first
of all, the West), historical contingencies influenced Georgia too. Such
historical contingencies were the attacks of September 11 and the
increased American interest in Central Asia and the Middle East,
historic opportunities for transporting Central Asian oil resources through
the Caucasus, and political changes in Russia and Turkey.
In recent years, the influence of foreign countries (again, mostly
of the West) on Georgia has manifested itself in the following forms:
the imposition of conditionality by international financial institutions
(IFIs), which hastened radical reforms of the economy and finances;
assistance to Georgian civil society; the implementation of educational
programs; support for communications development; providing humani-
tarian and other relief (which partially filled the gap created by the
absence of a social security net, allowing the government to concen-
trate on strategic and development issues); direct military, infrastructural,
and financial aid; political support in international organizations and
other international forums; participation in conflict resolution efforts
and investments in the economy.
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The issue of Russia must be dealt with separately. It is evident
that Russian involvement in Georgia’s domestic affairs has consider-
ably hindered its economic development, but, at the same time,
Russian political pressure substantially contributed to the establish-
ment of Georgia as an independent state and towards the formation
of the Georgians as a political nation as well as the formulation of
Georgian foreign policy.
The consequences of these various kinds of influences may be
summarized in the following way: the image of Georgia has signifi-
cantly improved (from the “”failed state” in the early 1990s to “bea-
con of democracy” in the mid-2000s); Georgia’s strategic importance
has grown on the world political map (which gives the country a
historically unique chance to retain independence); a certain number of
young men and women acquired management and governance skills
and proved to be ready to assume leadership in crisis conditions; due
to the involvement of international financial institutions, the economy
underwent a certain degree of liberalization, which may bring long-
term dividends (without liberalization, the Georgian economy would
never rise again); the level of protection of human rights grew signifi-
cantly; democracy spread its roots and acquired signs of irreversibility;
political culture developed – a method of political discussions has
emerged, the level of political and ideological tolerance increased, as
well as the level of the citizens’ participation in political processes.
At the same time, external influence has proved to be not so
benign for Georgia (at least in the short run): First of all, the existence
of unresolved conflicts on Georgian territory and their manipulation by
external powers (e.g. Russia) gravely diminished the likelihood of
foreign investment flow. Secondly, the process of globalization left a
controversial mark on Georgia – with diminished state control over
financial flows, friendly foreign governments have been unable to
influence the direction of investments to Georgia. These two aspects
create grave problems for the economy (at least in the short run).
It may be argued that foreign influence on Georgia has been
important but not decisive. Ultimately, this influence has had many
more positive sides than negative ones.
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10.
Given that Georgia’s state-building process is far from com-
plete, ensuring national and human security must remain the pri-
ority of the government. In the first place, this security is asso-
ciated with membership of NATO, which would guarantee Georgia’s
independence, after which the other priorities would emerge on
Georgia’s agenda.
On the other hand, however, it is becoming clear that international
alliances would not be sufficient to ensure Georgia’s security (including
territorial integrity and political independence). Georgia, like Israel,
must create an effective system of defense and security. In this
endeavor, institutions of military education must assume a priority role
and serve as the main objectives behind the development of defense
and education systems.
The development of the economy is an undisputed priority, and
it would be desirable if Saakashvili’s government broadened its minimalist
approach (which is currently based solely on privatization) and worked
out a certain economic policy – for instance, prioritizing the branches
of economy and actively searching for a niche in the international
distribution of labor (and not merely declaring that the market will
determine the priorities – which is an outdated doctrine in even most
liberal market economies).
In terms of long-term programs, the authorities must provide
for the development of economic infrastructure (especially commu-
nications – which is happening) and make efforts to form a societal
consensus over the priorities of development and ideology (which
is not happening). The growing gap between the winners and losers
may endanger not only the political stability of the country but also
its unity (Georgia remains a rather vulnerable country – therefore,
unequal development, e.g. in terms of the regions, may develop
into a threat).
The consolidation of democracy, the restoration of territorial integ-
rity and the creation of a professional (not politicized) bureaucracy
may be named as the remaining priorities.
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Notes:
1 As a measure of evaluating these “achievements”, I will use the major indi-
cators of development of Georgia that were consensually recognized by the majority
of the population and the intellectual elite of Georgia in the second half of the 1980s.
These indicators included political independence within the existing borders of the
then-Georgian SSR, integration into the international community, development of liberal
economy, and sustaining indigenous culture.
2 “South Ossetia” for short
3 The role of nationalism in choosing a pro-Western orientation has been a
revival of the peculiarities of Georgian national identity (such as mythologization of the
Christian past of Georgia).
4 This feature of Georgian nationalism has been explicated and aptly described
by Professor Stephen Jones. See Stephen Jones, “Georgian Nationalism: A Reassess-
ment”, Analysis of Current Events (Slavic and East European Studies, Baylor Uni-
versity), Vol. 12, No. 5-6, September 2000.
5 By “political stability” I mean the avoidance of Georgia’s democratic system
being replaced, either by the government itself, through an opposition-inspired coup or
by external intervention.
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1.
The answer to the question “What has Georgia failed to achieve
during its independence period?” refers more to the respondent’s thoughts
and feelings than to the actual social or political situation. And because
even the Christian Church abandoned the practice of public confes-
sions a number of years ago, I will only discuss the changes in
Georgia’s social life and culture…
It has to be said that over the last 15 years there have been
several changes affecting not so much society and culture as the
direction of their development. At the same time, our society has not
gone far enough in any of these directions to make the reality around
us tangibly different. Another important aspect is that the changes in
the directions of cultural development effectively coincide with the
changes of government. It seems that this is a reflection of some
fundamental characteristics of our society. And now we can begin the
description of the directions themselves.
The first direction can be described as the period of naïve eclec-
ticism. During Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, the collective con-
sciousness of society was a patchwork of different and often mutually
exclusive views, moods and sentiments, none of which was completely
formed and all of which chaotically floated on the turbulent surface
of historical processes. Naturally, the process of building a state of any
kind could not take place in this land, as the required discourses were
not separated from one another or clearly formulated.
The second period (Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency) is much
more resistant to unequivocal description. The formulation and devel-
opment of Georgia’s foreign policy took place mostly in that period.
Georgia entered the international arena as a state, but the state insti-
tutions in the country were very weak. The rapid development of the
civil sector and the fact that the establishment of oligarchic structures
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did not succeed in Georgia were positive side effects of this situation.
The liberal democratic discourse, which began to spread across the
broad masses of the population, also developed noticeably during the
Shevardnadze period, though its spread ended later on.
After the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government consciously
set about correcting the flaws of the Shevardnadze period. The
slogan: “Georgia without Shevardnadze”, which became one of the
mottos of the National Movement, as well as the frequency of
comparisons with the Shevardnadze era are made in Mikheil
Saakashvili’s speeches, attest to this. There is a paradoxical situation
here: as a result of the unswerving course toward the strengthening
of state institutions, the liberal democratic discourse which initially
gained a substantial foothold among the broad masses of the popu-
lation is gradually being drowned out by nationalist discourse, which
is acquiring an increasingly religious hue. This is especially noticeable
in the younger generation.
This change is likely to acquire a decisive importance for the near
future in Georgia’s social life.
2.
In my opinion, Zviad Gamsakhurdia had no political program or
set of beliefs at all. At any rate, despite his numerous slogans, he
never expressed his program in a rational form. Furthermore, the steps
taken during his presidential tenure also indicate that there was no
such program.
Both the main achievement and main failure paradoxically overlap:
it is instilling ideological criteria quite firmly in the Georgian popula-
tion. In time, these criteria lost their relevance in the area of political
choice, but they are still quite established in everyday consciousness
and determine the social schizophrenia which is characteristic of the
Georgians: people who freely express their will during the elections do
not possess the values which correspond to this will.
The Gamsakhurdia period was different from the Soviet regime
mostly in the emotional aspect: universal indifferent hypocrisy was
substituted by an unhealthy excitement that was just as universal.
From an economic standpoint, the Gamsakhurdia regime did not
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introduce anything that would have been fundamentally different
from those superficial innovations that were ushered in by
Gorbachev’s perestroika. But one thing has to be noted: none of
the governments after the independence can boast such a charisma.
Gamsakhurdia’s was the only government whose leader proved
capable of creating a situation in which Georgians were ready to
sacrifice their personal security, prosperity, freedom and sometimes
even life for an idea. Of course, the idea itself did not stand up
to scrutiny, but its effectiveness can still be a very worthy object
for profound reflections.
The main characteristics of the social and political situation of that
period were accounted for by two factors:
1) The extreme polarization of social consciousness in terms of the
“struggle between good and evil”. Everything that was banned or
undesirable during the period of domination of the Soviet ideology
was viewed as useful for building an independent state. It turned
out that society did not have any positive resources apart from the
dissident or mythological discourse which was good only for Soviet-
era social gatherings of the “intelligentsia”. An almost complete
transplantation of the Soviet-period hushed-up soirees to the ses-
sion hall of the Supreme Council took place;
2) A complete inability to properly assess one’s own potential.
As for the developments of the winter 1991-1992, which resulted
in the ouster of the Gamsakhurdia government, the realization of its
causes is definitely not a worthy object for profound reflections. The
Gamsakhurdia government was doomed, and every social stratum and
group contributed to its demise, including the so-called “Zviadists.”
3.
The period of Eduard Shevardnadze’s leadership cannot be de-
scribed as a period of implementation of some political program or
system of views. It was more like perpetual bickering with the par-
ticipation of the political leader’s boundless belief in his own skills,
inborn or acquired in the Soviet period, on the one hand, and the
groups which emerged spontaneously within his immediate entourage
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on the other. Hence the hackneyed assessments which describe
Shevardnadze as “balancer.”
The key word which describes the Shevardnadze regime is “cor-
ruption.” Precisely the negative sentiments related to this word (phe-
nomenon) became the best reason for the spread of democratic values
in society. In addition, violations of human rights took place which
bore two conspicuous characteristics: 1) they were visible and easily
identifiable; and 2) there existed no cogent argument to justify or at
least alleviate them.
Because of all this, the Shevardnadze period can be considered an
era of propitious conditions for the so-called “third sector” (non-
governmental organizations). These conditions were made even easier
and more favorable by many nongovernmental organizations’ direct
links with the opposition wing of the government. The direct conse-
quence of this tactic was that perception of liberal democratic values
in the mind of the public did not result from the realization of their
meaning; rather, they were rather seen as a handy weapon which
could be of use in overcoming the social displeasure which was
associated with the Shevardnadze regime. The events, known as the
Rose Revolution, were the highest expression of the precisely these
views. They were correct for the purposes of that particular situation,
but superficial in general.
Finally, one more positive aspect can be highlighted, and I will use
a dramaturgic metaphor to describe it. The Gamsakhurdia period can
be compared to a Greek tragedy in which one man is the formal ruler
and the protagonist of the action at the same time. He personally
confronts hostile forces and is defeated in the fight against them. This
period can be described as “Zviad Gamsakhurdia” without hesitation.
When discussing the Shevardnadze period, we cannot talk any more
about the combination of the formal ruler and actual protagonist as the
same person. This would be tantamount to choosing “Claudius” in-
stead of “Hamlet” as the title for Shakespeare’s famous tragedy. In
the Shevardnadze period, others were the protagonists, for example,
Zurab Zhvania. His contribution to Georgian politics was decisive. The
introduction of multiple centers to the social situation is associated
with the Shevardnadze period.
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4.
Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidential tenure, which is not over yet, is
the only one in recent Georgian history which can be associated with
a political program. The goal of the program can be expressed in quite
a brief phrase: strengthening state institutions.
The implementation of the program has had two flaws: 1) The
program is not clearly formulated; and 2) Its implementation is hin-
dered.
Both flaws have both external (objective) and internal (subjective)
causes. Among the objective causes are foreign political factors, the
country’s economic situation, the scarcity of human resources, the lack
of civic education and the legacy of the previous regimes, among others.
However, it is internal (subjective) causes which are of interest.
The Saakashvili government has two similarities with the Gamsakhurdia
period: the existence of a charismatic leader (whose influence on the
realities in the country gradually diminishes) and the possibility of
using psychoanalysis to explain the Georgian political and social situ-
ation. Two opposing trends attest to this: the obvious falling of the
average age of officials at all levels of state governance and in the
majority of the social institutions on the one hand and the frequency
of resorting to the historical past on the other.
Despite this, the Saakashvili period stands out for its hitherto
unseen diversity of political and social developments. Compared to the
previous periods, it is immeasurably more difficult now to draw the
“front line” of confrontations. It is difficult for civil society to operate
in this situation, because the old “propitious conditions” no longer
exist, and the old civil leaders (at least the majority of them) encoun-
ter difficulties maneuvering their way through the complexities of the
new reality due to their lack of qualification and experience.
Quite a dangerous situation is taking shape now: on the one hand,
violations of human rights no longer take on the old obvious and
easily identifiable forms, and on the other hand, there is a value which
is actively establishing itself and in whose name these violations be-
come justifiable – the idea of strengthening of state.
In my view, the oddest and most dangerous trend of the Saakashvili
period is the view that the state should become strong first, and only
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then can democracy be established. It has to be noted, however, that
this trend was clearly noticeable only in the period immediately fol-
lowing the Rose Revolution. Euphoria is gradually subsiding and today
it is no longer possible to affirm unequivocally that the aforementioned
trend is indeed relevant.
5.
Whether or not the government uses repressions is not of a
decisive importance because this cannot be the main reason for the
incapacity of the opposition. Neither can the objective successes of the
government be cited as the reason for the opposition’s inefficiency,
because those “objective successes” exist only because the criteria of
their assessments are so low. Some of the main reasons for this are
given below:
1) Diversification of the social and political reality: opposition parties
are in the same situation as civil society – old methods do not
work any more, and new ones have not been developed yet. This
is why the leaders of political parties use the strategy of partici-
pating in reality shows (appearing in traditional Georgian costumes,
lighting candles before icons, etc.).
2) Underdevelopment of society: opposition parties do not express the
interests of large social groups. Being in the majority in Georgia
is the only incentive for capable people to join the organization
because loyalty to political principles and the affiliation of the
intellectual elite with the abovementioned social groups have not
established themselves in Georgia yet.
3) Faulty tactics: the opposition predicates its political struggle on the
government’s weaknesses or, to be more precise, on the negative
phenomena, which it tries to exaggerate. This process exposes the fact
that the opposition is not interested in anything but seizing power.
6.
The meaning of the future slogan will not be related to the
government’s “mistakes” – this is how it was in the past, which can
be considered the main flaw of the changes of government in Georgia.
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But the worsening of the social and political circumstances does not
make such situations possible any more. The strengthening of the state
institutions might result in the creation in Georgia of a large social group
that has its interests. The slogan of the new “strengthened” opposition
will be determined precisely by the specific interests of that social group.
What kind of a social group could it be? One possible option is
that the interests of the medium-sized businesses will enlist the intel-
lectual support of the new academic elite.
7.
I have already partially supplied an answer to this question above.
Let me reiterate that the most probable, and perhaps most desirable,
combination would be an association of medium-sized business and
the new academic elite (high remuneration guaranteed by the state
system, ties stemming from the conditions of the labor market and
other factors will shape such an alliance, its goals and motivation). If
this happens, the very process of establishing relations will be inter-
esting. First and foremost, both parties of the alliance should grow
stronger and acquire a strong social identity.
From the cultural standpoint too, these two participants have quite
bright prospects, although overcoming the mental barrier is important.
The new academic elite should bring up people for whom the stereo-
types which gained currency in society, and especially in business
circles, will be irrelevant. For instance, the point of view that expenses
on personnel training and business development will have a much
greater influence on the improvement of living standards than transfers
to the bank account of a diocese cleric should prevail.
8.
The determinant of political stability is the existence of large social
groups with clearly formulated and intellectually or politically formal-
ized interests. If the state hinders the creation of such groups, it will
be self-detrimental. In that case, the specific scenario of developments
will not matter any more because in Georgia, the dominant party
system will not be similar to either those systems in place in Mexico
and Japan, or to the revolutionary cycles typical of Latin America.
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From the cultural standpoint, conditions in Georgia for the devel-
opment of liberal democratic pluralism do exist, but there is a need
for the people who are in a position to influence the process of
molding public opinion to develop better tastes.
In addition, the stability of the political system is a boon which
society should achieve not only through economic growth or thanks
to favorable foreign factors, but also by developing more advanced
views. In this respect, the changes which “force” people into making
fair decisions and assuming responsibilities seem very important to me.
Specific examples which are of utmost importance are the introduction
of trial by jury and self-governance in public schools. Both of these
new institutions carry a strong social potential whose development and
realization are much more important than possible initial failures.
9.
Two channels can be identified in the influence of foreign factors
on Georgia’s political evolution: 1) The international political situation;
2) Sentiments within Georgian society itself.
The influence of the factors which exert their effects using the
first channel will strengthen in time, as Georgia increasingly integrates
into the international community. Accordingly, the prospect of isola-
tionism is increasingly dimmer. If we look in retrospect at the influ-
ences which were exerted through this channel, we see that there were
several stages:
a) Passive: the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its political reper-
cussions took Georgian society completely by surprise. The opin-
ion that the “national liberation movement” presumably took any
active part in these processes seems debatable to me. The slogans
at the rallies were more a result of the general loosening of
controls than a manifestation of any effective political will;
b) Formal: in the Shevardnadze period, the direct influence of the
Western models on Georgian law-making was noticeable. Despite
the fact that administration of the laws was by no means stringent,
a substantial formal foundation was nonetheless laid for Georgian
statehood, which determined the country’s real course;
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c) Partnership: Although foreign policy was considered Georgia’s stron-
gest, or rather, least weak, point from as early as the Shevardnadze
period, it still is to be noted that there is significant progress in
this sphere too. Georgia already not only reacts to changes in the
international situation, but also takes some steps itself. In this
respect, the most important event lately was the arrest of Russian
military officers on spying charges in September 2006. Despite
numerous negative results, the positive effect is evident: Georgia
is quite successful at using diplomatic means for changing the
situation to its benefit. Georgia’s recent entry into the international
arena is not only the most successful part of the activities of the
Georgian state, but it has also started to look like what the rest
of the world calls policy.
The second channel is much more difficult to notice, although the
foreign factor here is confined to Russia’s influence alone. The rel-
evance of those social strata and individuals which culturally and
economically depend on Russia is gradually diminishing. On the other
hand, there remains one extremely important social institution – the
Georgian Orthodox Church – whose relations with the Moscow
Partriarchate and accordingly, Russia’s political interests, call for a
close scrutiny.
10.
In my opinion, the main policy priority should be the radical
reform of the secondary education system in Georgia. The most
effective step in this direction lately has been the introduction of self-
governance in secondary schools. However, close public control is
required here to make certain that the school boards do not attach
priority by using democratic methods to everything that hinders the
development of the modern society and promotes isolationism.
Of course, monitoring should not be direct and straightforward.
But the social prestige of liberal values must increase. The role of the
media in this is hard to overestimate. Today, victory goes to those
who preach democracy, not those who “fight” for democracy.
103
103
David Losaberidze
More than 15 years have passed since Georgia declared its inde-
pendence. The country has gone through a number of major upheav-
als and crises during this period. The following is an analysis of the
progress Georgia has made and an attempt to make forecasts for the
future.
New questions arose against the backdrop of new challenges, and
we must supply answers to them if we truly want to react properly
if not to all, then at least to the most important demands of modern
times.
However, answering the questions asked is both easy and difficult.
It is easy because we have all thought about these issues and
formed our opinions on them (unverified and reflexive though these
opinions may be).
It is difficult because it is impossible to supply exhaustive answers
and compile all the arguments in support of our views under the
limitations of this format.
Given that the questionnaire is intended as a catalyst to spark a
discussion, I have tried to present the fundamental postulates in the
form of theses.
1.
Main achievements:
• National sovereignty. To Georgian society, this meant the restora-
tion of Georgian statehood, to the international community – the
emergence of a new entity recognized under international law;
• An establishment which is necessary for the functioning of an
independent state has been created during the period of indepen-
dence. Although the Georgian political elite pays great (sometimes
excessive) attention to the interests and demands of large countries,
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still it is no longer a local administration of this or that superpower.
In short, the Georgian authorities (I mean all three branches of
power) now know the taste of real power and, regardless of whether
the state is strong, weak, or altogether unaccomplished, the Geor-
gian political elite is unlikely to let go of its privileges.
Main failures:
• None of the independence-period governments have proposed to
society a comprehensive development strategy. The governments
either did not have any cohesive vision in this respect
(Gamsakhurdia), or there were generalized views, but no clear-cut
action plans and no strategic decision making in the normal work-
ing mode (Saakashvili);
• Widespread political naivety and wishful thinking and a low level
of social activity (accounted for by a number of reasons: eco-
nomic, psychological, political) ruled out the possibility of a strong
and pragmatic public demand. At the same time, it has to be noted
that there is progress, albeit slow, in terms of creating civil society.
What exerted the greatest influence on the above processes:
• For the most part, the Georgian statehood was being established
(or restored) against the backdrop of worldwide geopolitical changes
(upset of the bipolar balance of power and establishment of a new
world order). The domestic factors played a relatively minor part
in this; the countries which did not “fight” for independence
(Central Asia) became just as independent as those who did (the
Baltic countries, the Caucasus). At the same time, domestic factors
are increasingly important because the government system and the
transformation of a number of sectors (education, social security,
etc.) are much less dependent on foreign factors.
2.
The main change:
• The idea of restoring Georgian statehood became extremely popu-
lar in Georgian society in the second half of the 1980s and later,
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during Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s presidency. Although the project had
a mythical aura to it, was tinged with ethnocentric nationalism and
had little to do with political realities, Georgians’ desire to build
their own state spread beyond narrow intellectual and dissident
circles and became popular.
Gamsakhurdia’s achievements:
• Declaration of national independence, which was predicated on the
results of the nationwide referendum;
• More intense (if infantile) social activity and achievement of a high
level of social capital.
Gamsakhurdia’s failures:
• The beginning and strengthening of the process of infantile and
excessive politicization in society and the newly formed political elite;
• The lack or absence of experience in state governance;
• Dramatic growth of confrontation among social and ethnic groups
and clans and between these and the government, which was
often encouraged by the government.
New developments:
• Shift in the public mind in favor of independent statehood. The
syndrome of fear of independence disappeared in society. What
was considered just a dream 10 years before had become an
achievable reality in the public eye.
Reasons for the fall of the Gamsakhurdia government:
• The authorities “inspired” all domestic and foreign parties opposed
to it (Russia, Soviet intelligentsia, criminal world, youth and most
of Soviet nomenclature business circles) to unite against it. This
in conditions where other actors remained neutral (the West) or
were rapidly growing disenfranchised (wide public masses);
• Shortage of internal resources (first and foremost, human re-
sources).
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3.
Most important changes brought on by the Shevardnadze govern-
ment:
• The new government came to power with the idea of building a
democratic and modernized state, confronting its predecessor’s
ethnocentric and isolationist course. Although the state was week,
it consolidated real political power and achieved international rec-
ognition, but maintaining the resulting status quo became an end
unto itself.
Shevardnadze’s achievements:
• The changes in foreign policy were the main achievement: Georgia
achieved international recognition;
• Political romanticism gave way to the primacy of real interests,
which was achieved by balancing foreign and domestic forces;
• The major economic and political projects were launched (the
Eurasian corridor, oil and gas pipelines, etc.).
Shevardnadze’s failures:
• The policy of balancing both foreign and, especially, domestic
factors served to intensify the confrontation between political (in-
ternational orientation), social (dramatic rise of the proportion of
marginalized population) and civil (segments of civil society and
old party nomenclature) interest groups;
• Shevardnadze’s desire for a super-presidential model made him the
overseer of all confrontations, so all of the negative energy was
directed against him;
• The coup, civil war and lost ethnic conflicts caused – aside from
economic collapse – public frustration, mistrust and a nihilistic
attitude toward the state.
The novelties:
• In contrast to the Gamsakhurdia-era idealism, realism and prag-
matic views started to dominate the process of state governance.
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Moreover, it was the period of prevalence of exceedingly mercan-
tile (in the worst meaning of the word) views; the political elite
viewed the state as a means of deriving their private material or
other benefits.
The reasons for the fall of the Shevardnadze government:
• Despite authoritarian methods of governance, Georgia did not (and
still does not) have the resources that are required for the estab-
lishment of dictatorship (existence of natural resources, strong
punitive mechanisms and foreign support). Unlike Belarus,
Azerbaijan and the Central Asian regimes, Shevardnadze was forced
to implement a semi-liberal policy in the country;
• A new balance of power was established in the country. With
support of the displeased masses and new social groups (civil
society, bureaucracy and part of the business sector), “the Young
Reformers” who split off from the Shevardnadze team made him
follow in Cronos’ footsteps.
• In foreign policy, the existing balance was also preserved. The
more and more influential West was no longer pleased with
Georgia’s policy of frequent changes of tack and started to look
for a more pro-Western successor to Shevardnadze.
4.
The main change brought on by Saakashvili’s government:
• We see an attempt to create a stronger and more efficient state
compared to the previous regime. The changes are effected with
slogans of accelerated westernization and the complete renewal of
systems. Despite successes in some areas and the existence of a
strategic vision (idea), there is no action plan or tactic to imple-
ment this idea.
Saakashvili’s achievements:
• Greater social activity is characteristic of post-Shevardnadze Geor-
gia. The Rose Revolution awakened a frustrated public from its
lethargy. Although disenchantment followed quite soon, the desire
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to protect one’s rights and do something that can make a real
difference gradually transforms from euphoric sentiments into prag-
matic actions;
• Major successes towards creating a single common civil area
(developments in Achara) and the administration of the state sys-
tem (the national budget increased 6-7 times in three years) should
be considered the government’s undisputable achievements;
• Positive changes are taking place in some sectors (implementation
of a number of programs in the education and social protection
systems), although the results of these changes will manifest them-
selves many years later.
Saakashvili’s failures:
• With the dramatic reduction of widespread corruption, corruption
at higher levels has become more likely;
• Despite ceaseless propaganda (which is often of mediocre quality
and is waged with gross violations of the principle of supremacy
of law), the approval ratings of the government are falling rapidly;
• There is a lack of strategic planning and an absence of tactical
solutions. If under Shevardnadze, the government formally re-
ceived advice from expert circles but failed to act on it, now they
do not even listen for formality’s sake and, at best, limit them-
selves to calls on the expert community to support the process of
implementing the decisions they make;
• There is a tendency toward super-centralization of power. Instead
of strengthening local governments, even the minimal powers of
the local governments of the Shevardnadze period were further
trimmed. At the national level, the balance between the branches
of powers is upset. In effect, decisions are made by only a small
group of people.
New developments:
• The strength of the PR efforts distinguishes the incumbent gov-
ernment from its predecessors. At the same time, we see clearly
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wrong assessments of the situation. There are instances of the
existence of “Potemkin villages” as well.
5.
Reasons for the opposition’s weakness:
• Despite the dramatic fall of its approval ratings, the government
is still much more popular than the entire opposition spectrum put
together;
• There are indirect, and often direct, government repressions against
the opposition (especially in the pre-election periods and especially
in the provinces);
• The opposition does not have a charismatic leader of the Saakashvili
level, which is very important in Georgia. The government’s desire
to prevent the emergence of such a leader is also evident (the
release of footage of opposition Tbilisi city councilman Koba
Davitashvili taking money from a man in exchange for a spot on
his electoral bloc’s party list);
• The middle class, which is necessary for political diversification,
is very small in Georgia, whereas the business sector fears the real
or imaginary compromising materials which the government might
possess against them;
• The post-totalitarian mentality, which makes people always support
the incumbent government (“if not they, then who?”), also works
against the opposition (despite their diametrically opposite views,
the vast majority of the population supported Gamsakhurdia,
Shevardnadze and Saakashvili at the time of their coming to
power);
• The opposition parties (at least most of them) are not political
parties in a strict sense (perhaps with the exception of the Labor
Party). They have no permanent constituency with its own inter-
ests and no democratic party structure;
• All the opposition’s activities are focused on criticism of the gov-
ernment. No attention is paid to presenting their own programs
and views (if they have any).
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6.
The opposition ought to appeal to those values (the supremacy of
law, human rights, social issues, radical and isolationist nationalism) to
which the government pays little attention or which it opposes.
Considering the Central and Eastern European experience, the
following lines of action seem promising:
• Mobilizing a substantial number of people under social (and to
some extent, even social-revanchist) slogans, especially given the
acuteness of the economic problems and economic hyper-polariza-
tion of society;
• Kindling nationalist and, partly, isolationist sentiments is increas-
ingly frequent in the lower-income strata, which comprise the
absolute majority of the population;
• Seeking the establishment of the principle of supremacy of law in
light of the mistakes or transgressions of the incumbent authorities,
citing as the reason the need for speedy reforms.
The opposition’s prospects in the following areas are relatively dim:
• Advocacy of human rights, which is viewed as an alternative to
building a strong state and perceived as protection of the rights of
minorities (especially religious and sexual) at the cost of the majority
(Orthodox Christian, “indigenous” Georgians);
• Struggle against corruption, which fell into much discredit because
of scandalous “PR arrests” and gross violations of the presumption
of innocence;
• Primacy of democratic principles, especially liberal values, which
is associated with the current economic and political difficulties.
This is precisely why these ideas are undergoing serious devalu-
ation in the public eye.
At any rate, decisive importance in the process of raising the
opposition’s approval ratings should be given to clear-cut programs
that will be understandable to the general public.
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7.
With different probabilities, it is possible to assign the function of
the effective opposition to political forces of different origins:
• The existing opposition parties will likely die out unless they
radically change their strategies. At best, they stand to become
parts of other political entities (it is possible that the names of the
new political entities will be borrowed from the old vocabulary);
• A breakup of the United National Movement is inevitable. Usually,
the approval ratings of the parties which are closely integrated into
the structure of government (the Round Table, Citizens’ Union)
falls rapidly and disappears altogether after the latest political crisis
or change in the “engine’s” (head of government’s) policy. At the
same time, the future opposition usually comes precisely from the
ranks of the ruling party, disclaims its association with the previous
government and especially with the political course of its leader,
no matter what the political views or capabilities of the new leader
might be (Sigua and Kitovani were ex-Round Table members,
Zhvania and Saakashvili – ex-Citizens’ Union members);
• It is very likely that new political forces will be created, combining
both the groups which split off from the National Movement and
parts of today’s opposition. Although, if this happens, the new
parties will have new names, but they will still be staffed with “old
faces”, who already have held some government posts, are familiar
with the intrigues in the government corridors and, in the opinion
of a substantial part of the public, “know their business”.
In this situation, government reshuffles give rise to many questions,
suspicions and predictions. The development of the Georgian political
spectrum depends in large part on the incumbent government’s policy.
Despite numerous declarations of unity, there are groups within the
Saakashvili team, which often confront one another. The president
himself tacks pretty neatly among his own entourage, which notionally
can be divided into three types of political figures:
• Representatives of the ruling National Movement’s departments,
who form the president’s support base both in parliament and
middle- and lower-tier echelons of power;
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• High-level officials from the executive branch, ministers, most of
whom are not leaders of the ruling party and do not have any
strong political force or public image to back them. Accordingly,
they are entirely dependent on the president;
• A narrow circle of individuals, a camarilla if you will, whose
members usually do not hold any important positions of power but
wield great influence on the process of setting the country’s po-
litical course.
8.
Assessing the stability of the incumbent regime, not to mention
making predictions for it, is quite a difficult task which hinges on
many factors, although it is still possible to highlight several fundamen-
tal premises:
• Compared to its predecessor, the incumbent government is less
stable, and compared to the Gamsakhurdia government – more
stable;
• The Saakashvili government is different from the first govern-
ment of independent Georgia in that Saakashvili has although
small (app. 5%), but really existing interest groups/social strata
which support him;
• The Shevardnadze government was more stable for two reasons:
First, more people were pleased thanks to the mechanisms of
corruption, and second, there were no reforms, which now are
often painful (the “swamp is always stable” principle was at
work).
Recent developments clearly demonstrated the process of diminu-
tion of several political figures. After the weakening, or rather, disap-
pearance, of Okruashvili’s and Arveladze’s positions, the only real
force at the current stage is so-called Bokeria-Merabishvili wing. This
situation makes possible three scenarios of further developments:
1. The latter group wields control of the situation and eventually
gains strong influence over the president;
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2. President Saakashvili fails to discern the potential threat of upset-
ting the balance within the team and thinks that this group will be
loyal to him at all times;
3. In time, this group will be weakened and replaced by other, less
well known and less politically weighty persons.
Presumably, the latter two forecasts (especially the last one) sound
more realistic.
Prognoses:
• The backdrop of instability will become even more accentuated in
the future. The ongoing changes foster new interests and groups
that have these interests, which will tend to associate and even-
tually confront one another and/or the government;
• In the opinion of intellectual representatives of the authorities and
their ideological supporters, a Mexican or Japanese model will be
established in Georgia, with years-long domination of the ruling
party, economic growth and gradual development of guided de-
mocracy. Only the timeframe (10 or 30 years) is moot for them.
In my opinion, this scenario is unlikely given the fragility of the
National Movement as a political force;
• It is more likely that two trends, liberal and revanchist, will clash
in the political arena and that representatives of both sides (the
ruling party and the opposition) will join the ranks of each faction
more or less proportionately.
• Accordingly, Georgia must choose between two paths of develop-
ment: the liberal progressive one (emergence of modern or post-
modern Westernized society through reforms), or the one of pro-
nunciamentos (frequent Latin American- or African-style coups
against the backdrop of growing influence of military and eco-
nomic elites);
• Naturally, both paths individually have slim chances of succeeding
if domestic factors alone are considered. How events will unfold
will depend in large part on foreign factors: accession to NATO
and, particularly, integration into Europe would increase the prob-
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ability of the former option, whereas growing Russian political
influence would favor the latter (in this case, I am more an
optimist than anything else and deem the decrease of Russia’s
political weight in the future an inevitable necessity).
9.
The foreign factor has been, and still remains, an extremely im-
portant (although not the only) factor. Looking back at the dynamic
of Georgia’s development in the last 15 years and extrapolating it into
the future, several phases can be identified:
• Stage I (1991-1995): Strong prevalence of the Russian vector.
Gamsakhurdia’s “rebellion” resulted in the end in the loss of two
autonomous regions and accession to the CIS. Russia controlled both
the Georgian economy and Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy;
• Stage II (1995-2003): Weakening of Russia’s positions in the
Caucasus and beginning of its replacement by the West. Imple-
mentation of the Western projects (TRACECA, etc., which were
labeled economic but were in effect political) begins against the
backdrop of the Yeltsin-period democracy and chaos in Russia and
relative stability in Georgia;
• Stage III (2003- present): Balancing of the Western and northern
vectors, although the West is already an equal competitor to
Russia. The balancing-oriented Shevardnadze government is re-
placed by unequivocally pro-Western forces;
• Stage IV (near-future prospect): Beginning of Western domination.
Russia’s influence will be minimized by strengthening international
institutions (first and foremost, NATO);
• Stage V (long-term prospect): Georgia will be completely integrated
into the West.
How long will this process take depends on:
• World market prices of oil and other fossil fuels;
• Anticipated changes in Russia’s domestic policy (a political crisis
due to social and nationalist perturbations) because radicalization of
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the Russian political spectrum is likely to intensify confrontation
with the West and correspondingly, the process of weakening
Russia;
• Public readiness – how successful Georgia will be in resolving its
problems, at least partially.
What has to be said is that as time passes, the influence of foreign
factors is gradually diminishing, and the influence of domestic factors
on the country’s political life are increasing accordingly.
10.
A thorough revision of the state system will be required if devel-
opments are to follow the ideal scenario. We discussed the foreign
factors in the previous section. It is a fact that the international
environment is increasingly favorable for Georgia. This, of course,
does not mean that old threats will disappear and new ones cannot
emerge (strengthening of etatist policy-backed radical nationalism in
Russia, growth of radical Islam in Turkey, delays or suspension of the
process of accession to the EU, slowing down of the economic growth
rate, social problems resulting from ageing of the population, etc.), but
effectiveness in reacting to new challenges can be achieved by choos-
ing optimal directions of state development.
Five main priority areas can be highlighted with respect to the
required changes:
1. Government system: Georgia should be a parliamentary system.
Arguments in support:
• This will reduce the threat of authoritarianism inherent to the
presidential system, which is one of the demands of the post-
totalitarian society.
• Because of Georgia’s limited resources and strong foreign in-
terference, authoritarianism will never become dictatorship here
and will cause new revolutionary waves (to great disappoint-
ment of Pinochet apologists);
• Political diversification (growing importance of the groups within
Parliament) – although it will slow down the reforms, but this
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is inevitable under the presidential model too: the emergence
of new groups within the ruling elite and intra-party strife
make this scenario the only possible one.
2. Real independence of the judiciary. Arguments in support:
• Introduction of a real mediator and balancer (even if somewhat
incompetent, but more or less impartial) between the govern-
ment and society will increase the Georgian state’s political
capital and rid the government of its public image of a gen-
darme and executioner.
3. Decentralization (simultaneously with de-concentration) and region-
alism. Arguments in support:
• Closeness to the population will enhance the degree of civil par-
ticipation in decision making and take away from state the image
of the only institution which resolves political and social tensions.
• Improvements in the provision of social services at the local
level will free the state from extra concerns and enable it to
use available resources more efficiently for implementing gov-
ernment policy.
• The creation of regions (not constituent parts of a federation!) will
promote the process of the establishment of local political elites,
which will replace the existing clannish and criminal entities.
• Real decentralization will oppose the disintegration processes
because local problems will be resolved at the local level and
the center (Tbilisi) will not be the object of public criticism
anymore (including from ethnic enclaves).
4. The improvement of the business environment through develop-
ment of a carefully designed macro- and microeconomic develop-
ment strategy. Arguments in support:
• Development and prognostication by the state of a competitive
economic strategy (rather than attempts to manage the economy).
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At present, we see the opposite picture: the government’s economic
policy is entrusted to people who are categorical opponents of the
idea of development of a government strategy, whereas practice
shows routine gross, populist and sometimes illegal intervention of
government departments in private businesses’ affairs (Kakha
Bendukidze’s ideas vs. the activities of the Financial Police).
5. The social and education sectors should be on the list of the
country’s top priorities. Arguments in support:
• In the decades to come, while the economy is gaining strength and
fundamental changes are under way in social psychology, it is
unlikely that purely market-oriented systems of education, healthcare
and guarantees of social security that might be created will be able
to truly meet the growing demands of the ageing society.
Action plan:
The main directions of the vision for the country’s development
should be defined with maximum transparency and civil co-participa-
tion in order to enlist maximum public support for difficult and often
unpopular reforms.
Any action must entail the following phases:
I. Development by the state of strategic blueprints for different sec-
tors with participation of local and foreign experts;
II. Disseminating the formulated strategies and blueprints among the
public, sharing ideas to make appropriate amendments; priming the
public by reaching nationwide consensus (if this proves impossible,
then reaching consensus at least among the most important actors);
III. Designing strategy-based action plans (which should be accompa-
nied by a simplified, easily comprehensible and clearly formulated
list of procedures);
IV. Involving society in the implementation process and boosting its
motivation to guarantee success (selection of staff in a democratic
and transparent manner, etc.)
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Assessment of the current developments by contemporaries is an
interesting though not very simple task. It is interesting insofar as the
contemporaries’ reflections create an excellent opportunity for a better
retrospective analysis of the social and political phenomena of the
past from the more distant perspective of the future; and it is
difficult if only because observations of the recent history may be
based on biased views that lack awareness of the broader context.
This political forum aimed at appraising Georgia’s recent history
confronts us precisely with this difficult task. The present article lays
no claims to being a piece of scientific research – and neither do
the objectives of the project require it to be one. The views and
ideas which are expressed here are but an attempt to give assess-
ments to the recent Georgian history and make prognoses for the
future, and they are presented more as separate postulates and
hypotheses than as assertions. However, it would be better if an-
swers to each of the questions that were asked here were based on
proper case studies and research data. We hope that precisely the
intensification of research efforts in these particular areas in our
society will be one of the results of the forum.
Introduction
On the whole, the 15 years of national independence have amounted
to just a pool of attempts to build statehood, which in Georgia, with
its record of three changes of government, had to begin from scratch
after each disturbance. Accordingly, Georgia’s political development
can be envisioned as a model of spiral of development with three
distinct cycles.
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The first cycle coincides with Z. Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, the
second – with E. Shevardnadze’s, and the third – with Mikheil
Saakashvili’s. Each cycle is marked by major social transformations,
which played the role of a solution to the crisis of the legitimacy of
the previous government on the one hand and a vehicle of entering
the next cycle on another. Accordingly, entering each new cycle is
linked with critical episodes of the country’s recent history: in the first
case, it is the April 1989 events, in the second – the December 1991-
January 1992 coup, and in the third case – the 2003 Rose Revolution.
Starting the process of building statehood all over again is what all of
these cycles had in common, although the starting positions in which
they were implemented were different each time and depended on the
results of the preceding cycle. To a certain extent, they are determi-
nants of how successful the development processes of the following
cycle are, although the new governments have not always taken this
into account and tried to draw a dividing line between themselves and
their predecessors.
Figure 1. The spiral model of Georgia’s development in the last
15 years.
Exhaustion of social capital by 
the authorities and crisis of 
legitimacy, which causes new 
social transformation 
Authorities' successes and 
failures 
A new group comes to power 
as a result of social 
transformation 
Figure 2. Cyclical development model
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Our overview provides a general description of Georgia’s cyclical
development and outlines prospects for the future. It has to be noted
here that we consider it the top priority when discussing the country’s
prospects to overcome the spiraling development of this sort and
establish a straight-line pattern in the process of state development.
1.
The spiral pattern of development and the consequent “going
around in circles” has prolonged the process of achieving the kinds of
successes reached by the Baltic States, which have been the most
successful in the former Soviet Union1. For quite some time, Georgia
was a glaring example of what a country should not do if it aspires
to be independent and build a democracy.2
In this report, the assessment of the last 15 years of the country’s
development is given in the form of general trends, with greater detail
provided in the discussion of individual cycles. It also has to be taken
into account that none of the trends should be viewed as an accom-
plished process yet, for they still remain unattained objectives, al-
though progress is obvious according to all the parameters.
Getting rid of the “failed state” label. Overall, the recent his-
tory of Georgia has been nothing but the incumbent authorities’ con-
sistent attempts to tackle the failed state syndrome, which was rooted
partly in the civil strife of the 1990s and partly in the clan rule which
took shape during the Shevardnadze period.
Growing recognizability of Georgia and in general, more in-
terest toward Georgia in the international arena. Georgia’s inter-
national image is improving. Once a part of the USSR, the obscure
Georgia is transforming into an independent sovereign state and a
legitimate member of the international community.
Transition from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism. The
radically nationalist statements which were made at the beginning of the
15 years of development are gradually changing and being conclusively
replaced by so-called civic nationalism. However, the degree of territorial
and civil fragmentation still remains high. Georgia’s territorial integrity
has yet to be restored and the civil integration of ethnic minorities
residing in Georgia’s borderlands still remains a problem.
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Transition from violent to non-violent methods of changing
government. In this respect, the difference between the 1991-1992
coup and the 2003 Rose Revolution was remarkable. Despite the fact
that Shevardnadze’s decision to step down in itself played a significant
role in the bloodless outcome of the transition, it can in large part also
be attributed to the Georgian population’s having experience of chang-
ing government by bloodshed, which acted as a deterrent factor. It is
possible to conclude, therefore, that the political awareness of the
Georgian population has also risen.
Weakening of Russia’s influence in favor of Western influence.
In the first years of Georgia’s independence, Russia dominated the
center stage of the Georgian foreign policy. Eventually, and after the
Rose Revolution almost completely, it was replaced by the West.3  In
the early 1990s, Georgia started its transition from a passive actor in
international politics to playing an active role. Post-revolution Georgia
strives to be a regional actor in the Black Sea region and fosters the
idea of starting a new wave of democratic transformations in other
countries of the former Soviet Union.
Despite the above positive changes, the elections in Georgia are
unable yet to be the instrument of change of government, so Georgia
cannot qualify as a country of so-called electoral democracy. This
is precisely why governments in Georgia are changed in an unconsti-
tutional manner. The only exception was the 28 October 1990 parlia-
mentary elections, in which the transformation of the old regime and
establishment of the new one took place within the constitutional frame-
work4. Accordingly, the 28 October 1990 elections set the first prece-
dent of changing government through elections. In the period that
followed, the institution of elections was assigned somewhat of a façade
function and, in both the 31 October 1992 parliamentary and the 2004
parliamentary and presidential elections, played the symbolic role of
crowning the winner who was established in the process of social
transformation with the triumphal wreath. The elections became not the
instrument of change of government, but a means of formalization of
the victory of the winning side during the social transformation.5
The practice of overcoming the legitimacy crisis by resorting
to electoral irregularities has not been uprooted yet either. The
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Shevardnadze authorities were actively trying to derive benefits for
themselves from the elections and to ignore voters’ preferences, es-
pecially in the last few years of his rule, when the discrepancy
between the negative public attitudes toward the authorities and the
election results was glaring. This phenomenon reached its peak in the
2 November 2003 elections. The incumbent authorities are exposed to
the same temptation. In conditions of the existing imbalance in terms
of distribution of power, they may be tempted to wield administrative
resources to rig the elections. It is therefore a major challenge of the
incumbent authorities to hold fair elections.
As for the questions of how the Georgian society and culture
changed in the 15 years of independence and which societal char-
acteristics affected the political processes the most, it has to be
said that the negative activity of the Georgian population has
the greatest impact on social and political processes.6 The impor-
tance of this factor is particularly high during major upheavals as
compared to periods of social development at a regular pace. The
Georgian population stands out for its participatory culture and high
degree of involvement in the political processes only during social
transformations, but not in the periods between those transforma-
tions. This is accounted for by the high degree of fragmentation,
which is why the possibility of the nation’s consolidation and
accordingly, the success of social and political movements in con-
ditions of the nation’s steady development are limited. On the other
hand, the authorities do not feel the obligation to take into account
the small groups’ demands. Uniting the nation when the level of
disunity is so high requires slogans which would appeal to and
unite the most people possible. But in Georgia, as it has already
been proven more than once, it is easier to rally the people under
negative slogans, such as, for instance, “Georgia without the USSR!”
(Russia was implied), “Georgia without Gamsakhurdia!”, “Georgia
without Eduard Shevardnadze!”, “Achara without Aslan Abashidze!”
and so forth. As a consequence, protest sentiments which cannot
find constitutional channels of expression through the election pro-
cess, for example, are manifested in street protests and give rise
to a new cycle of social transformation.
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A look back at the political processes of the last 15 years in
Georgia shows that this period is best described as the “era of
charismatic leaders”. The very fact that the history of independent
Georgia is usually divided into the periods of heads of state and not
by some other criterion attests to the high demand for charismatic
leaders in our society. Some of the explanations are the Soviet-era
cultivation of the belief in the leader and the country’s numerous
crises, which generate demand for charismatic leaders.
The social capital of charisma and the legitimacy which it confers
are not permanent. As soon as disappointment with the charismatic
leader’s capabilities and success sets in, demand for a new leader is
created. The dramatic change of charismatic leaders demonstrates this
most illustratively. However, it should be admitted that, in contrast to
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s, Eduard Shevardnadze’s trial period proved to
be longer. It is possible that in Saakashvili’s case too, excessive
support for the charismatic leader against the backdrop of revolution-
ary euphoria will plummet dramatically. That three years after the
revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili lost a substantial number of supporters
according to opinion polls may constitute evidence in support of this
scenario. But the most important thing is that the authorities them-
selves should not fall victim to this patrimonial political culture by
trying to keep up the dizzying support for them which initially existed
through election rigging.
In general, Georgia’s political ethos is personalized. Today it is
predicated more on the person than on the system, more on the leader
than on the institution. This is characteristic both for the public
service, governance, and a variety of systems, including those of
political parties, both at the national and local level. Therefore, fos-
tering the development of systems and institutions remains the
main task and one of the major problems to be resolved in the
process of state development.
Naturally, while analyzing the successes of the 15 years of devel-
opment and the existing problems, the starting positions and objective
conditions in which each cycle took shape should be taken into
account. However, the main question which should be asked is which
way the country is headed. Successes that were achieved both in the
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establishment of systems and institutions of democratic governance
and in integration into Western structures should serve as the criteria
here. To answer this question, we will try to assemble a general
picture of the last 15 years of Georgia’s development piece by piece,
by discussing the successes and failures of each cycle individually.
2.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s presidency was the most controversial pe-
riod of the last 15 years of Georgian history. During his presidential
tenure, every success turned out to be a failure in a very short time.
Just a few examples would suffice to prove this. Despite the fact that
Zviad Gamsakhurdia managed to unite the nation7  to the extent which
in Georgia’s modern history was emulated only during the Rose
Revolution, the unity soon passed into oblivion and the country be-
came completely fragmented.8 Under his government, the country was
divided into two camps – Zviadists and anti-Zviadists, which resulted
in a bloody civil strife and the 1991-1992 coup. The late 1980s
phenomenon of the nation standing united as one was forgotten until
the Rose Revolution.
The credit for paving the road for restoration of the national
sovereignty, which was abolished in 1921, should also go to Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, as the conditions in which he achieved this were not
particularly favorable.9 Despite the fact that the country’s de-jure
recognition coincided with the putsch against Gamsakhurdia, he man-
aged to bring about the country’s recognition during his brief rule.
Moreover, Georgia was the first republic in the post-Soviet area where
universal democratic elections were held. Together with the Baltic
States, the Georgia of that period spearheaded the struggle for resto-
ration of national sovereignty. It also has to be taken into account that
Zviad Gamsakhurdia strenuously objected to Georgia’s accession to
the CIS because he considered it an attempt at resurrecting the
USSR.10 The 1991-1992 coup and 1992-1995 civil strife put Georgia’s
statehood in severe jeopardy.
Among the failures of the Gamsakhurdia period were the authori-
ties’ nationalist rhetoric, which, although it proved effective during the
struggle for independence and was the main weapon in the battle
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against the USSR, turned out to be inappropriate for Georgia’s
multiethnic social context. Zviad Gamsakhurdia failed to put nationalist
discourse into the right foreign and domestic context; he proved un-
able to carry out an appropriate personnel policy and accordingly,
created an apparatus that was unfit for governance and unable to
resolve social problems.11 Zviad Gamsakhurdia proved unable to part
with the era of the pro-independence protest rallies of the 1990s. He
had neither experience nor enough intuition for this.12 Mistakes were
made in relations with the opposition parties: Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s
policy for the opposition parties lacked pragmatism. The accusation
that the Gamsakhurdia government banished them from politics should
probably be considered as legitimate. Gamsakhurdia proved to lack the
talent for changing tack, which is so necessary for the regulation of
crisis situations; his campaign against the so-called Red intelligentsia
was ill-thought-out as he issued threats that he would publish black
lists and information about their disreputable activities in the Soviet
period. Georgia did not completely leave Russia’s orbit: in August
1991, when the State Emergency Committee in Moscow tried to stop
perestroika and restore order, the Georgian president, who at that time
was engaged in the South Ossetia conflict, did not actively speak
against the conspirators; the Gamsakhurdia government took the bait
in South Ossetia and got embroiled in the conflict. Of course, using
foreign military units during a civil strife, being guided by personal
ambitions, and taking part in stirring the Abkhazia conflict should
all be viewed as mistakes.
The main reason for the premature end of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s
presidency was the lack of democratic political culture and statesman-
ship. This can explain the mistakes that were made both by the rival
political groups of the period (the authorities and the opposition) and
by society at large. The unwillingness to compromise, tendency to
solve problems solely by confrontational methods, heightening of ten-
sions until crisis is created – all these are characteristic of that period.
Radicalism and acrimony, which were weapons of choice in political
opponents’ rivalry, resulted in the use of force against the legitimately
elected government. The intensity of the political process of the period
can be accounted for in several ways:
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The specific nature of the transition period itself can be considered
the first reason. That is to say, after winning independence and
coming to power, the Gamsakhurdia government ran afoul of great
public expectations. The public expected rapid economic growth and
significant improvement of social and economic conditions. However,
the government had neither the resources nor sufficient experience to
live up to these expectations. The wide gap between the public
expectations and the actual government actions gave rise to the
population’s extremely negative attitude toward the authorities of the
day. In addition, the public also had excessive expectations that de-
mocracy would be established in the country, which resulted in ex-
tremely negative assessments of any deviation from the democratic
procedure. The opposition camp often called Gamsakhurdia another
Ceausescu. The rhetorical questions of the period was what was more
important – democratic development or sorting the country out, which
should come first or whether it was possible to achieve both objec-
tives at the same time. Initially, Zviad Gamsakhurdia too was more
inclined toward development and consolidation of the independent
state, but the radical opposition and the Russian media saw to creating
the image of a dictator for him.
The Georgian society of that period did not really think about the
possible results owing to their lack of experience of civil strife and
therefore was making demands in the most pressing manner. Later, the
fear of reliving the chaos and lawlessness of the past played an
important role in the bloodless conduct of the Rose Revolution. In
other words, having effectively acquiesced use of force, a substantial
segment of the Georgian society of the period did not fully realize
what the potential outcome would be.
When discussing the causes of the coup in Georgia, we also have
to take into account the Kremlin’s position: Moscow was interested in
the extreme escalation of the situation in the country. The point is that
from the moment of declaration of independence through early 1993,
Russia’s prospects in Georgia seemed quite unclear. Georgia, like
Azerbaijan, did not join the Commonwealth of Independent States and
was trying its best to rid itself of Russia’s influence. To Russia, on
the other hand, maintaining its influence on Georgia, with its Black
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Sea ports and common border with Turkey became a strategic goal.
When the Georgian government headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia failed
to find an ally in the West, Russian interference in the country’s
domestic affairs and conflicts became inevitable. Russia actively em-
ployed for this purpose the Transcaucasus Military District, both in the
December 1991-January 1992 developments and for escalation of the
situation in the hotbeds of ethnic separatism. The occurrence of events
which were similar to the coup in Georgia in other countries of the
post-Soviet area support the argument about the Kremlin’s participa-
tion in the coup.13 The first failure of the state thus became evident.
3.
The 11-year period of Eduard Shevardnadze, former Soviet for-
eign minister who had earned enormous political capital in the eyes
of the West and returned to the Georgian political stage, can be
described as a road from criminal to clan governance.
On his return to Georgia, Shevardnadze had to rebuild the state
over again because the only thing Georgia had at that time was de
jure recognition by the international community following the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union and hope that a country headed by Eduard
Shevardnadze would start receiving international assistance. Judging by
other parameters, the country’s development was under serious threat.
Society was divided into two camps, Zviadists and Shevardnadzists;
Kitovani and Sigua, participants in the December 1991-January 1992
coup who were backed by some of the National Guard units and
criminal kingpins, were on one side of the civil strife barricades, and
supporters of the former president with part of the National Guard
were on the other. The dire social and economic situation in the
country was added to this.
Shevardnadze spent three years from 1992 to 1995 on implement-
ing stabilization programs, and this should be considered the most
important success of his presidency. However, in the same period
most of Abkhazia’s territory was lost, military units (Admiral Baltin’s
troops) of a foreign country, Russia, were used to consolidate his
power,14 disadvantageous peace agreements were signed on the South
Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts, Georgia joined the CIS, and the pres-
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ence of the Russian military bases in Georgia was extended for
another 25 years.
Striking a balance between the conflicting parties should be con-
sidered one of Shevardnadze’s achievements, especially in the first few
years after his return to Georgia. Eduard Shevardnadze acted as a
mediator between the opponents. He rallied around himself and tem-
porary groups, which he would later dismiss after using them for one
purpose or another. It was thanks to Shevardnadze’s talent for political
flexibility that Jaba Ioseliani’s paramilitary units were dismissed pain-
lessly and Igor Giorgadze was removed from power.
Shevardnadze achieved considerable success in the establishment
of state institutions and, in general, the country’s institutional devel-
opment. Despite the fact that the institutions that were established in
his period were largely artificial and played the role of a façade, they
should still be considered a major step ahead in conditions of the
dysfunctional state apparatus of the early 1990s. It also has to be
taken into account that precisely during the Shevardnadze period, the
Soviet-era legal framework underwent a major transformation and was
brought closer to the Western values. The adoption of the new
constitution and abolition of capital punishment also merit mention.15
Paving the way for the development of the free media and nongov-
ernmental sector is also associated with Shevardnadze’s name. It has
to be said that even the harshest critics of Shevardnadze cannot avoid
admitting these achievements.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s voluntary resignation was also to his credit.
Although this was done under pressure from the Rose Revolution, the
revolution might have ended in bloodshed had it not been for
Shevardnadze’s position. It also has to be said that no division has taken
place in society along the Shevardnadzist-anti-Shevardnadzist line. The
entire society became an anti-Shevardnadze camp, in other words, after
the Rose Revolution, society was not as factionalized before entering a
new cycle of state development as it was the case before the second
transformation, after Shevardnadze’s return; instead, this happened on the
basis of the consolidation of the nation. Strange though this might sound,
it has to be said that Shevardnadze, who returned in the early 1990s to
a divided society, managed to unite the nation against himself.
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The gradual transition of Georgia to the pro-Western orientation
and the beginning of the process of Georgia’s integration into the
European structures, which manifested itself in Georgia’s accession to
the Council of Europe in 1999, the laying of the groundwork for the
closure of the Russian military bases, paving the way for Georgia’s
accession to NATO, as evidenced by the Georgian army’s participation
in the US-led Train and Equip Program, were also among
Shevardnadze’s achievements.
As a result, the explicitly pro-Russian orientation of 1993-1995 gave
way to a bipolar foreign political orientation when hopes of restoration of
all the country’s territorial integrity with Russia’s help were dashed.
Although Shevardnadze was trying to the end to find the golden medium
in the foreign politics and implement a policy of balance between Russia
and the West, it has to be said that his policy proved to be ineffective
because Russia could not reconcile itself with the idea of appearance of
the West in the geopolitical area it considered its own, whereas the West
has never been given a carte blanche in Georgia given Russia’s presence.
As for the mistakes and failures of the Shevardnadze period,
besides the already mentioned ones, his retrogressive style of gover-
nance and the tendency to resolve the problems facing society through
minor improvements (incrementally) have to be mentioned, which
looked more like stagnation than progress. Ultimately, this style of
work of the public administration and countless problems on the
agenda which required strategic solutions rather than minor improve-
ments dissolved the system. During his presidency, attempts to im-
prove the grave economic situation, worsened by the energy crisis,
failed. Public displeasure was growing daily, and the degree of the
authorities’ legitimacy was falling.
Among the characteristics of the Shevardnadze rule were clannish
and corrupt government, nepotism, government officials’ shares in
private business, chronic budget deficit, permanent problems with the
collection of budget revenues and an unenviable investment climate
which precluded foreign investment and made economic development
impossible. Precisely these were the reasons why discontent with and
the crisis of the Shevardnadze government evolved, and the Rose
Revolution found a way out of the situation.
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4.
With the Rose Revolution and Saakashvili’s coming to power, for
the third time in modern Georgian history, yet another process of
building the Georgian state started, one which qualitatively and quan-
titatively is very different from the preceding cycles. The political
arena in post-revolution Georgia has become much more dynamic and
target-oriented, and discussions on value systems have been substituted
with finding practical solutions to social problems. In contrast to the
previous regime, the public can see the results of the authorities’
activity (whether these are positive or negative is another matter),
which proves that they are working.16 In contrast to the Shevardnadze
government, the Saakashvili authorities declare as their mission imple-
menting systemic changes and carrying out reforms at an accelerated
pace. Accordingly, if we should consider Zviad Gamsakhurdia the
founder of the country’s statehood and Eduard Shevardnadze – its
institutional designer, Mikheil Saakashvili is the person who rendered
it more systemic and made it functional. In contrast to the preceding
periods, the Saakashvili authorities are building state according to
Western standards, which is no small task and quite painful a process
because it requires the authorities to take many unpopular decisions
and put them into practice17 , which in a post-Soviet society, or rather,
a society which is used to the Shevardnadze-era primacy of clan,
corporate and individual interests, is associated with the difficult task
of changing the popular mindset. This is why, in order to enlist public
support and maintain legitimacy, the incumbent Georgian authorities
give a wide publicity to their successes.18 and sometimes even make
concessions and offer the public populist alternative solutions. So, the
dualism which exists between state building and populism is evident,
and the Saakashvili government often seems to be its captive.
Among the successes of Saakashvili and his government, the first
and foremost to be mentioned is that the Rose Revolution was carried
out bloodlessly, breaking with the tradition of bloody transformations
and creating a precedent of peaceful, albeit unconstitutional, transfer
of power. The restoration of Georgian jurisdiction in the Autonomous
Republic of Achara, which significantly reduced the degree of territo-
rial disunity of Georgia, also has to be mentioned.
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From the point of view of state development, the incumbent
government’s indisputable successes include the establishment of a
culture of public love and respect toward the national symbols (an-
them, flag, coat-of-arms), and from the point of view of civil integra-
tion – promotion of multiethnic unity on the basis of civic nationalism,
which has more than once been specifically emphasized by Mikheil
Saakashvili himself in his public speeches and reports.19 Among the
results of the incumbent government’s three years’ work, tackling the
problems of permanent budget deficit and collection of budget rev-
enues, as well as annually improving economic indicators merit special
emphasis. Despite the fact that collection of budget revenues in Georgia
is often associated with “state racketeering” by the authorities, it has
to be taken into account that the established practice of the
Shevardnadze period, tax evasion, can only be ended through strict
enforcement, which is naturally identified with state racket in the
critics’ eyes.20 The incumbent Georgian authorities also have to work
on improvement of the investment environment, which was unenviable
under Shevardnadze, although the criteria of selection of property for
privatization, impartiality of the authorities in these matters, and the
issue of participation or otherwise of government officials in this
process still remain disputable. It is a fact that the incumbent authori-
ties are faced with the same challenge as the Shevardnadze govern-
ment was – not to fall under the influence of private business and
play the role of a mediator between the government and private
sectors to the end.
Taking a firm position in relations with Russia and forcing Russia
to admit the Georgian statehood not only de jure, but also de facto
is also among the successes of the Saakashvili government.21 Another
noteworthy achievement is the withdrawal of the Russian military
bases from the country’s territory; Georgia started to openly call
Russia a party to the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia
conflicts, which would not have happened under Shevardnadze. There
are visible efforts to replace the Russian peacekeepers deployed in the
conflict zones under the CIS aegis with some other peacekeeping
contingent. When talking about the conflicts, we must mention the
establishment of the alternative to the separatist Tskhinvali authorities
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in the form of the pro-Georgian provisional authority under the lead-
ership of Dmitriy Sanakoyev, which is considered an outpost for the
peaceful restoration of Georgian jurisdiction in South Ossetia, just like
the Kodori Gorge authority in Abkhazia.
It was precisely during Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency that the
practical implementation of Georgia’s integration with NATO and, more
generally, into European structures, began, whereas before it remained
just an instance of wishful thinking. The Patrol Police and standard-
ized national university entrance exams are also on the list of Mikheil
Saakashvili’s successful initiatives.
When talking about the negative aspects of Mikheil Saakashvili’s
rule, what has to be mentioned first and foremost is the heavy shift
in separation of powers toward the executive branch even compared to
the Shevardnadze period and the weakening of the role and functions
of the legislative branch, which gives grounds to some researchers to
talk about the “super-presidential” system of governance. The authorities
cite the need for and necessity of rapid reforms as an explanation.
The same explanation is given to the repeated practice of the
incumbent Georgian authorities of tailoring the law to suit their needs
on the one hand,22 and to the top down process of policymaking and
disregard in the process of reaching public political decisions for the
opinions of the nongovernmental sector and the public even at the
initial consideration stage. It is known that achieving this goal (carrying
out the reforms) using democratic methods is very difficult and that
it is relatively easy to use autocratic methods. It also has to be taken
into account that there is quite a great demand among the Georgian
public today for a tight rein, which makes the Saakashvili government’s
slant toward autocratic decisions acceptable to the public and obviates
the need for the authorities themselves to think about self-restraint.
Gross legal violations in the process of confiscation of property of
former high-level officials during the anti-corruption reform, as well as
the acceptance of inadequate evidence when political opponents were
arrested, seem to attest to this. And all this indicates that the su-
premacy of law is not yet the supreme principle for our society.
The social environment has not improved in the three years of
Saakashvili’s presidency. The social situation still remains one of the
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most painful and most dangerous factors to the stability of govern-
ment. The 10-lari (about 6 USD) pension raise cannot change the
situation in conditions of chronically high inflation and unemployment
rates. The social safety networks are still based on subsidized social
assistance and intended only for the most impoverished families, whereas
building the social security system on the basis of redistributive justice
would have been more efficient. Among the noteworthy failures of the
incumbent authorities are also the summer 2004 military operation in
South Ossetia, the grave situation in the penitentiary system, the
limiting of freedom of speech and dependence of the judiciary on
other branches of power.
Overall, Mikheil Saakashvili’s three years in power can be de-
scribed as the process of revival after the two failures to become an
accomplished state, which seems to be based on the radical etatist
ideology. In effect, however, what is happening is the restoration of
statehood and the beginning of proper functioning of state compared
to the preceding periods. Precisely this creates the impression of active
participation of the state. However, it is also true that, as the expe-
rience of the last 15 years shows, the days of autocratic governance
are unlikely to last long, and the Saakashvili government will sooner
or later have to think hard about transforming itself if it wants to
remain in power.
5.
The opposition’s weakness has been one of the most conspicuous
phenomena of the last 15 years of Georgia’s political development.
The periods of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s, Eduard Shevardnadze’s and
Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency are not very different in this respect.
It has to be taken into account that, when talking about the weakness
of the opposition, the criterion is the likelihood of the opposition
parties’ coming to power, which, with the exception of the parties
which split from the ruling party in the past, is effectively equal to
zero. The point is that the succession of ruling parties in Georgia has
been taking place not through the replacement of the ruling party by
the opposition, but through the coming to power of an opposition wing
that emerges from within the ruling party headed by a charismatic
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leader. Accordingly, changes of government is associated with internal
discords and rifts within the ruling party, which in the last 15 years
of Georgian history has become an established spiraling pattern, not
a feature of any individual cycle. The replacement of the seemingly
unrivalled Gamsakhurdia government became possible through the efforts
of Tengiz Kitovani and Tengiz Sigua, who had left the ranks of his
supporters, on the one hand, and the former Soviet nomenclature on
the other23 . Eduard Shevardnadze was also replaced by the oppo-
sition groups who had in the past split off from his party, the
Georgian Citizens’ Union.24  The likelihood of continuation of the
same trend at present is often pointed out when forecasts are made
about the future of the United National Movement. Currently, the
probability of some opposition party’s coming to power in Georgia
(at any rate, from among the present-day political spectrum) does
not merit consideration. The absence of corresponding rise in the
approval ratings of any of the opposition parties despite the falling
approval ratings of the ruling party attests to this.25  The more likely
scenario is the one in which the next ruling political force has some
connection with the United National Movement. It is therefore ap-
propriate to draw a line between the opposition with and without the
record of belonging to the ruling party (internal and external oppo-
sition) when we discuss the possibility of the political opposition’s
coming to power in Georgia: The former denotes opposition groups
which split off from the ruling party (not from a coalition), whereas
the latter refers to the part of the political spectrum without this type
of link with the ruling party.
When we discuss the weaknesses of the external opposition par-
ties, we should perhaps take into account objective systemic problems
and specifics of the Georgian political culture of the last 15 years,
which was heavily prone to supporting political parties that were
created around charismatic leaders. What factors cause such a high
support for political parties that are created around charismatic leaders
is a subject for a separate piece of research. It is a fact, however,
that support is given not so much to the party as to its leader. The
landslide victories of Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table-Free Georgia,
Shevardnadze’s Georgian Citizens’ Union, and Saakashvili’s United
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National Movement attest to this. Precisely this specific quality of the
political culture should serve as an explanation for putting the ruling
party in a monopolistic situation of sorts and sidelining the external
opposition spectrum. This situation gives the opposition parties the
impression of being left out of the political process and grounds to talk
about an exclusive political environment and a high degree of political
verticalization. The feeling that the ruling party is beyond the competi-
tors’ reach is, in the final analysis, quite disadvantageous to the ruling
party itself because governments who came to power with overwhelm-
ing popular support usually consider public trust a static resource
which will never get exhausted. But the point is that the feeling of
matchlessness of the ruling party remains only as long as the leader’s
charisma makes this possible.26 Questioning the charismatic leader’s
abilities and disappointment with him automatically result in the change
of attitudes toward the ruling party, although the Georgian population
may have to continue to formally acknowledge that the former char-
ismatic leader has no alternative for a long time, until the emergence
of the new charismatic leader, as was the case after the public
disappointment in Eduard Shevardnadze.27
What other factors may underlie the weakness of the external
political opposition?
Ineffective party system and structure: One of the main short-
comings of the opposition political parties is the paucity of their
structural units and absence of real local branches. The latter are
mostly active only during election campaigns. The lack of qualified
staff may be one of the explanations. Another indicator of ineffective
party system and structure is that the opposition does not know its
own voters. The opposition is not familiar with the situation on the
political market and therefore cannot work out an appropriate strategy
to attract more voters. This ability can only evolve through the growth
and qualitative improvement of the analytical component. The ruling
party seems to have a better situation with respect to the party
structure, although in general the institution of the political party is still
at the initial stage of development in Georgia.
Lack of credibility of the party as a political institution in
Georgia, compared to other social institutions like the media or the
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church28, is a characteristic of modern-day public sentiments. Strong
support for a ruling party which has grown around a charismatic
leader, especially soon after its coming to power, is one thing, and
lack of support for the political parties which do not have a charis-
matic leader is quite another.
The “Shamatava syndrome”29  – lacking long-term strategy
and counting only on the authorities’ mistakes: The opposition
parties do not propose to the public any alternatives to the authorities’
solutions to problems of society or policy options. This undermines
both public trust in them and their image as capable political entities
and molds the opinion that if the opposition cannot propose alternative
models now, it will not be able to propose them when it comes to
power either. Accordingly, the external opposition spectrum acts only
as a mouthpiece, a conduit for articulating the problems, not as a
mechanism for solving them.30  In these conditions, the opposition can
only count on the authorities’ mistakes and failures. Reiterating old
controversies and looking into the past, not the future, to which the
opposition often resorts, is yet further proof of the absence of policy
analysis and long-term strategy of dealing with the country’s problems.
It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the ordinary citizen
prefers to go to the authorities and the media instead of some political
group to get some private or public problem resolved. At a time when
the authorities’ successes are obvious, especially against the backdrop
of nonfeasance of the Shevardnadze government, this sort of passive
activity is disadvantageous to the opposition.
The absence of charismatic opposition leaders at the current
stage: Disappointed with the authorities, the protest vote awaits the
emergence of a new charismatic leader and new political party, which
was clearly manifest for a brief period after Salome Zourabichvili
crossed over to the opposition camp.
Lack of coordination between the parties: The rivalry for the
status of the “main opposition force” is apparent, especially between
the parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition, which hinders
creation of an opposition alliance. However, it also has to be taken
into account that unity is the only way for the opposition parties to
win over a higher number of supporters and come to power. At the
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same time, the authorities would be more likely to reckon with the
political weight of the united opposition.
The absence of an opposition-controlled regional center of
political power: Just like the central government, the local self-
governments are also entirely under the ruling parties’ control. Accord-
ingly, the Georgian opposition spectrum today lacks the lever which
during Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency existed in the form of Acharan
leader Aslan Abashidze’s Revival party.
Limited fundraising opportunities for the opposition political
parties in the electoral marathon, where, given the common practices
of toll-gating and macing, the use of government levers is highly likely31.
The weakness of the opposition spectrum can also be accounted
for by factors like government pressure, i.e. irregularities and unfair-
ness of the electoral process and use of administrative resources,32 as
well as by introduction of the high election threshold.
6.
Any failure or mistake by the incumbent authorities may serve as
a slogan. To supply answer to this question, two factors have to be
taken into account. First, the last 15 years of Georgia’s development
show that the legitimacy of any government depends in large part on
its fulfillment of its campaign promises. An International Republican
Institute study in which respondents put giving false promises at the
top of the list of unacceptable qualities of a politician,33 also attests
to this. This quality was found equally unacceptable for the respon-
dents in both the incumbent ruling party and the opposition, although
it is clear that this test is applicable today more to the authorities than
to the opposition, if only because the authorities are responsible for
today’s public policy. Therefore, failure to keep all the promises of the
political force which came to power after the Rose Revolution may
presumably be wielded against the government by the opposition in
the future. Despite the fact that this is precisely what the opposition
is doing and that it is putting an emphasis precisely on the authorities’
mistakes and unfulfilled promises, there is no rise in the opposition
parties’ approval ratings. The only result of disappointment in the
government for now is the falling government approval rating, which
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in itself does not cause rising opposition ratings. What we see is part
of the population which is displeased with the incumbent government
but does not deem the opposition – which it knows very well – an
alternative either. The opposition sentiments are wasted purposelessly.
A conclusion follows that the launch of any serious movement against
the Saakashvili government is unlikely in the near future.34  Precisely
this makes it possible to predict that the incumbent president will stay
for a second term, although another consideration has to be factored
in when talking about this issue, in particular, that disappointment and
discontent with the ruling party might easily transform into support for
a political group which will rally around the new charismatic leader
should such a leader emerge. Accordingly, if a new charismatic op-
position leader enters the Georgian political arena, it is quite possible
that the brewing sentiments of displeasure with the authorities might
be put to use against the government.
As for the values, slogans and messages which might lay founda-
tion for an anti-Saakashvili social or political movement, these might
be infringement of property rights, violations of human rights, persis-
tence of the grave social and economic situation, failure to resolve the
unemployment problems, rising prices and utility fees, and inflation,
although it is clear that slogans against radical privatization and in
support of the national economy will have a greater potential for
mobilization of supporters. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the
commitment which Georgia made as early as during Eduard
Shevardnadze’s presidency to repatriate the Muslim Meskhetians as a
precondition for accession to the Council of Europe and which Mikheil
Saakashvili will have to fulfill might encounter stiff resistance, although
in this case Saakashvili will probably parry the campaign against him
by pointing at Shevardnadze.35
The discussion on the opposition’s slogans requires taking into
account that in the future, the focus of political rivalry will move on
to discussions and debates on alternative solutions to public problems
and individual issues, and debating how the given problem should be
resolved will become much more important.
As for the niche which today exists in the Georgian political
spectrum, it has to be said that despite the current dire social situation
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and popularity of social slogans, the left wing is relatively free. This
is precisely why the new opposition party should try to occupy
precisely that niche and take advantage of the dire social situation.
7.
From today’s standpoint, it is unlikely that any strong opposition
of the future in Georgia will develop from the existing opposition
political spectrum. Today’s Georgian opposition spectrum does not
have sufficient political capital for this.36 Of course, it is possible that
a new political party will rise from among the ranks of today’s
opposition, but it clearly will need to muster its forces around the new
charismatic leader because political preferences in Georgia are still
leader-centered and this will not change in the foreseeable future.
However, even if such a party emerges, it is hard to imagine that the
incumbent government will give it a free leash. The problem is that
success of the new party is possible only so far as the ruling party’s
failures and breaking of promises allow it.37
The scenario of change of government by employment of the
well-established and proven practice which is built around discord and
rift within the ruling party seems much more plausible today. The next
ruling parties emerged from within the political force in power, rather
than from some external opposition party both in Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s
Round Table-Free Georgia and Eduard Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union
examples, which shows that the ruling parties have strong immunity
and automatically favors the above scenario. However, unlike the
previous transformations, this process is more likely to unfold like a
self-incubation or mock rift than originate from a real rift within the
United National Movement. The main argument in support of this is
that to extend its political life cycle, the Saakashvili government will
prefer receiving fresh blood to following in Shevardnadze’s footsteps
and rigging the elections. Accordingly, the more likely scenario is the
one which envisages the emergence of the new ruling political force
via the incorporation of new successful persons in the United Na-
tional Movement. It is possible that this process will be launched with
the slogan of purging the party ranks and optimizing the ruling party.
The creation of a new opposition party on the basis of the former
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National Movement members is also possible, but the incumbent
government will perhaps not want to cede its symbolic revolutionary
assets and opt for internal reorganization.
8.
It is hard to talk about the stability of today’s political system,
especially given Georgia’s experience of unconstitutional changes of
government, which, if extrapolated, speaks in favor of deliberating
about the feasibility of the Latin American-style revolutionary cycles
in Georgia. However, as proven many times under previous govern-
ments, whether or not such forecasts will become a reality depends
in large part on the government itself and on its success at keeping
its promises to the public, remaining legitimate, and carrying out the
reforms. However, even if the developments follow the most pessi-
mistic scenario, it is hard to predict whether any opposition political
force will be able to persuade Georgian society of the necessity of
yet another transformation through revolution. Despite the diversity
of the groups that are aggrieved by the incumbent government’s
activities (unemployed former civil servants, some of the university
teachers, displeased street vendors, citizens whose property was
confiscated, etc.) and quite intense revanchist sentiments among them,
it has to be admitted that their negative activities are unlikely to
escalate into a revolutionary movement due to their limited extent.
As for the abovementioned slogans against the radical privatization
and in support of the national manufacturing sector, they are much
more likely to mobilize the people, although they are much more
likely to boost the number of opposition supporters than change
government through revolution. At the same time, the incumbent
authorities still control the levers that would enable them to alleviate
social discontent, for instance, raising the 1990s issue of bank de-
posits. However, in the long term, neither can this scenario be ruled
out as improbable.38
As for the possibility of the transformation by the United National
Movement of the Georgian party system into a dominant-party system,
this scenario should fall into the category of the possible but hardly
feasible because to emulate the Mexican or Japanese model in Geor-
141
10 questions on Georgia’s political development
gia, the current Georgian ruling party should meet at least the mini-
mum requirements for a properly functioning institutional party, and
the National Movement, as a party which was created around the
person of charismatic leader, has a lot of work to do to achieve that.
In addition, it has to be taken into account that neither the Mexican
Institutional Revolutionary Party nor the Japanese Liberal Democratic
Party stands out for its loyalty to liberal democratic values, so the
establishment of this type of an institution in Georgia would be a step
backward in terms of the country’s democratic development, even
though by moving in this direction, the incumbent government will
create a stable environment that is needed for carrying through the
reforms it has initiated. The possibility cannot be ruled out that, to
justify and compensate for backsliding in democratic development and
deviation of the political system from the principles of liberal demo-
cratic pluralism, the government might opt for the Japanese model,
because like in Japan, the Georgian political culture also tends to favor
the dominant position of a single party organization. The incumbent
Georgian authorities’ discourse on the issue of new constitution and
prognoses about transition from the presidential to parliamentary gov-
ernance also indicate a tendency toward the establishment of the
Japanese-style dominant-party system. In addition, the Rose Revolu-
tion government will go down in history as the initiator of the historic
decision to adopt the parliamentary model and abolish the presidential
system, which in Georgia has always been viewed as an institutional
basis for autocratic governance. At the same time, under the parlia-
mentary system, it will be much easier for the incumbent ruling party
to approve the candidates for the post of prime minister.39
9.
As in any small country, the foreign factor in Georgia’s political
development can be described as one of the most important influences
because the country’s domestic political success mostly hinges pre-
cisely on the degree of support for our country in the international
political arena.
Foreign political support is one of the guarantors of the stability
of government. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was often criticized for his failure
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to bring about the country’s international recognition during his presi-
dential tenure. Despite the existence of objective reasons for this,40 the
lack of foreign political support was a major determinant of
unacceptability of the Zviad Gamsakhurdia government for contempo-
rary Georgian society and, on the contrary, the recognition of a
political persona like Eduard Shevardnadze, for he was expected to
enlist foreign political support. And, one might say, Eduard Shevardnadze
lived up to expectations. The most important success of the initial
period of his presidency was precisely enlisting foreign political sup-
port, which the country desperately lacked under Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
The attitude toward the Mikheil Saakashvili government is similar.
The president undertook the mission of improving Georgia’s image,
which was tarnished by corrupt and clannish governance, and allaying
the West’s disappointment with Georgia in the final period of
Shevardnadze’s presidency.
The West is an influence that promotes the country’s development
toward democracy. An important trend is noticeable in the context of
foreign political influence on Georgia: like in the Shevardnadze period,
failures in domestic policy become increasingly conspicuous against the
backdrop of foreign political successes, and many people predict that
Saakashvili will share his predecessor’s fate. However, the incumbent
authorities are trying to merge these two areas and deal with the flaws
of the previous government by viewing the foreign political successes
as a precondition for a successful domestic policy and vice versa, as
Georgia’s accession to any European organization requires the imple-
mentation of specific action plans, all of which stipulate achieving
progress in domestic political parameters and drawing nearer to West-
ern values. In the past, the abolition of capital punishment and imple-
mentation of reforms to achieve the liberalization of the economy
became prerequisites for Georgia’s accession to the Council of Europe,
the World Trade Organization, etc. Today, the West is the factor
which promotes the country’s democratic development and curbs
authoritarian tendencies. In conditions of the absence of checks and
balances in Georgia, the West plays the role of external monitor of
establishment of democracy in the country. Accordingly, Georgia’s
democratic development is taking place either because of the Western
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recommendations and assistance or because it is a prerequisite for
integration into Western systems.
It is important to note when we discuss the influence of foreign
political factors on Georgia’s development that this influence is not
uniform. In particular, effects of foreign political factors are noticeable
in different aspects of the country’s political development. Several
levels of influence of foreign political factors can be identified: politi-
cal, economic and social.
At the political level, the influence of the foreign political factors is
somewhat dualistic and can be reduced to confrontation between Russia
and the West for influence over the Caucasus region. Despite the fact
that the dualism in this case boils down to quite a simple equation, it
has been vital in the modern Georgian history. Looking back at the last
15 years leads us to conclude that the independence period has been
a process of looking for an ally in this confrontation and movement
toward the complete replacement of the pro-Russian orientation with
pro-Western one41 . It is noteworthy that while there has been difference
of opinion regarding relations with Russia from the very day of resto-
ration of national sovereignty, there is much more unanimity about the
West in Georgian society. One might say that the Georgian political
class, opposition and society in general have never once in the last 15
years of development questioned Western political support. This is
precisely why integration into Western structures is considered an im-
portant factor of national consensus. As for the pro-Russian orientation,
in the current confrontational model of Georgian-Russian relations, when
Russia does not want to lose control of the process of restoration of
Georgia’s territorial integrity, the groups of pro-Russian orientation stand
to become part of the political fringe in Georgia.42
The influence of the foreign political factor at the economic level
has manifested itself in the implementation of projects of different
kinds and in economic assistance to the Georgian authorities. It also
has to be taken into account that putting into operation the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum gas pipeline, and the
TRACECA project had both economic and political significance, pro-
moting Georgia’s integration into the Western political and economic
area and eliminating its economic dependence on Russia.
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As for the social dimension of the foreign factors’ influence, both
the nongovernmental sector and political institutions of government
developed with Western assistance.
And in answer to the question of how the foreign political factors
have been changing over the last 15 years, this can be divided into
the following periods: The stagnation period – 1991-December 1992.
From the time of declaration of Georgia’s independence till the dis-
solution of the USSR and de jure recognition of Georgia’s indepen-
dence by the international community, the country had no support of
any type from the West43 . Precisely this determined development of
Russia’s scenario: toppling of the Gamsakhurdia government and es-
calation of the situation in the hotbeds of ethnic separatism. The de
jure recognition period – 1992-1993. In this period, Georgia won
international political economic support, but owing to the great impor-
tance of Russia as a foreign political factor for the regulation of the
ethnic conflicts, a pro-Russian orientation was chosen. (1993-1995).
After a period of self-deluding expectations regarding Russia and the
failure of the project of restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity
with Russia’s help, Georgia pursued for a long time (1995-2003) the
policy of balancing between Russia and the West. The coming to
power of the Saakashvili government in the wake of the Rose Revo-
lution was followed by a widening in the gap between Russia and
Georgia and a clear-cut pro-Western orientation. This might result in
Georgia’s accession to NATO in the near future, with the long-term
prospect of becoming a candidate for EU membership.
10.
The incumbent Georgian authorities are charged with the historic
mission of overcoming the spiral model of the country’s development.
Establishing a precedent of constitutional change of government would
be seen as their greatest success. This is why it is crucial how change
of government will be effected under the incumbent authorities. There
are high expectations that the government which came to power on
the wave of the Rose Revolution and which attaches great importance
to the opinion of the international community in general and the
leading Western countries in particular will not stoop to electoral
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irregularities, although there is a threat – and this was confirmed to
some extent in the 2006 local elections too – that the Saakashvili
government will try to direct the electoral process in its favor by
tailoring the law to suit its needs and using administrative levers.
Accordingly, holding fair elections remains one of the most important
tasks of the incumbent Georgian government.
Besides the above historic mission, the following have to become
the incumbent government’s priorities:
Improving social conditions through liberalization of the
economy: The incumbent Georgian authorities have to put the social
security system improvement program on the agenda as their top
priority and offer a better social protection service to the population.
This will both earn them support of the socially vulnerable strata and
deprive the opposition of the grounds to criticize them about this
issue. How the improved service will be implemented in practice given
the infeasibility of economic miracles is another matter; the main
emphasis should still be placed on indirect methods of improvement
of the social background. And this is possible only through a radical
liberalization of the economic sector. In that case, the social security
system will be able to meet the demands of the socially vulnerable
strata. Despite their election campaign promises, the incumbent au-
thorities have yet to take real steps toward economic liberalization and
support for the local medium-size and small businesses.
Creating fair environment for political rivalry. No government
has made any real effort to create equal conditions for political rivalry
in the 15 years of Georgia’s independence. The parties have failed to
agree on the most basic rules of the game. In contrast to many other
countries, including Spain, during the transition to democracy the
political parties had not reached consensus prior to the adoption of the
country’s constitution.44 This can even be considered one of the
reasons for the spiraling development of the modern Georgian history:
there exists no consensus on procedural issues of political struggle, and
in some cases, when they are ignored, the potential elite have no other
option but unconstitutional to come to power. Accordingly, creating
equal conditions for all political players and setting rules of the game
should be in the incumbent authorities’ interests. Although strengthen-
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ing the opposition should not be the government’s task, creating a fair
environment for political rivalry in the country certainly is. This en-
sures inclusiveness in the political arena and rules out exclusivity.45
The authorities should lower the election threshold and carry out other
initiatives as well, e.g. greater participation of and cooperation with the
parliamentary opposition in making laws. The opposition should not
have the impression that persuading the government to make compro-
mises during parliamentary or other discussions is only possible with
the participation of representatives of the Western international orga-
nizations.
Ensuring success of government initiatives. For the authorities
to achieve success in any field, they should permanently monitor how
the government policy for that field is implemented and assess the
results. When a government initiative is carried out, funds should be
allocated to increase the conformity between the expected and actual
results of the project.
Ensuring civil participation in political decision making. The
majority of government decisions are made within a narrow political
circle or, at best, with the participation of non-governmental organi-
zations close to the government. Accordingly, the modern-day Geor-
gian political system leaves the impression of an extremely closed
system which is not open enough to take into account the opinions
of those people whom the decision will directly affect. The incumbent
Georgian authorities are not particularly considerate of the opinions of
representatives of the civil sector and conduct public policy from the
top down. This gives to the public a sound reason to talk about the
directive-based style of governance of the incumbent authorities and
causes great displeasure. This is precisely why it would be better for
the incumbent government to make its public policy more open and
transparent, although the nongovernmental sector itself will need to be
more proactive and strong and become a force to be reckoned with
in this process.
Amid the fast transformation and reforms, the main concern of the
incumbent government should still be avoiding deviations from the
path of democratic development and the use of autocratic methods of
government, especially when it is quite likely that the security issue
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might jeopardize the country’s democratic development and create a
half-democratic military-style state.
In conclusion, one might say that the main threat of the latest
phase of Georgia’s political development is precisely authoritarianism,
justified by the need for fast reforms. In the context of modern-day
Georgia, the only counterweight to that and guarantor of the estab-
lishment of democracy in Georgia is the West. The point is that, like
during the last 15 years of development, precisely the Western insti-
tutions and European organizations are permanently monitoring the
country’s democratic development, and they will try to make certain
that the processes in the country will unfold precisely in the demo-
cratic direction. And the negative thing about counting on them is that
there is not enough will within the Georgian establishment itself, so
it becomes necessary to resort to foreign influence to ensure demo-
cratic development in the country.
Notes:
1 Debate on whether or not it is warranted to draw parallels between Georgia
and the Baltic States of 1990s continues to this day, although it is increasingly evident
that in terms of development of its statehood, Georgia ought to follow in the Baltic
States’ footsteps.
2 Malkhaz Matsaberidze (2006), Georgian Politics: Authorities and Political
Process. Social sciences series. Tbilisi, Center for Social Sciences, p. 12.
3 Time will tell how advantageous to Georgia unilateralism in foreign political ori-
entation and building of relations with Russia according to the confrontational model are,
but the incumbent Georgian authorities should try to improve relations with Russia.
4 Although the 28 October 1990 elections were held under the Constitution of the
Georgian SSR, it has to be taken into account that major amendments were made to
it to allow multi-party ballot.
5 No one argues that after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili would win even
without using administrative resources, but what made his coming to power possible
was not so much the elections as the Rose Revolution. Therefore, the rotation of
governments in Georgia is governed more by street demonstrations rather than by
elections.
6 The positive means of being active still remain unused by the Georgian
population.
7 When discussing the nation’s unity during the Gamsakhurdia rule, the ethnic
Georgian population is implied, although it also has to be taken into account that 98%
148
Nani Macharashvili
of the Georgian population, including ethnic minorities, expressed their support for
Georgia’s national sovereignty at the 31 March 1991 nation-wide referendum.
8 In our opinion, describing the two-week-long December 1991-January 1992
developments as a popular uprising is an exaggeration because it was more of a
military coup, although the classification of participants as Zviadists and anti-Zviadists
is accurate. It was indeed a true civil confrontation, when even families were divided
by the member’s attitudes toward Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s persona.
9 The restoration of Georgian state was taking place when the USSR still existed,
so surprising as this may sound, Gamsakhurdia, a former dissident who had fought against
the Soviet regime, had to combat the USSR using the means that were available under
that regime. The restructuring which was required to resume suspended sovereignty was
taking place in the old system environment, and the 28 October 1990 parliamentary
elections, in which Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s electoral bloc Round Table-Free Georgia won
a landslide victory, were held in compliance with the Soviet Constitution. These factors
must be considered when talking about Zviad Gamsakhurdia as an inflexible politician,
although it is also clear that his abrasive personality gave the opposition the grounds to
have reservations about trusting him and to talk about his links with the Soviet leadership.
Holding the first parliamentary elections on the basis of the Soviet Constitution was the
first watershed for the united opposition. Some of the opposition parties which grew away
from Gamsakhurdia in the National Forum criticized the future president precisely for this.
10 According to one version, precisely his stiff resistance was the reason why the
Kremlin got rid of him. By the same version, the Kremlin was trying to keep the
Caucasus under its influence and supported the coming to power of Eduard
Shevardnadze, who in Kremlin’s view was a politically loyal player.
11 Zviad Gamsakhurdia failed to rise up to any of the challenges of the period.
12 Gamsakhurdia cannot qualify as a politician, he could not stop playing the role
of a dissident, which may be one of the explanations for his permanent fear and
obsession with searching for secret service agents. Ultimately, Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s
lack of political prowess and dissident personality proved detrimental for his career.
13 Reference to the developments in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.
14 This was included in the document signed in 2004 after the Rose Revolution
in Tbilisi’ Kashveti church, which condemned the attempt to involve foreign troops for
their interference in the country’s domestic affairs.
15 Although they were certainly a step ahead in terms of modernization of
Georgia’s legal framework, the initiatives of this type were mostly implemented on the
West’s recommendations and requests.
16 The Shevardnadze-era tendency to choose the method of minor gradual im-
provements in resolving problems is over. Besides that method, which is currently
used for initial quick response to the problem, the authorities prefer revolutionary, not
evolutionary solutions and, for the first time in the last 15 years of the Georgian
history, offer systems of strategic solution of problems to the public.
17 This gives rise to extremely negative sentiments and attitudes among some
strata of society. The displeasure with the authorities has its objective grounds too, for
in conditions of fast-paced reforms, upholding procedural justice is often difficult.
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18 The description of Georgia as a “TV state” can be accounted for precisely
by this factor.
19 However, there remains a gap between the declarations and practical actions,
and a lot of work remains to be done to bring about full integration of minorities into
society.
20 The possibility cannot be ruled out that there are cases when the critics are
right. The money that the government extorts from the private sector is often spent
during the election campaign, to sponsor the ruling party.
21 This irritated Russia and made the incumbent Georgian authorities unacceptable
for it, although Russia is gradually coerced into making concessions and restraining its
imperialist ambitions. The resumption in January 2007 of diplomatic relations, which
were suspended in the fall 2006, attests to this.
22 The introduction of the institution of Prime Minister, initiative to schedule the
presidential and parliamentary elections for the same day, and many other things are
examples of this.
23 In this particular case, it is possible to talk about the double rotation of
government. The new government was formed by both former Gamsakhurdia support-
ers and former Soviet officials, who harbored revanchist attitudes toward Gamsakhurdia
for the dismantling of the Soviet regime
24 During the Rose Revolution, the opposition wing of his former party members
was reinforced by some of the Zviadists, namely, Zviad Dzidziguri and Guram Absnadze,
who declared it their duty to fight against Shevardnadze for the injustices that he did
to Gamsakhurdia’s supporters. Therefore, similarly to the second transition, here too
it is possible to talk about the double rotation. In contrast to the second transition and
former Soviet officials’ long period of ruling, however, Zviadists remained in power
only briefly.
25 This may be caused by the little likelihood of growth of the existing opposition
parties’ recognizability or support base. The chance of success of the opposition
parties is further reduced by the fact that the voters know them well, so rapid growth
of positive sentiments toward them is not expected.
26 The idea of matchlessness of the ruling party is also associated with the party
leader’s charisma.
27 A high proportion of protesting voters and absenteeism enable the authorities
to rig the elections and serve as an additional argument in support of formal
acknowledgement.
28 See Ghia Nodia, Alvaro Pinto Scholtbach, The Political Landscape of Geor-
gia. Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects – Tbilisi; The
Caucasus Institute of Peace, Democracy and Development, 2006, p. 115.
29 The Shamatava case is linked with illegal sale of land through corrupt deals
by the Tbilisi mayor’s office back during Shevardnadze’s presidency. The incumbent
authorities are renationalizing that property and handing it back to the mayor’s office.
The opposition political spectrum helped the private owner of one of the lots, Shamatava,
articulate the problem, although when the details of the deal were established and it
transpired that there were no legal grounds for the land to remain Shamatava’s
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property, the opposition temporarily desisted from defending Shamatava’s position because
they were unable to propose an alternative to the authorities’ solution of this problem
30 This explains the opposition’s readiness to join any, even completely unjustified,
protest action against the authorities.
31 Macing is when a public employee is forced, as a condition of employment
or career growth, to give money that will be used for funding a party, in this case,
the ruling party. Toll-gating is the practice of demanding donations for the party in
return for issued licenses or permits.
32 In a markedly radical political culture, there are few complaints about a
landslide victory in the first presidential or parliamentary elections, but the objectivity
of the next elections raises reasonable doubts because the authorities have to resist
quite a strong temptation to demonstrate another overwhelming victory to society and
rig the opposition’s results. In the conditions of the Shevardnadze-era proven practice
of “direct casting” of ballot sheets into boxes and total election rigging, any opposition
group seemed uncompetitive, although this, of course, was far from reality.
33 See Ghia Nodia, Alvaro Pinto Scholtbach, The Political Landscape of Geor-
gia. Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects – Tbilisi; The
Caucasus Institute of Peace, Democracy and Development, 2006, p. 115.
34 Of course, this is true only if the opposition spectrum remains the same,
although it is unlikely that any serious opposition movement will be created in the
short run.
35 A heated polemic might begin on Georgia’s constitutional system (presidential
or parliamentary) too.
36 It was lost during the Rose Revolution: Some of today’s oppositionists refused
to side with the Georgian people back then.
37 Besides, the Saakashvili government might resort to the Shevardnadze-style
practice of election irregularities.
38 The method of long-term forecasting is not very accurate but is a widely used
method for averting potential threats and planning preventive measures. Accordingly,
the very possibility of such a scenario should be a sign of sorts for the incumbent
authorities to start correcting their mistakes.
39 Should the presidential system remain, the party will find itself faced with the
difficult task of finding a Saakashvili-like charismatic leader.
40 The reason why Georgia was not recognized as independent state in the
Gamsakhurdia period was that the USSR had not yet dissolved at that time, and the
country was still seen as part of the Soviet political area.
41 In discussion on pro-Russian orientation, it is important to take into consider-
ation the fact that Georgia has never had a downright pro-Russian foreign political
course. As for the declaration of Russia as a strategic partner in 1993-1994 by the
Shevardnadze government, this was more of a necessary step by the country’s lead-
ership of that period, which they made counting on Russia’s assistance in and quick
regulation of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.
42 Russia refused to take into account Georgia’s national interests and keeps
implementing this policy to this day. Its policy has done heavy damage to Georgia, but,
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contrary to Russia’s expectations, it has not resulted in the restoration of Russia’s
influence over Georgia. On the contrary, the Georgia is trying harder to stay at a
distance from Russia. Accordingly, the only alternative which will make improvement
of Georgian-Russian relations possible is Russia’s giving up on its imperialist ambitions
and recognizing Georgia’s independence de facto.
43 The West did not interfere because the Soviet institutional design still existed
and because the West did not have any contingency plan for the dissolution of the
USSR.
44 The incumbent authorities might seize this opportunity and spend the time
which remains until adoption of the new constitution precisely on creating a fair
environment for political rivalry.
45President Mikheil Saakashvili’s proposal to the opposition to start a dialogue and
designate opposition members to be included in the Security Council was made pre-
cisely for the purpose of addressing the current inequality between the parties and
verticalization, but obviously, unless procedural issues are agreed, no such initiative can
be successful.
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1.
Answering this question requires formulating the goal or goals that
independent Georgia was supposed to attain. We may ascribe these
goals to the Georgia of fifteen years ago in retrospect, irrespective of
how they were actually understood by the Georgian elites of that
period. I would define two such goals: one is stateness, the other –
social modernization. They may also be combined: Georgia was sup-
posed to become a modern country, which involves both being a
modern state and a modern society.
Saying this implies that fifteen years ago Georgia not only was not
a modern state (this would be commonplace), but that it could not
be called a modern society either. To be sure, during two centuries
of co-existence with Russia, Georgia did become modernized in quite
a few dimensions: it became urbanized, literacy became universal and
it became normal for women to be publicly active, to name but a few.
But thanks to seventy years of Communism, Georgia’s social and
political institutions and values instead moved away from the model
of modernity represented by western countries.
A brief assessment of the road traversed up to this point may be
formulated as follows: during the fifteen years that have passed so far,
Georgia has come closer to ideal types of modern state and society
but it is not where it wants to be in either of these categories.
Let us start with stateness: is Georgia a state now? Obviously the
question is not just about the formal status of its statehood – something
we had in mind when we were happy because “Ukraine recognized
us”.1  This stage is truly behind us. But this status can hardly be called
an “achievement”, if only because Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan, which
had been in the same starting position, did not need any efforts to get
the same. Do people who live on the territory which is defined on the
map as “Georgia” have state governance? If the answer is negative,
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than our condition is that of a “failed state” or a “quasi-state”. This
story continues to be central to the drama entitled “The history of post-
Soviet Georgia”. Georgia was a classic “failed state” in the early 1990s
and in the twilight years of Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency the
stateness started to erode again. Now we see the light in the end of
the tunnel at last, but the “happy ending” is yet to come.
The most obvious deficit happens to be the most basic: territorial
control. Georgia has yet to define what its territory really is, how far
its jurisdiction extends. What is the country the Abkhaz of Gagra and
the Ossetes of Java, or ethnic Georgians of Gali2  and Kurta3  reside
in? This is not a problem of romantic nationalism that is nostalgic of
the ideal of “sacred Georgian land” – if we go in the latter direction
we may start lamenting the loss of Tao-Klarjeti.4  This is an existential
problem of stateness: it cannot exist without having defined the bor-
ders of its jurisdiction. In that sense, even finally legitimizing the loss
of those territories – a deep psychological trauma as it would certainly
be – would be a decisive step towards consolidating stateness.
For the sake of argument, let us forget about Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Do we have a state on the remaining 85 or 90
percent of Georgia’s territory? My answer would be: mainly yes, but
not fully. Most importantly, the state now has a monopoly over the
legitimate use of force. Twelve or 15 years ago the state did not
enjoy such a monopoly even in Tbilisi, five years ago it still could
not enforce it everywhere, but now it can. Today there are no
armed groups that openly challenge the state’s right to use force for
controlling any part of the country or any segment of public life.
This is an enormous achievement. As to how lasting it will prove
to be, this is another question.
Why am I not sure about sustainability of this accomplisment? Not
only due to the external (Russian) factor. I do not think this one is
so important. One of the main indicators of sustainability is the
consensus about the political regime. If we believe public opinion
polls, almost everybody in Georgia is for democracy. But this is a
general normative statement. Now, let us ask our citizens: “How
would you define the political system in which you live today?” If I
encounter such a question in a questionnaire, I would go for the “Do
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not know/No answer” option. The issue is not how free the media
is or how easy is it to register NGOs; the main feature of political
regimes is how political power is acquired and kept. The regime is
consolidated when all the principal players know what is the way to
obtain political power in a given country. Let us pose a simple
question to check this: “How will power change hands in Georgia next
time?” If we do not know the answer (and I think we do not), this
means we do not know what our political regime is.
To sum up, apart from the failure to achieve full territorial control,
Georgia has also failed to stabilize the political regime, or the rules of
the political game. I want to make a corollary here: I do not a priori
contend that the political regime in question should only be a consti-
tutional democracy. I happen to believe that constitutional democracy
is the best political regime available, and also that the only chance for
Georgia to consolidate any political regime is through stabilizing demo-
cratic rules of the game. Accordingly, any efforts towards stateness
should imply strengthening the foundations of constitutional democ-
racy. In theory, though, an undemocratic regime can also be stable
and consolidated. Whether I personally like it or not is another matter.
Georgia’s main problem is not that its democracy is not consoli-
dated yet. The problem is that no political regime of any kind has
been established. If this is so, stateness is yet to be achieved.
Let us set aside the ways of gaining political power as well. One
more feature of stateness is the sustainability and efficacy of the
governance process. The question is: Is there a system of state
governance institutions that could serve as an efficacious instrument
for implementing certain policies?
This question is linked to another one: Whose is the state? Does
the state apparatus serve the political leadership or does it attend to
needs of other societal players? In Georgia we often call these other
actors “clans”, in lieu of a better term. “Organized crime” or “criminal
underworld” may be considered a particular kind of such a “clan”. In
any case, what one has in mind here are social organizations or
networks that define loyalty and trust in opposition to formal state
institutions and compete with the latter for areas of social control. If
we focus on this second version of the question, the problem may be
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reformulated as that of “corruption” or “state capture” (how precise
these terms are is another question).
This is the key issue for many postcolonial and developing coun-
tries (to whom Georgia is typologically close). This is also where the
dividing line between modern and pre-modern societies runs: state
bureaucracy is controlled either through formal institutions or through
“clans” and similar entities. Some level of competition between these
players may be under way in any country, but if the contestants of
the state become too powerful, we find ourselves in the territory of
“failed” or structurally “weak” states. How does Georgia look in this
regard? I will come back to this topic when analyzing Shevardnadze’s
and Saakashvili’s presidencies, but I will give a short summary here:
there has been progress in the past few years, but we are still far
from making it. The point is that whatever was accomplished has yet
to be institutionalized.
In the end, there is one more important dimension: identity and
recognition. These are two sides of the same coin. Has Georgia as
a nation found its place in the modern world? For this to happen,
Georgia needs to know what that place should be (this is “identity”),
but others should also agree to positioning Georgia in such a way (this
is the “recognition” side). In this regard we may be somewhat more
advanced. One could say more: fairly stable general orientation and
foreign support are among most important resources we have for
succeeding in political development. Obviously, this concerns our fa-
mous “pro-Western orientation”. I admit that this orientation may be
somewhat superficial and opportunistic and that the social institutions
and values that embody “western-ness” do not have deep roots in
Georgia. The fact of the matter is, however, that in recent years this
orientation towards the West has proved stable and firm. We can
speculate a lot as to what this or that politician really aspires to and
what he would do under other circumstances, but we cannot refute
that as of today, no player of any political weight (however modest
the criterion of “weight” may be) openly challenges the validity of the
choice in favor of the West. If somebody does oppose this choice (in
our situation, this means being “pro-Russian”), this opposition is not
expressed in public.
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In that sense, the fact that our pro-western orientation (however
superficial we may consider it) has become firm, has turned into a
dominant political tradition and constitutes an accomplishment of these
fifteen years. Georgia sees the direction of her political development
in coming closer to Europe (naturally, under Europe I also imply
North America). On the other hand, even though Georgia is not
universally recognized as a Western country, within Western elites the
number of people who take Georgia’s European aspirations seriously
has sharply grown. The Louises5  of today at least politely listen to
Georgian envoys and sometimes even give them substantive support.
Georgia has developed a rather solid national project that has a
reasonable chance – even if not a guarantee – of success. This may
be Georgia’s chief accomplishment of the past fifteen years.
Now about social modernization. Here there are even more dimen-
sions and success or failure is more difficult to measure. I will briefly
dwell on two topics alone: the political elite and the institutions of civil
society. The blatant lack of competence of the new elite was the most
conspicuous feature of the national movement of the late 1980s. Both
its political discourse and practices were fully divorced from the
modern context. If that is taken as a reference point, today the
progress is striking. I do not want to be misunderstood here: I
recognize that fifteen years ago we had excellent mathematicians and
film directors. On those accounts we look much worse today. What
I have in mind is competence in political action. Today we have a
social milieu (consisting mostly of young people) whose members
speak and act as modern people. This layer is very thin. This is why
the deficit of human resources is the most acute problem of Georgia
today. But if we compare this with what we had fifteen years ago,
the change is vast.
Civil society is a completely new sphere which fifteen years ago
was only taking its first steps. Media, interest groups and associations
of different kinds exist but are weakly developed. Now is the time
when we focus on the underdevelopment of this area; but within the
larger picture, the progress is considerable. We take for granted that
we can talk about anything we think is worth discussing, that we can
associate ourselves around our values and interests and advocate them,
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if we come up with adequate ways to do so. These new social
competences and practices have encompassed a small amount of
people so far (short outbreaks of revolutionary euphoria do not count),
but new paradigms do exist.
2.
The brief rule by Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his Round Table can
be seen as the conclusion of “the national movement period”, there-
fore I will consider them as one. This dramatic episode can be called
the false start of democracy and stateness in Georgia. This is the time
when society became genuinely active and developed heartfelt demo-
cratic enthusiasm based on a consensus around a specific and legiti-
mate goal – creating a nation-state. By itself, this shift in public
attitudes constitutes the most important achievement of this period.
The result, however, was a national catastrophe which hampered
Georgia’s political development for at least a decade. Those respon-
sible for this disaster are our national movement in general, and
Gamsakhurdia with his political team in particular. Pointing the finger
at Russia as the main culprit in this fundamental defeat is an attempt
at self-deception and a denial of reality.
If we focus more narrowly on Gamsakhurdia’s rule or his political
regime it is difficult to discern any tangible achievement. If attaining
the status of an independent country is seen as the goal, it was logical
to set out to declaring independence on April 9, 1991. In the context
of the time, however, this was a purely symbolic gesture signifying
political impotence. Not many people remember now that this hap-
pened in response to military defeat in South Ossetia and was just
about putting on a brave face amidst failure. Otherwise one cannot
understand why Georgia would proclaim independence at that particu-
lar moment. It was both ironic and contained a kernel of historical
justice that the real advent of independence (which coincided with the
break-up of the Soviet Union) happened at a time when Gamsakhurdia’s
ouster from Georgia was getting under way.
The episode of declaring independence can be seen as another
illustration of the general mythopoeic nature of the discourse and
practice of Gamsakhurdia’s rule (and of the national movement in
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general). It replaced real actions with symbolic ones: “Did we suffer
defeat? We will express our anger by declaring independence!” Politi-
cal action was reduced to declaration and mobilization: thou shall
“speak the truth” and mobilize as many people as possible around it.
Gamsakhurdia hardly took any steps aimed at building state institu-
tions. The main innovation under his rule was the changing of names:
for instance, militsia was renamed police. Creating a Georgian army
was supposed to be the most notable exception – the result, however,
was a caricature that even failed to stage a decent coup.
In politics, mythopoeic thinking finds its closest expression in
fascism. The label attached to Gamsakhurdia by Shevardnadze ideo-
logues, “parochial fascism”, was partly fair, but it would be more
precise to call it “failed fascism”. The ochlocratic, neurotic, and ro-
manticist character of political mobilization was typologically close to
fascist movements (the most recent analogies may be found in the
Balkans), but it fell short of developing into a fascist dictatorship. One
reason for this was the international context. In the 1990s, fascism
was too much out of vogue. Therefore, the national movement and
Gamsakhurdia in particular tried to preserve a democratic façade (the
leaders may have sincerely believed they were true democrats). But
the real reason for the breakdown lay in political incompetence: while
Mussolini and Hitler were successful at strengthening their states at
least temporarily, the Georgian quasi-fascism became associated with
tearing the state down.
The so-called ethnic conflicts as well as the Tbilisi war6  are the
most patent expressions of the disastrous outcome of the national
movement. It would be unfair to blame the Abkhazia and South Ossetia
conflicts only on Gamsakhurdia or on Georgian nationalism in general.
It is the beloved cliché of western liberals to say that minority nation-
alisms constituted a natural defensive reaction against Georgian nation-
alism. In fact, minority elites were under the spell of romantic mythopoeic
nationalisms, much as their Georgian counterparts. Moreover, they –
and, especially, their patrons in Kremlin – had a vested interest in
pushing the conflicts to the military stage, as this was what gave them
better chances of success. The incompetence of the Georgian leadership
showed itself in the fact that they helped the conflicts to develop
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according to a military scenario which was the most unfavorable for
Georgia, thus helping the opponents to legitimize their programs.
This incompetence linked to mythopoesis may be defined as political
idiocy typical for the Georgian national movement in general. I use the
word “idiocy” here as a term and do not imply any assessment of
intellectual capacity of the leaders of that time (some of them may
have had a reasonably high IQ). Even the smartest people of the
period, however, were characterized by an incapacity for thinking
politically. Moreover, they were hostile to political discourse as such.
On that account, Gamsakhurdia may even deserve less criticism than
others. One should not forget that many people voted for him7
because “at least, he was better than Tsereteli and Chanturia”:8  This
happened to be a correct assessment. Other frequently mentioned
alternatives to his leadership were Nodar Natadze and Akaki Bakradze.
Admittedly, Gamsakhurdia’s approaches were much more adequate
than theirs as well.
Against this background it becomes understandable that despite his
declared anti-Communist agenda, Gamsakhurdia failed to replace the
Communist elite (nomenclatura) in power. Many key positions in his
government were occupied by former Communist bureaucrats of the
high and middle levels. It would be unfair to hold only him respon-
sible for that, however, as few people competent to govern were to
be found in other social groups. But even so, Gamsakhurdia could
probably have achieved much more. He failed even to lay foundation
for a new ruling elite.
 If I wish to single out specific accomplishment of Gamsakhurdia,
it would be an agreement with the Abkhaz reached in the fall of 1990
that led to elections to Abkhazia’s Supreme Council based on effective
ethnic quotas. From today’s perspective such an assessment looks
rather strange and the subsequent Georgian government called these
“apartheid elections”, while the fight for the actual division of power
led to a war afterwards. But so far this is the only precedent of an
agreement between the Georgians and the Abkhaz that took into
account the interests of the both sides. If not for the way events
developed in Tbilisi later, this agreement had a chance to become the
foundation of a historical compromise.
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From today’s perspective, the most significant achievement of
Gamsakhurdia’s rule is a negative one. Through him the Georgians
relatively swiftly (but painfully) acquired immunity from a virus which
was probably impossible to avoid altogether – that of political roman-
ticism and its natural inference – quasi-fascism. I am very far from
entertaining the illusion that Georgian society has been cured of xeno-
phobia (does such a society exist anywhere?), but ethnic nationalism will
probably not become the dominant motive of the Georgian politics any
more. At least for some period, the immunity keeps working. To
compare, Russian society is going through a similar stage now. The civil
war that signified the end of the Gamsakhurdia era left behind economic
breakdown, deep societal divisions, the advent of criminal warlordism
and territorial disintegration. One can find something positive even in
such a tragedy, however. For a nation, a civil war can be a coming-
of-age experience. The civil war served as our version of “shock
therapy”. It forced Georgians to face the political reality. Another of its
results is the emergence of distance between nationalist and liberal-
democratic agendas, something that had been neglected until then.
3.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule was an important transitional period.
Compared with the catastrophic stage that preceded it, it can be
considered a success. But it can also be seen as a series of fatal
failures. Both assessments contain a kernel of truth.
The most important achievement was that Shevardnadze legitimized
political thinking and behavior. The art of declaration and mobilization
based on mythopoeic romantic discourse, typical for the national move-
ment, had in essence been anti-political. For this mode of thought
politics is a dirty word. In practice, it was Shevardnadze who taught
Georgians that politics is an arena where real interests clash and come
to an accommodation. This seems commonplace – but many people still
find it difficult to accept. At the time, however, that was a turning point
when collective madness gave way to common sense.
This is linked to the fact that Shevardnadze took the first steps
towards creating state institutions. The national movement’s attitude
towards institutions inherited from the Communist era was parasitic:
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they continued by inertia until the “Christmas coup” and then collapsed.
When Shevardnadze came back, he encountered a situation close to
what Hobbes called a “state of nature”, which contemporary political
science calls a “failed state”. This was a state whose only real attribute
and resource was international recognition but that was not able to
perform any functions within its formally designated borders. First of all,
it did not enjoy a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Shevardnadze
failed to fully solve this problem (I will expand on his failures later),
but a set of brilliant Machiavellian moves allowed him to establish a
minimal mode of stateness on the larger part of Georgia’s territory. He
turned state power into the principal, though not the only, instrument
for regulating and balancing conflicting interests. Compared to his start-
ing point, this was an immense achievement.
He also accomplished this in such a way that allowed some
space for liberal pluralism. It was under Shevardnadze’s rule that
people got used to the idea that expressing a variety of opinions (in
post-Soviet conditions, this means the possibility to criticize govern-
ment) is a routine matter. Although institutions of civil society –
media, civic associations, political parties – first appeared in the
period of the national movement, it was only under Shevardnadze’s
rule that they were stabilized, gained legitimacy and developed to a
certain level. Pluralism of business interests was no less important:
a lot can be said about the business activities of Shevardnadze’s
relatives, but even this family contained several centers of interest.
All this made the Shevardnadze era a rather important period in
Georgia’s social modernization.
To return to the political level, it was under Shevardnadze that
Georgia’s pro-Western orientation was determined and stabilized.
Shevardnadze’s pet project was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. From
Georgia’s perspective, its main purpose was to anchor the West’s
strategic interests in Georgia. It was under him that Georgia expressed
its wish to join NATO. Arguably, for Shevardnadze this choice might
have been opportunistic. In 1993-94 he tried to forge a “strategic
partnership” with Russia (which in practice meant turning Georgia into
a Russian satellite), but after it became evident there was no benefit
from this, he drifted towards the West. Even if his moves are so
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interpreted, it was significant that his experiment proved that being
oriented towards Russia does not make any sense.
 Last but not least, Shevardnadze laid foundation for new political
elite in Georgia. The national movement turned out to be rather
unproductive in this regard. If any figures from that period are still
on the political scene, they are marginalized failures. The only excep-
tion was the team of Zurab Zhvania, later called the Zhvania-Saakashvili
team. They succeeded in learning the ABCs of modern politics while
still staying under Shevardnadze’s umbrella. It is too complicated to
judge here what motivated Shevardnadze when he decided to launch
these young people – who subsequently would become his future
political grave-diggers – on a track towards political preeminence. The
result is what counts here: by promoting “Zhvania’s team”, he laid the
groundwork for a new elite that mastered the contemporary political
language and practice.
All these important achievements of Shevardnadze took place in
the 1990s. My next statement may not be quite humane from the
point of view of normal standards, so I will first excuse myself by
saying that I wish long life to Eduard Shevardnadze as a human being.
But Shevardnadze as a politician would have been extremely lucky
had the attempt on his life in February 1998 succeeded. I do not think
that would have been good for Georgia, but Shevardnadze would have
gone down in history as a great hero, as a founder of stateness and
democracy in Georgia. But as it happened, Shevardnadze’s historical
image ultimately came to be greatly tarnished.
His main failure was his inability to create modern state institu-
tions. For him, the state was more an end in itself rather than an
instrument for ensuring the public good. To be more precise, his state
did secure a minimum of public benefit: stability and basic security.
This, as I said, was an important success compared to the starting
point he had. However, the methods he used for attaining that goal
did not allow the state to be used for implementing specific policies.
In a sense this was a state of a medieval type. To take a telling
example, the salaries of the public servants were purely symbolic and
a job in public service was essentially a license to extort money from
common citizens (now we call this “corruption”). The top political
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leadership was a kind of coordinator and arbiter for reconciling dif-
ferent corrupt pyramids.
Such political regimes may last – look at some of our immediate
neighbors – but for it to do so, the political leadership must not be
timid about using harsh autocratic methods, and it should not claim
to be part of Europe. At the very least, the boss should be able to
carry out demonstrative purges among his own followers. Shevardnadze,
however, overdid it with democracy, and he recognized this as his
major mistake. To put it another way, Shevardnadze fell short of
finding a proper formula for his political regime. It was a liberal
oligarchy that tried to preserve a democratic façade. This was where
Shevardnadze, commonly called the master of the politics of balanc-
ing, did not succeed in maintaining balance (if that was possible at all).
That’s why in the last years of his rule even his model of the
state started to erode. He was overpowered by the plurality of inter-
ests within the ruling elite as well as outside it. Non-state actors such
as organized crime and popular militias returned to the public arena.
If turning Georgia from a failed into a weak state was Shevardnadze’s
main achievement, after 1998 the trend was reversed. The situation
in the Pankisi Gorge9  and events surrounding it were the most evident
symptom of this.
Another legacy of Shevardnadze’s regime that led to his disgrace-
ful exit was moral nihilism and cynicism – another aspect of what we
call “corruption”. The problem of façade democracies is that they are
based on fraud and their stable functioning requires widespread cyni-
cism. Shevardnadze underestimated the necessity of moral legitimacy
for his regime – this was a resource that he exhausted in the end.
It seems that the reason for this might have been his personal lack
of confidence in Georgia and the very idea of the Georgian state.
Shevardnadze appeared not to believe that it was possible for Georgia
to become a “normal” state and create a modern order based on the
supremacy of law.
4.
Answering this question is most risky because the period under
question is continuing and there is no historical distance separating it
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from the present. But major trends, achievements and challenges have
already been formed.
 Saakashvili’s government has achieved obvious, visible (in a lit-
eral sense), rather impressive successes which may be summed up by
a simple formula: effective stateness. One cannot say that Saakashvili
has managed to finally remove the shadow of failure or hollowness
from Georgian statehood. Until situations with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are stabilized, even the formal criteria of an effective state will
not be met. But qualitative advances have been made over the pre-
vious stage. There are quite a few indicators for that. The most
popular are the most conspicuous: paved roads, painted facades of
buildings, well-lit streets and supplied electricity (among others). These
things demonstrate that the state has learned how to produce public
goods. What underpins all this is a more fundamental accomplishment
– the creation of a governable state apparatus. Such a seemingly trivial
step as appointing salaries to public servants (one of the first steps of
Saakashvili’s government) was in fact a vital innovation, as it denoted
a transition from a medieval to modern type of state, one in which
public servants are supposed to be reimbursed from public treasury
rather than directly collecting money from people. The same can be
said about the more stringent tax administration. This is important not
only because the state has more money to pave roads and such, but
because it reinforces the idea that citizens and businesses should pay
taxes to the state treasury rather than give bribes to individual bureau-
crats (the latter is also a way to finance the state, but a much less
efficient one).
Another aspect of strengthening the state is destroying or weak-
ening those social players that challenge the state in its function of
social control. In this sense, efforts aimed at fighting organized crime
(“the thieves’ world”) is not only about defending citizens from crimi-
nals (obviously, this is rather important in itself), but it is also crucial
in the fight for stateness. There would be nothing new in saying that
mafias emerge where states fail to fulfill their principal functions, first
of all, that of creating and enforcing rules.
This is linked to one of most important features of Saakashvili
government: the advent of the new elite. One can argue whether or
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not the Rose Revolution was a “real” revolution according to criteria
shared in political science (I do not think it can be called a revolution
in a classical sense). But it conformed to at least one meaning of a
revolution – let us call it “Pareto criterion”. It was an elite change.
It essentially led to the full ouster of the Communist-Komsomol
nomenclatura from the government structures, which, unlike in Eastern
European countries, does not yet show any signs of a comeback. This
is more than a symbolic act: the new generation brought with it a
new, more modern political discourse.
The junocracy brought by Saakashvili (this term may be used in
opposition to Brezhnevian gerontocracy or “the rule of the old”) is in
some ways controversial, as the whole older generation came to feel
marginalized. Ministers under thirty may be the butt of many jokes
– evidently, under conditions of normal development of the public
system, that should be considered an aberration. But in our specific
context this is preferable to whatever alternatives are available.
Achievements in the area of foreign policy are also striking. Since
the Rose Revolution, Georgia’s claims to be a European country have
been taken much more seriously. But this does not mean they are
fully accepted. The issue of Georgia’s membership of NATO is yet
to be resolved. But today’s Georgia is no longer just another recipient
of humanitarian aid. It has become a player in European politics, albeit
a marginal one.
Relations with Russia are to be considered in this context. Con-
trary to one widespread view, I do not think that relations with Russia
constitute a liability for the new government. Those who reproach it
for that should also propose some idea of how these relations could
be successful. I sympathize with the travails of winemakers in Kakheti,10
but the crisis in relations with Russia involved a strategic gain: basi-
cally, Georgia called Russia’s bluff, which was based on the assump-
tion that it “feeds” Georgia and can strangle it economically if it so
chooses. I do not know when and how Russian-Georgian relations will
be normalized, but this experiment appears to have been a necessary
step towards this end.
As to the issue of territorial control, establishing effective control
over Achara and, later, the Kodori Valley, were historical achieve-
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ments. But after three years in office, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
constitute the most pressing problems that Saakashvili’s government
faces. On that account, it is hard to assess the government’s record
in straightforward terms. On the one hand, the government promised
to solve the problem quickly, while in reality not only is there no
progress, but tensions have been further exacerbated as well. This
makes the government policy look like an obvious failure. The South
Ossetian campaign in summer 2004 has been the biggest fiasco of
Saakashvili’s government so far. It led to human casualties and also
gained him the image of a politician prone to risky adventures.
But let us look at the issue in a more strategic way again. I do
not know how these problems will be solved at the end of the day,
but one thing is clear: the simulative “peace process”, as it had
proceeded before would never have led anywhere. Increased tensions
have brought the issue back to the agenda. This does not mean a
solution is imminent, but there is a somewhat greater chance of a
solution coming sooner rather than later. Establishing genuine control
in the Kodori Valley and creating the parallel government in South
Ossetia have changed the format of the conflict situation and given the
Georgian government greater room to maneuver.
The greatest weakness of the government is that mechanisms are
yet to be created that will ensure the sustainability of its achievements.
First of all, there is no consensus on the rules of political competition.
This means that we cannot in a definitive way answer the question
as to where Georgia is moving politically: towards the new revolution,
towards a “Mexican”-style semi-autocratic consolidation, or towards a
“normal” democracy. The country still has a “hybrid” system in place,
that is, an inherently uncertain and unstabilized political regime that
combines elements of democracy and autocracy. This still prevents
Georgia from being called a “stable state”.
This cannot be blamed on the government, at least, not only on
the government. Saakashvili and the small group around him who
define the agenda of his rule do display some elements of autocratic
Jacobin ethos: this is a revolutionary avant-garde of the society that
has a vision of the better future but does not necessarily consider
itself obliged to take into account what the majority of the people
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think. This allows one to define the style in which the government
carries out its reforms as authoritarian modernization. One could prob-
ably find serious arguments in favor of this approach at this stage of
development. Whether we like it or not, creating stateness logically
precedes the development of democracy. Even if the political regime
is not democratic, the state is still necessary, because order is better
than anarchy. I will recall here a phrase by Walter Lippman that
Samuel P. Huntington quotes in his book Political Order in Changing
Societies: “I do know that there is no greater necessity for men who
live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if
possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, gov-
erned.”11  A country that has developed an inferiority complex due to
being a “failed state” will naturally give priority to strengthening the
state. But when institutions of civil society are objectively weak, it is
difficult to strengthen the state without causing some authoritarian tilt.
The main thing here is not to indulge in self-deception and not to call
the existing condition a “democracy”.
Saying this does not imply agreeing with the assessment that
Saakashvili’s government is more autocratic than that of Shevardnadze.
It is just another kind of hybrid regime that constitutes a much better
starting point for strengthening democratic institutions since the latter
only make sense against the backdrop of effective state. The current
government mainly adheres to democratic rules, at least it is not so
easy to catch it openly breaking them. The February 2004 changes
to the Constitution were an exception, however. They were also
formally authoritarian as parliament was sharply weakened in compari-
son to the president’s powers.
5.
Fist of all, this question – or rather the contention implied in it
– does not only pertain to the first several years of Saakashvili’s
presidency. This is a general institutional problem typical for Georgia.
On can sum up the record of the last fifteen years in Georgia by
saying that, as a rule, the opposition does not perform, or that it does
not create a credible alternative to the incumbent government. The
only exceptions are pre-revolutionary periods that are caused by inter-
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nal governmental crises. As long as the government is more or less
strong and popular and as long as it can demonstrate to its people
some achievements, the opposition looks inept. It only criticizes some
aspects of the government’s actions (how fairly – this is not of a
decisive importance here), but does not propose any credible alterna-
tive. The situation only changes after the government weakens and
loses popularity. After this, internal splits begin and the rebellious part
of the government becomes the leading part of the opposition, while
the “old” opposition turns into the junior partner of the latter.
Therefore, there is nothing new in the current weakness of the
opposition. But what’s the reason for this general regularity? The
favorite argument of the oppositionists (especially today) is the “merger”
of the ruling party with the state apparatus or the “abuse of admin-
istrative resources”. But this consideration is too abstract and describes
the effect rather than the cause.
Problems appear to be more structural. One is the weakness of
political parties as an institutional form, which, in its own turn, indicates
the general weakness of civil society. Citizens find it difficult to create
large associations, especially as such membership does not promise them
any short-term gains. If we go further, one can speak of society being
“infantile”: it still perceives the government as a parent, as the father
who at the end of the day turns out to be a stepfather. Society is
supposed to complain, to issue noises of discontent, just as a whim-
pering child hopes to secure more goodies from its parent. The oppo-
sition sees its main function in articulating such whimpering. But when
people nod in agreement to criticism of the government, the opposition
tends to overestimate the people’s enthusiasm for them. If citizens
welcome the eloquence with which the opposition leaders articulate their
own complaints, this does not yet mean that they are keen to bring
these same leaders to the helm of the state, as that is a wholly different
function. As elections draw closer, the people start remembering that the
opposition is “all talk and no walk” and chooses to vote for the “known
evil”. As long as the father somehow provides for the needs of the
family, nobody wants to get rid of him.
Under such conditions, why should citizens unite into political
parties at all (or become their stable supporters – which is the
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same)? Party pluralism is supposed to rest either on value pluralism
or on differing interests of social groups. But so far there are no
alternative political platforms in Georgia, and there are no distinct
social groups either. As one opposition activist recently said (natu-
rally, this was said in informal circumstances): “we all [meaning all
political parties] have the same political platform, the issue is only
how it is to be implemented”. If this is true (and it does seem to
be the case), the real need for the opposition only emerges after an
obvious breakdown in the government – which brings us back to
what I have said above. Admittedly, the political party system in
Georgia is artificially preserved by the proportionate electoral system,
which allows small groups consolidated around one or several leaders
to claim they are political parties.
The shortage of human resources may be another part of the
problem. There are simply not too many people in Georgia who are
capable and willing to act politically. It seems that there is not enough
people to ensure the existence of a fully-fledged government and
opposition parties (we will be lucky if there are enough reasonable
people to staff the agencies of the executive). When a more-or-less
capable political group comes to power, most sensible people support
them until they fail.
For this reason, the executive becomes the place where much
greater competence accumulates than in the opposition. If my answers
to the previous questions were more or less fair, each new Georgian
government was considerably superior to the previous one in terms of
its political discourse and practices. In contrast, the competence of the
opposition hardly grows: it does not appear to be able to go beyond
tactical reactions to specific malfunctions of the government. Unfor-
tunately, there are no signs of change in this area so far.
The above should not be interpreted as a call to ignore the
opposition. Even the presence of the most negativistic and opportu-
nistic opposition is much preferable to its absence, while instituting
impediments against it would only lead to a decrease in its quality.
Our not-so-distant history should also teach us that the political situ-
ation in Georgia may change very quickly. The government is not
insured against making mistakes and failures. For one, the Girgvliani
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case12  demonstrated that when the opposition has something specific
and clear to say, the protest tide may emerge quite soon and the
opposition may become a tangible player. One also cannot rule out an
economic crisis, which could make people listen more carefully to
what the opposition says.
6.
In the twilight of Shevardnadze’s rule the opposition had one
single and clear key-word: “corruption”. The government was further
delegitimized by its inefficacy, and the ineptness of Shevardnadze
personally which emasculated the power from within. The opposition
of today has yet to define its main theme. But the government has
several areas of vulnerability which, under certain circumstances, may
help the opposition to consolidate and mobilize:
(a) Rule of law. Problems in this sphere include insufficient inde-
pendence of the judiciary and human rights violations by law enforce-
ment. The aforementioned Girgvliani case demonstrated that if the
government makes serious blunders, this topic has a serious mobilizing
potential. Admittedly, in the context of the Girgvliani case Saakashvili’s
opposition became most powerful and served society best. It would
be best for the future development of democracy in Georgia for the
opposition to make the rule of law its main theme.
The problem here is that in this case the opposition has to wait
for specific missteps of the government. By making the “rule of law”
its main theme, the opposition will not go up against the leitmotif of
the Saakashvili government unless, of course, the latter descends into
an open dictatorship. What will the opposition do if the government
no longer evidently blunders as it did in the Girgvliani case? Relatively
specific issues of developing the rule of law will stay on the level of
elite discourse but will not suffice to “feed” the opposition movement,
which requires broad support. In any democratic society there may be
a debate on where exactly to draw the line between, on the one hand,
measures necessary to ensure public safety, and, on the other hand,
inalienable individual rights. No doubt that Georgia has much greater
problems in this department than developed democracies, and any
171
10 questions on Georgia’s political development
improvement would require lots of attention and commitment. But the
government generally accepts this predicament and – most importantly
– it also can bring some evidence to the table when it claims to be
making serious steps to achieve the genuine rule of law. The oppo-
sition should gather support by demonstrating that it is more motivated
than the government is to defend the rule of law. This, however, is
a hard sell.
(b) The “Sorosian government” against national values. Western-
style modernization does truly dominate the agenda of the government.
If this is the case, then it might be considered natural for the oppo-
sition to be led by anti-western, anti-liberal, anti-globalist, nativist
forces. It is so logical that one may be amazed why this is not so.
But the fact of the matter is that no such opposition has emerged yet.
No serious force has even come forward to criticize the idea of
joining NATO and the EU. One explanation may be that Georgians
like Guram Sharadze13  or Elizbar Javelidze14  cannot master the tech-
nique of modern political action – that is, they are not sufficiently
modernized themselves. One should remember here that leaders of
Islamic radicalism are often those educated in the West. According to
this logic, the future leader of Georgian nativistic anti-globalism should
be a graduate of a western university. The smart tactics of the
government are also important here, as they are aware of the nativist
danger and balance it by promoting issues of state nationalism. In any
case, there certainly is some mobilizing potential in this theme, but this
does not yet mean that it will become the dominant idea of the
opposition movement.
(c) Defending workers’ rights. Although many people are not
aware of this, the main direction of the economic policy of the
government is rather right-wing (not to count some spontaneous moves
by the president). Logically, this should create wide opportunities for
the left-wing parties. In any European country, the new Georgian
Labor Code15  would be met with mass demonstrations led by leftist
parties and trade unions. But the logic based on western political
experience does not work here. The president’s frequent appearances
172
Ghia Nodia
in free canteens for the poor are still enough to balance the right-wing
tilt of his economic team. It seems so that the creation of a serious
left-wing opposition will also require new leaders.
(d) “Incompetent kids”. The young age and the lack of experi-
ence of key government players, their being sometimes prone to
chaotic and inconsistent moves is one more thing for which the
government is often criticized. This is the favorite motive of old elites:
if the failures of the new government are to be explained by its lack
of experience, problems may be solved by involving old and experi-
enced cadres. When reformed communists came back to replace the
first post-communist governments in Eastern Europe, they sold them-
selves to voters not by the prospect of returning to communism, but
by invoking competence in governance. If we keep in mind the age
of our current government and the number of experienced cadres who
lost their jobs, there should be important resources for the opposition.
However, Shevardnadze’s government was so ineffective and inept in
its last years, that there is not much to be nostalgic about.
(e) Anti-corruption yet again. Anti-corruption campaigns some-
times tend to increase temptations for being corrupt. Therefore, no-
body can be sure that representatives of the new government, espe-
cially in the higher echelons of power, do not fall for it. Moreover,
the weakness of the opposition reduces the accountability of the
government, thus increasing opportunities for corruption. If the same
group stays in the government for a long time, the problem is further
exacerbated. Therefore, this government may also descend into cor-
ruption as its predecessor did. If this is the case, the opposition may
find new strength around the anti-corruption theme, more so because
this is an already trodden path.
Perhaps, but that will take time. The government has achieved
conspicuous success in fighting mass corruption. Citizens are no longer
subjected to extortion anywhere they go. This does not mean that elite
corruption is also gone. But it is not enough to spread rumors about
it. Until the opposition has any credible facts, corruption will not be
the main theme for mobilizing mass protests.
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Since none of these topics has developed into an effective instrument
for political mobilization, what we hear from the opposition is an oppor-
tunistic mélange of all of them, which in itself is an important expression
of its weakness. The government is aware of its potential vulnerabilities
and has been quite adept at defending itself so far. The impression is that
until the government makes some blunders, nothing will change.
7.
Apart from a theme to rally around, the opposition also lacks human
resources. It is unlikely that it will achieve any meaningful success with
its existing leaders. Most political faces that are around today are asso-
ciated with failure, defeat and marginality, and it will be difficult for them
to change this image. Presumably, society craves some innovation in this
area. One can see that the opposition tacitly admits the necessity of new
leaders from the fact that almost any famous government personality that
breaks away gets a chance to become an important opposition figure for
which the existing parties start competing. This was true of sacked
Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili, and, some time later (to a lesser
degree) – dismissed Minister for Conflict Settlement Goga Khaindrava.
The increased activity on the opposition flank caused by Irakli Okruashvili’s
sudden resignation was somewhat comical, the opposition first got visible
hopes but ended up frustrated.
Past experience reinforces these expectations: strong opposition has
always come from the government. One cannot rule out this scenario
repeating itself but so far we do not see any splits in the government
or important figures that are likely to strengthen the opposition in a
tangible way.
“New faces” may also come from outside of the government, for
instance, from Georgian diasporas abroad. These people may bring
with themselves more up-to-date political know-how which the gov-
ernment masters much better than the opposition at the moment.
8.
As I already said, we still have a hybrid system containing ele-
ments of both democracy and autocracy. This makes it inherently
unstable from a structural standpoint. In such a system, the moment
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of the change of power is the most problematic. This is confirmed
in part by our historical experience – two unconstitutional changes of
power, which has led to an expectation that the point of the political
competition is to create a revolutionary situation (for the opposition)
or to avoid it (for the government). This reduces chances for dialogue
and cooperation between the opposing sides. Not only did political
players get used to such a situation, they feel comfortable in it
because it serves their short-term interests better. Both sides have a
vested interest in maintaining the confrontational environment, even
though they may occasionally make demonstrative gestures to show
that they mean to be “constructive”. The opposition parties compete
among each other to see who can be the most oppositional, that is
the most irreconcilable towards the government. As for the govern-
ment, the image of the opposition as a purely destructive, anti-sys-
temic force suits it, as it makes it easier to ignore its opinions.
With regard to hybrid systems, one can talk about the short-term
and long-term structural stabilization. Shevardnadze was a great master
of achieving short-term stability. The methods he used to achieve this
goal, however, only deepened the structural instability of the system.
Long-term stabilization, however paradoxical it may sound, requires
changing the system. Preservation of what we have, on the other
hand, implies structural instability.
No threats to short-term stability (say, for the next 2-5 years) are
visible at the moment and it is quite possible the situation is preserved
for an even longer time. This short-term stability depends on the
government’s capacity to demonstrate specific tangible achievements (it
knows how to do it) as well as on the inability of the opposition to
propose any credible alternative to the public. But there are also
dormant roots of a crisis: narrow human resources of the government,
its overdependence on a single person – the president, and a small
group of people around him. Any serious mistake may lead to con-
siderable tensions within this group. The probability of such a mistake
is aggravated by the fact that this group is mainly self-sufficient and
its contacts with outsiders are relatively limited. The function of the
reality check is mainly performed by the system of international
contacts. One also should not forget about factors that are largely
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beyond the control of the government: economic crisis, new outbreak
of tensions in separatist regions, possibly inspired from without.
If a change of power constitutes the point of vulnerability, such a
potential moment of crisis will come towards the end of the president’s
second term (let’s assume that, under the conditions of short-tern stability,
his re-election for a second term is secure). If today’s tactical stability
largely rests on a single person, the replacement of that person automatically
implies the threat of instability. By this time, the system should have
evolved either in a more democratic or a more autocratic direction. The
second version may imply a rougher, let us say, Asian variant, when
constitutional restrictions on the president’s terms is removed and allows the
still young Saakashvili to stay in his office for an indefinite future. This
would transform Georgia’s regime from a hybrid to an autocratic one.
The milder version would be what we sometimes hear from the
people well-disposed towards the current government. This could be
called the Mexican version. For that, the incumbent ruling group should
be transformed from Mikheil Saakashvili’s team into a real political
party, which will guarantee the stability of the state institutions while the
leader is replaced. So far, however, we do not see a trend towards the
system being transformed into a sustainable structure independent of the
personality of its leader. For this the power should undergo a systemic
change from a Jacobin avant-garde group into a broader, clientelistic
network that would probably be more open to corruption.
In the most optimistic scenario, while the incumbent government
preserves stability based on the existing pro-Western consensus and its
own effectiveness, there will be changes in society: economic success
leads to the creation of a broader middle class and strengthens insti-
tutions of civil society, which supply human resources to a more
competent political elite. Public dialogue then starts to focus on real
policy options instead of personal bickering. In the meantime, consti-
tutional reform makes general rules more democratic (no mention of
specific models here). Nothing is impossible: let us wait.
9.
In the Georgian case, the main external factors are neatly divided
into two: the Russian and the Western (although there also exist
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regional countries whose role cannot be placed in either category). In
these years, Russia was brilliant in her part of external enemy, thus
providing much help to the Georgian political elite. It is always handy
to have an external enemy, and Russia diligently delivered everything
one could expect from such an enemy. In particular, (1) she encour-
aged trends towards disintegration wherever she could (Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, until 2004 – Achara, and to some extent – Javakheti), (2) she
helped to consolidate nationhood in the remaining part of the country’s
territory, and (3) she did not leave Georgia any alternative other than
being oriented towards the West – that is, she killed any temptation
Georgia could have had to be oriented towards Russia. Especially for
this last point we should be deeply grateful to Russia.
The role of the West consists of (1) helping Georgia to maintain
independent statehood in the moment when she was most vulnerable,
(2) providing models of development which Georgia more or less
follows; and (3) helping socializing and strengthening the new elites.
The last is most notable: it is thanks to contacts with the West that
the new elite is genuinely new and not just young. This socialization
implied that many people – mostly but not necessarily young – got
a chance to get knowledge and experience relevant to the current
condition. This helped to replace romantic fantasies of the West
(typical for the national movement) with competences related to spe-
cific practices. Moreover, in some critical moments the West contrib-
uted to fortifying key players such as independent media, civil society
organizations and reformist politicians.
The capacity of the West to essentially change direction of the
Georgian political elite is limited: nobody can be forced to do what
he expressly does not want to. It would be a mistake to attribute the
relative liberality of the rule of Shevardnadze or Saakashvili to West-
ern influence alone. Why is the West not equally successful in other
countries? But once general Western orientation had been chosen and
Western opinion and assessments had significant influence on the
political behavior of both leaders. It has considerably restricted their
autocratic instincts, which are quite natural for Georgia’s political
culture. Today this influence has become even stronger, with NATO
membership becoming a realistic option and the goal of membership
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of the European Union defining the general direction of the country
– however distant that goal might be. For a comparison, let us imagine
that Europe of today resembles what it was in 1930s: what would the
chances for democracy (or even a liberal hybrid regime) in Georgia
be like?
Last but not least, about our neighboring countries. The greatest
role of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Georgia’s political life is to influence
ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the country. This influence is
mainly benevolent. The joint role of Azerbaijan and Turkey in the
context of oil and gas pipelines is so often discussed that it does not
make sense to go into detail here. In part, these projects give us
greater energy independence from Russia and, at the same time, make
us more interesting for the West. However, this factor is rather a
starting capital that needs to be augmented. The strategic influence of
Turkey mostly depends on whether this country becomes a member
of the European Union. If it succeeds, our membership is all but
guaranteed as well, if it does not, it becomes much less probable. As
for Ukraine, after the “Orange Revolution” it seemed that on the way
to both NATO and EU we had to walk together with Ukraine or,
rather, get on her bandwagon. But the later defeat of the Orange
coalition somewhat weakened this linkage, as well as the strategic
importance of Ukraine for Georgia.
10.
I do not think that Georgia’s policy should have a single dominant
direction overriding anything else. It is a mistake to say: “Let us just
get into NATO – that will solve everything else”; or: “Let’s improve
the investment climate and ensure economic growth – all other prob-
lems will take care of themselves”; or: “All resources should be
directed towards solving the territorial integrity issue”. The Georgian
government cannot indulge itself by being so simplistic. It has to fight
on several fronts.
Neither do I think that today’s priorities need to be dramatically
changed. One should develop and consolidate what has already been
achieved, while in some areas priorities should be modified. I will sum
these up in several points:
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(a) External threats. This is naturally about Russia. Putin’s
government would be rather happy to do something nasty to us.
But if we do not do something really stupid, it will be difficult for
Russia to significantly harm Georgia. The government is tempted to
exaggerate the importance of the Russian factor, which may be
considered an expression of its own authoritarian instinct, and
strengthen it. Being too obsessed about Russia may harm Georgia’s
credibility with the West and turn Russian aggression into a self-
fulfilling prophecy. When we change our constitution because of
Russian election cycles, the fear of Russia comes dangerously close
to paranoia.
Naturally, orientation towards NATO membership should continue.
I think – and this seems to be government’s idea as well – that the
road to better relations with Russia (which is important in itself) goes
through NATO membership. The course towards Georgia’s unilateral
Europeanization (taking advantage of the resources of the European
Neighborhood Policy) shall also continue. This way may even have
some benefits as compared to Europeanization in the process of
integration.
(b) Territorial conflicts. The belief that these conflicts can be
solved rapidly turned out to be one of gravest mistakes of this
government. This clearly was not true, but it would be wrong to
reconcile ourselves to them being unsolvable either. Relying only on
confidence-building measures and lengthy (quasi-)negotiations is in
effect tantamount to giving up. Efforts should continue in two
directions: on the one hand, working with the residents of conflict
regions in order to gain their trust, and secondly, steps should be
taken to keep the issue on the international agenda. Of course,
while doing this all Georgia should beware of not letting the con-
flict descend into a new violent stage. Combining all these things
is very difficult, but possible.
(c) Developing democracy. Whatever the public rhetoric of the
government may be, it should recognize that there is serious deficit
of democracy in the country. It is not only the authorities’ fault: for
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instance, one cannot blame the government for one of the most
important manifestations of this deficit – the weakness of the oppo-
sition. But there are steps that it must take. First of all, this is about
the constitutional system. It should be clearly said that work on a new
Constitution is to begin, and the government encourages as broad a
discussion on this subject as possible.
(d) Institutionalization and stabilization of public service. It is
clear to everyone that dramatic changes in the state apparatus were
necessary. But without a stable and non-political state bureaucracy,
stateness will hardly stabilize either. One need not think of something
original here – this is rather an issue of political will and a change
of attitude.
(e) Economic policy. The direction of liberalization which is taken
by the government is – as much as it is really taken – the only
correct one. But making the tax and customs offices more civilized
and creating more predictable conditions so that investors feel more
confident continues to be a challenge. Anti-corruption zeal frequently
comes into contradiction with ensuring the protection of property rights
– at least at this point, nobody presents sufficient justifications when
they are violated. The government should pursue a clear and consis-
tent policy in this area.
(f) Social policy. Such a thing simply does not exist yet and has
to be created – the first step should be recognizing that such a policy
has never existed.
(g) Education. After all the unavoidable draconian measures taken
in this area, some period of stabilization is needed so that one can
evaluate what did work and what steps should be taken next. But
further steps will have to be taken. Moreover, however commonplace
it may be, a country that does not have oil or similar resources should
spend a greater share of its public revenue on education and science.
Otherwise, structural reforms alone will not bear fruit.
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Notes:
1 Ukraine recognized Georgia in December 1991, while the Soviet Union still
existed and both countries were internationally considered to be its constituent parts.
This act of recognition became a symbol of a politically futile symbolic gesture.
2 A district in Abkhazia populated almost exclusively by ethnic Georgians.
3 A Georgian government-controlled village in South Ossetia.
4 Now part of Turkey.
5 According to some historical sources – and a popular Georgian poem of 1970s
– Sulkhan Saba Orbeliani, a leading figure of the Georgian enlightenment, sought
support from Louis XIV of France, and gained an audience, but the French monarch
did not show any interest towards the misfortunes of this distant Christian nation. This
story is used as a symbol of Europeans not caring about Georgia.
6 A stand-off in the center of Tbilisi between Gamsakhurdia’s government and his
opponents that lasted about 10 days and ended in Gamsakhurdia’s ouster on January
6, 1992.
7 In the breakthrough elections of October 1990.
8 Irakli Tsereteli and Gia Chanturia were leaders of rival and more radical
nationalist parties that called for a boycott of the elections.
9 A tiny region on the Chechen border which turned into a lawless enclave
beyond any effective state control following the outbreak of the second war in Chechnya
in 1999.
10 Following the Russian ban on Georgian wines in the spring of 2006: Kakheti
is the main wine-making region in Georgia.
11 New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 2.
12 In January 2006, Sandro Girgvliani, a young Tbilisi banker, was beaten to death
by high-ranking officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, presumably settling per-
sonal scores. This case was widely publicized and caused numerous protest rallies.
13 A politician, MP in 1999-2003 and a founder of the Georgia First movement,
famous for his ethno-nationalist statements. Was murdered, presumably on personal
grounds, in May 2007.
14 Minister of education in Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s government and outspoken
defender of ethno-nationalist causes.
15 Adopted in 2005.
181
181
Malkhaz Saldadze
1.
From its inception in the late 1980s, the liberation movement demanded
secession from the Soviet Union. This rendered the idea of remaining in
the Soviet state even on a confederative basis to be considered heresy. The
prevailing nationalist sentiments of that period, according to which Georgia’s
participation in democratic and modernization processes was a negative
phenomenon, influenced this attitude. The most salient feature of the
Georgian political reality in the early 1990s was the stubborn and uncom-
promising attitude toward the struggle for independence (by the end of
Gamsakhurdia’s presidential tenure this attitude softened a bit, but this could
not influence the regime’s viability any more). In addition, there were
numerous slogans calling for independence that were tinged with nationalist
emotions, did not express any clear-cut vision for national and long-term
social development. Moreover, the struggle for national independence was
in conflict even with the principles of democratization and liberalization
which were introduced in the Soviet period. The “independence first,
democracy afterwards” slogan of the ruling elite of the period was in line
with that ethos. As a result, anti-modernism and neglect for liberal demo-
cratic values became a norm for both the political elite and for the majority
of the nationalistically inclined society.
In this sense, changes started in the mid-1990s. They stemmed
from the following factors:
• Ethnic strife and military and political failures in the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts, aggravated by the prolonged economic
crisis, led the ethno-nationalist ideology into a crisis;
• The relative political stability of the mid-1990s enabled the liberal
part of society to establish itself as a civil sector;
• The openness of the country in crisis and its leadership to the
influence of international actors facilitated the above process;
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• The faster pace of economic development in the second half of the
1990s deepened social differentiation, which, in terms of cultural values,
translated into the stratification of society as well. In this respect,
differences emerged from the regional point of view as well. (The
difference in modernization level and liberal values between the more
and less economically developed regions also became noticeable.)
Each of these changes had its effect on political processes:
• The weakening of the ethno-nationalist ideology and the develop-
ment of an ideological vacuum of sorts undermined the ability of
the society in crisis to mobilize on the basis of anti-modernist
nationalism, which created a favorable environment for launching
the social and economic reforms based on Western values;
• The development of the civil sector paved the way for integration
into the Western world. The discourse on the principles of mod-
ernization and democratization started within this sector. From the
mid-1990s, this found support among the political elite, especially
its younger representatives;
• The ruling core of the political regime realized full well that
encouraging the younger generation of technocrats was a necessary
prerequisite for development and therefore encouraged initiatives
that envisaged modernization (however, later on, when the ruling
elite realized that its role in the projects that were designed by the
new generation was minimized, these attitudes changed. Precisely
this caused the rift within the ruling political elite;
• In the wake of social economic development, orientation toward the
liberal democratic values became more pronounced. This changed
the basis for social mobilization (which was clearly manifest in the
slogans expressing civil protest ahead of the Rose Revolution);
• The increasing support for democratic political processes among
the elite won support among the public as well.
2.
From the early 1990s to this day, Georgia’s development as an
independent state has been accompanied by social and political trau-
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mas. The project of sovereign Georgian statehood has been in conflict
with internal and external political and domestic social and cultural
factors from the very beginning. The reasons for this inherent conflict
were first and foremost the lack and vagueness of the political strategy
within the political group itself that assumed leadership of the national
liberation movement (nationalists who supported Gamsakhurdia and
rallied around the Round Table-Free Georgia bloc) and the amorphous
political project which was based on ethnic nationalism. The principles
of populist democracy, unitarianism and pseudo-socialism (the vague
idea of so-called state capitalism), which lay in the foundation of this
ideologem, ruled out the possibility of society’s development into a
social, political and economic actor and the involvement in the political
process of a number of groups with certain ethnic, religious and
political characteristics. As a result of all this, Georgia found itself
embroiled in a number of domestic political crises.
The absence of a long-term political strategy was manifest, if noth-
ing else, in the speed with which the doctrine of building the nation was
changing in Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist group as a result of either foreign
political pressure or domestic criticism. Initially, the Round Table political
elite took an irreconcilable position on the issue of Georgia’s autono-
mous entities, which translated into the dissolution of the South Ossetian
Autonomous District and, consequently, ethnic conflict.
Later on, as a consequence of the developments in the Autonomous
Republic of Abkhazia, this position changed. The attitude toward this
region fostered the establishment of the anti-democratic regime of apart-
heid, which eventually turned into a factor that kindled the ethnic
conflict. The views of Gamsakhurdia’s political group on the place of
Georgia in the former Soviet political space (at some point, the idea of
Georgia’s presence in the Soviet political and economic space was
revisited, although this political position did not last long) and the role
the ethnic minorities were to play in the new Georgian state (the
rhetoric regarding this issue periodically alternated between extreme ir-
reconcilability and the granting of cultural autonomy with government
guarantees to ethnic and other enclaves) was swinging like a pendulum.
The main vector of the Gamsakhurdia government’s economic
policy was demonstrated in its attempts to weaken the newly estab-
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lished group of property owners that was created during perestroika
(the “cooperation sector”). The government was trying to tighten its
control over the capital goods (perhaps this was the attempt by the
new political elite to assume control over state-owned property and
effect a new redistribution of property). Naturally, this was damaging
to the interests of the aforementioned economic class. The declared
desire to abandon the Soviet economic system – if, that is, we view
the acts of “economic blockade” of the Soviet Union (blocking the
trunk railroads) which Georgia implemented as attesting to that desire
– widened the gap between the new regime and the cooperators as
a class of ownership which arose under the Soviet economic system
by exploiting state-owned property. Accordingly, the “gray” financial
resources that were accumulated back in the Soviet period remained
under the control of an economic class which was antagonistic toward
the new regime and supported the political groups confronting it.
Foreign policy was unclear as well. The nonchalant attitude of the
new regime toward protection of democratic and liberal values drew
international criticism, and without international support, the country was
destined to isolationism. This situation imparted some degree of legiti-
macy to the domestic opposition’s struggle against the quasi-Jacobin
Gamsakhurdia regime and the foreign and domestic environment which
had taken shape to the extent that even toppling the incumbent gov-
ernment by using extreme measures would be considered legitimate.
3.
Eduard Shevardnadze had an image of a fighter for change as early
as the Soviet period. In the perestroika period, this image of his was
further reinforced. Shevardnadze’s return to Georgia in 1992 was viewed
precisely from this standpoint. Despite this, however, there existed no
clearly-formulated program of Georgia’s democratic development that
could become established as a system in the Georgia of the Shevardnadze
period. Spontaneous successes in this field took place because of the
regime’s internal weakness and the influence of foreign actors.
Shevardnadze adhered to the principles of multi-actor politics (which
to some extent was accounted for by his experience of maneuvering in
confrontations between factions and groups in the Soviet party nomen-
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clature system and his familiarity with the “balancing” policy), which gave
some leeway to democratic development. Of course, there was a trend
toward monopolization of power too, but Shevardnadze also realized that
relying on only one group would pose a threat to his power and that
singling out a potential political successor might also result in his own
early departure from the political arena. The negative aspect of this
philosophy was the absence of the institutionalization of the political
process. Despite its being multi-actor, the policy predicated on clandestine
dealings and non-transparent rules of the game was undemocratic from
the outset. Refraining from singling out a political successor – a particular
group or individual – also posed a real threat to the creation of a strong
opposition bloc against him. And it was created ahead of the Rose
Revolution. Shevardnadze’s old political team took a passive position
toward development. The reason was their confusion about the role they
were playing in Shevardnadze’s calculations (perhaps Shevardnadze fright-
ened them by inviting the formerly opposition groups of Irina Sarishvili
and Vakhtang Rcheulishvili to his team, which undermined the sense of
stability and demonstrated the possibility of their replacement).
The following can be highlighted from among the failures of the
Shevardnadze regime:
• Hindering economic reforms and slowing down the pace of eco-
nomic development while networks of corrupt clans grew more
influential;
• Ignoring the necessity of institutional reforms;
• Reducing the notion of democracy to informal relations between
different political groups.
Shevardnadze’s political regime was quasi-authoritarian and bu-
reaucratic. It allowed some degree of democracy, but the extent of
institutionalization was low. The state administrative system func-
tioned with a pragmatism characteristic of the Soviet “apparatchiks”
(administrative function – private material benefits) and property and
power were not separated. Being in power made it possible to
establish control over economic activities or manage the process of
the redistribution of power (abuse of power to promote private
economic interests).
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Among the conditions antecedent to the Rose Revolution were
social and cultural changes and changes in cultural and value systems.
On the one hand, the growing civic consciousness contributed to
establishment of value-based civic mechanisms of mobilization of public
protest while on the other hand the weakly-structured but organized
middle class, which adopted the aforementioned values, was coming
into being over the preceding decade.
4.
Saakashvili’s political program is a mix of sorts of political pragmatism
and idealism. His team came to power under slogans of loyalty to
democratic and liberal values (which is what earned it public support), but
while consistently implementing a policy of reforms, it also often turns a
blind eye to the violations of democratic norms and procedures that
occur. It is precisely out of considerations of political pragmatism (ensur-
ing the fast pace of the reforms) that the new political elite exceeded even
the Shevardnadze regime in terms of the degree of monopolization of
political power. The concentration of power through introduction of con-
stitutional amendments, the growing degree of centralization (limitation of
local governments’ prerogatives), tighter control over the functions of the
public service (the strict, centralized and systemic nature of the anti-
corruption policy) – all these are trademarks of the Saakashvili period.
The main achievement of the early period of the Saakashvili
government was greatly reducing the alienation between state and
society. A decade of disappointment and skeptical attitude toward the
state were replaced by trust toward the state and sense of stability.
This was made possible by the quick and efficient resolution by the
government of critical political situations (e.g. in Achara and the Kodori
Gorge). Although the country’s economy has not improved to any
noticeable extent and rising prices are progressively undermining stan-
dards of living, well-calculated appeals strengthen public support for
the government and neutralize the influence of economic factors against
the backdrop of an unfavorable international environment (relations
with Russia). Among the unquestionable achievements should be listed
the ongoing structural reforms and the strengthening of the fundamen-
tal state institutions (the Interior Ministry, the Prosecutor General’s
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Office and the education system) and lower-tier administrative units
(where contacts between state and society are direct thanks to the
provision of state services), as well as a dramatic decrease in corrup-
tion. Yet another noteworthy achievement is reaching public consensus
on the main priorities of the country’s development and security policy
(both imply integration into the Euro-Atlantic area). This, however,
may be due not so much to the political program of Saakashvili’s
team specifically, as to the mobilization of public trust.
The worst failure of the Saakashvili period is, in my opinion, the
extreme tension in relations with Russia. This affects both the country’s
economic security and the stability of the existing political order. The
point is that implementing radical reforms will probably become more
difficult against the background of the worsening social and economic
situation (there will be less radicalism when social reality has to be
taken into account); in addition, the reforms will inevitably encounter
organized, if isolated and spontaneous, protests.
As for other failures (perhaps it would be more accurate to call
them flaws), in my view these include the following:
• Inadequate institutionalization of official relations in the state gov-
ernance system and confining the prerogative of decision making
to a small group of technocrat reformers (this flaw can to some
extent be accounted for by the lack of human resources, although
neither can it be ruled out that the post-revolution elite does not
trust the resources which are available);
• The decrease in the extent of participatory democracy and single
party domination in parliamentary political processes;
• As a result of missionary revolutionary policy, many a political
actor is being sidelined from the political arena, which increases
the likelihood of the emergence of an opposition (as early as in
the spring 2006, the prospect of a union of opposition groups with
different ideological platforms emerging to counter a political sys-
tem which was in the inception stage started to seem realistic); this
makes political stability in Georgia fragile;
• The place of the judiciary in the political system is not deter-
mined, and this issue is considered to be of minor importance;
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• The lack of clarity in setting the confines for the anti-corruption
policy and limits of competence for the institutions which imple-
ment it (economic actors are afraid of the possible establishment
of state racket in the name of anti-corruption policy).
In contrast to its predecessor, the political order of the Saakashvili
period stands out for its higher degree of mobilization and promptness
of action. This is a result of the introduction of the team spirit and
leadership principle. As for the categorization of the regime, it is hard
to describe it as mobilizing because the consistent liberalism of the
political elite does not raise doubts, although there are some signs of
its possessing the qualities of precisely that kind of a regime (growing
interference of the government in the economic sectors of public life,
centralization, strengthening of the control and repressive mechanisms).
At the same time, the regime evinces signs of a populist political order
(dominant political party and its ties with social organizations, weak-
ening of the institutions which act as mediators between state and
society, like the political parties, media, interest groups). However, it
is hard to talk about authoritarianism either because democratic insti-
tutions do exist and function in Georgia. Taking all this into account,
describing the incumbent regime as a delegative democracy (a term
coined by Guillermo O’Donnel to describe the Latin American democ-
racies) seems more acceptable (some degree of democracy plus the
abovementioned mobilization and populist elements).
5.
The weakness of the opposition cannot be attributed to pressure on
the part of the authorities, but it also has to be said that in some cases
– take the elections as an example – the electoral system and the law
put parties without access to administrative resources into a disadvan-
tageous position compared to the ruling party. The gist of the problem
should mostly be sought in the issues of the practice of civil conscious-
ness and the political culture of society. The Rose Revolution demon-
strated the civic values which took root in some parts of society in
action, precisely because other channels of practicing them (the elec-
tions, media) were either prone to manipulation or obliterated. Even if
the parliamentary and presidential elections were held freely and trans-
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parently, it would be desirable to practice civic values using these kinds
of channels more frequently, as this would make relations between the
parties and society more systemic on the one hand and establish formal
and informal rules for such relations on the other (ideological or finan-
cial support, membership, participation in campaigns, etc.)
6.
If the opposition grows stronger, the fundamental program of
opposing the government will be based on demands for social rights
and the supremacy of law. At present, the mechanisms of implemen-
tation of the modernizing and liberal reforms are not based on demo-
cratic principles; the tendency toward reducing the possibility of par-
ticipation is also marked. Obviously, the latter factor serves as a fertile
soil for implementing reforms with a shocking effect. In addition, it
has to be taken into account that in the medium and long run, the
results of the reform are bound to cause social, economic, and socio-
cultural changes which will logically evolve into demands for the
participation and establishment of new social groups in the political
arena. Accordingly, the need will arise to broaden participatory oppor-
tunities, which might become a hindrance in the implementation of
modernizing liberal reforms. Presumably, the existing political regime
will misperceive the growing public demand for broader opportunities
to participate. This is why the government should be able to stabilize
the volatile social and economic situation. It should create a system
to contain the growing protest. In this situation, the intensification of
the opposition’s efforts will be logical. Today, nationalism-etatism,
rightist liberalism and social issues with leftist elements are represented
in almost equal proportions in the ruling party’s political program. In
a possible crisis situation, it will have to reject its ideological eclec-
ticism. The vacated niches will be occupied by other parties.
7.
None of the listed options are impossible, although the experience of
changes of government in Georgia indicates that the leading political
opposition groups always emerged after rifts within the ruling party. The
Saakashvili team is trying to avert the rift. This is why leading politicians
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are moved from one post to another instead of being dismissed. Excep-
tions in this regard were Salome Zourabichvili and Goga Khaindrava, who
were outsiders in the governing team and had no support base in it. Irakli
Okruashvili’s case merits special attention because the above rule applied
to him too, but he chose to step down out of personal considerations.
This does not mean that the former defense minister will become an
opposition leader, although neither can it be said with certainty what
political position he will take should a crisis develop. Obviously, what
calculations the foreign political actors (the West and Russia) will have for
opposition politicians also has to be taken into account.
8.
The stability of the existing system in Georgia depends on suc-
cesses of the political elite which governs it, in other words, on the
efforts of a single political group. The political and administrative
processes are insufficiently institutionalized and, should the ruling political
team prove unsuccessful, the absence of institutional ways of settling
crises will threaten to change the elite through strong-arm methods or
the use of repressive mechanisms by the government to stay in power.
In the present-day Georgian reality, it is hard to find evidence of the
establishment of a dictatorship or authoritarianism. But the absence of a
system that would ensure political stability is also apparent, which creates
a margin of probability for a change of the elites through revolutionary
cycles. Ensuring long-term stability is one of the challenges of the incum-
bent political regime, as it is required for the continuation and completion
of the reforms. At this stage, steps that were made in this direction were
intended to strengthen and consolidate political power (see answer to ques-
tion 4). This is probably an indicator that Georgia is on its way toward
the establishment of a dominant political party system of the Mexican type
(which, for its part, implies the weakening of democratic processes).
9.
The influence of foreign factors on Georgia’s political development
is certainly great. Since the 1990s, Georgia’s fluctuations between
democracy and the lack thereof, between poles of stable and unstable
development, have stemmed from the prevailing trends in Western and
Russian foreign policy and the balance of their power in the region.
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If in the early 1990s, the destabilizing external factors in the
Caucasus were the result of Russia’s policy, it was the same Russia
which played a major role in the establishment of stability in the mid-
1990s (it established a form of stability which was to its advantage
by creating mechanisms of military-political influence). The Western
influence promoted deepening of the democratic processes from the
very beginning, and the West has been consistently and successfully
implementing its policy ever since.
Since the Rose Revolution, the balance between these two main
sources of foreign factors has been changing. Russian influence will
be aimed toward destabilizing the incipient system to maintain and
further broaden its influence in the country and region while the West
will step up its support for the policy of strengthening the state
institutions (especially the state and economic security institutions). It
is interesting to observe the attitude of these two foreign centers
toward the aforementioned decrease in the extent of democracy. It
might sound ironic, but criticism of the Georgian government for
weakening of democracy is more likely to come from Russia than
from the West because Russia is interested in bringing the legitimacy
of the incumbent Georgian regime into question. This does not at all
mean that the West will allow deviation from the democratic course.
10.
The government should consider as priorities the issues which will
help mitigate the effects of the factors which threaten to undermine
stability in the country:
I. Settlement of political and economic relations with Russia;
II. Deepening of the peaceful dialogue with the de facto authorities
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
III. Institutionalization of democratic processes and broadening of
opportunities to participate in political processes;
IV. Adherence to the principles of supremacy of law and separation of
powers; if this happens, the effective interplay between the mecha-
nisms of checks and balances will increase the legitimacy of the
political order and thereby neutralize domestic destabilizing factors.
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Overview
Georgia has had both successful and unsuccessful periods since
the restoration of its national sovereignty, so we can discuss both
successes and failures now that Georgia has been independent for 15
years. It has to be noted in discussion on failures that Georgia has
been failing thus far to create sustainable governance institutions,
and this term encompasses both government and nongovernmental or
business organizations. In this respect, i.e. in terms of establishment
of these institutions, the situation is roughly the same in all three
sectors: organizations are for the most part structured to fit a par-
ticular individual and have to be readapted to the new manager when
that individual leaves the organization. On the one hand, this allows
for flexibility and maneuverability, which are necessary in the tran-
sitional period, but on the other hand, problems are likely to be
created in the long run because of the consequent lack of the
institutional framework and prerequisites for the stable and sustain-
able development. As already mentioned, this situation is normal for
the initial period of transition, but certainly cannot be considered a
sign of normal development a few years later. And here is where
Georgia’s second main problem is: to this day, replacement of the
ruler by holding the election has not happened in Georgia. In other
words, there is no succession of leadership whereby each next
leader or party would pick up where his or her predecessor left off.
When analyzing the post-socialist transformation of the Central and
Eastern European countries, some experts noted a pendulum-like
process of sorts in the pattern of change of government: rightist
leaders (or parties) were replaced by leftists, often former members
or sympathizers of the communist party. These changes caused some
degree of change in society’s attitudes toward the reforms, but left
the overall direction of the reforms, as well as the strategic vector
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of the country’s development, intact. Unfortunately, this phenomenon
has not taken place in Georgia. All the significant changes in Georgia
have been of a revolutionary nature and resulted in radical changes
in the balance of power in the political arena. I strongly believe that
every form of governance was better than the preceding one, but
none of them helped the citizens take the view of Georgia as a
unified country and of themselves as participants in the process of
developing a state.
And finally, what Georgia has failed to achieve: Our society has
failed to see itself as a single entity. The integration/unification of
different ethnic, religious and social groups into a cohesive society has
yet to happen. Ethnic Armenians, Azeris and Ossetians who reside in
Georgia do not view themselves as Georgian citizens. Worse yet, the
dominant ethnic group, the Georgians, are constantly divided into
friends and foes; the divisions may run between religious denomina-
tions, political views, province of origin, personal income or any other
formal difference, but this does not reduce the extent of disunity. In
my opinion, this phenomenon causes Georgia more headaches than the
fourth major failure – the loss of territories. Even in the worst-case
scenario of failure to bring the lost territories under Georgian jurisdic-
tion, the remaining part of the country will have prospects of devel-
opment into a Western-type state, but without the emergence of a
society with a system of common fundamental values and the insti-
tution of the Georgian citizen, the country’s development seems im-
possible to me.
The following can be considered the most important successes in
the independence period:
a) Sustaining Georgia’s independence and implementation of
independent state policy. In the last 15 years, Georgia has more
than once been faced with the threat of losing its independence.
However, by now the country has managed to avoid becoming a
part or, more likely, a satellite or dependency of some other
country. An analysis of development of post-Soviet countries pro-
vides plenty of examples when only the existence of the govern-
ment and membership in international organizations remain from a
country’s independence.
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b) The second achievement that needs to be pointed out is public
participation in the country’s development and its growing
importance for this process. Of course, the extent of public
participation is substantially less than in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, not to mention Western countries. But in the context of the
post-Soviet area, Georgia can pride itself on its successes in the
areas of development of independent media and the NGO and
business sectors. Compared to neighboring countries, public partici-
pation in solving local and community-level problems is quite
significant. In this respect, the period of 1991-1994 played an
important role, when the state and state institutions almost disap-
peared. The generation which was raised during the Soviet period
felt for the first time that the state no longer cared about them
and was unable to resolve their (both society’s in general and
individual’s) problems. As a result, the people started to think
about their future themselves. This was often spontaneous, and
sometimes uncivilized, but ultimately, precisely this attitude shaped
the nongovernmental activity. In the Shevardnadze period, the
state regained some of its strength and managed to start perform-
ing its functions and bringing some of its old spheres of influence
back under its control, but failed to change the situation cardinally.
c) The third major achievement is clearly-formulated and well-
developed foreign relations. At the beginning of his presidential
tenure, Shevardnadze brought Georgia into the focus of interna-
tional attention by using his personal contacts. The country joined
international organizations, and both investors and academic circles
started to take interest in Georgia. From 1998, the initial interest
subsided, and Georgia was referred to as a “failed state”. The
2003 Rose Revolution once again brought Georgia to the center
of the world’s attention. The interest toward our country has
grown again. In addition, Georgia has shaped a long-term foreign
policy and vector of development. The new government has clearly
stated that pro-Western policy and the country’s integration into
NATO and the EU are top priorities over the next few years. It
has to be said that Georgia’s foreign relations have been brought
under a systemic institutional framework for the first time. Georgia’s
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first victories in the information war with Russia attest to this. The
main thing now is to finalize the process of formulating a com-
prehensive foreign policy and its institutionalization.
Now let us move from the general assessment of the independence
period to the assessments of individual governments. Since 1990, Geor-
gia has had three leaders: Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-1992), Eduard
Shevardnadze (1992-2003) and Mikheil Saakashvili (since 2003).
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s presidency
Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to power as a result of the develop-
ments of late 1980s, on the wave of the national liberation movement.
A significant part of the population viewed him as a leader who would
be able to meet the main demands of Georgian society – winning
independence and changing the communist regime. One might say that
many Georgians associated their expectation of real changes with
Gamsakhurdia. Gamsakhurdia had all the prerequisites for carrying out
the reforms in the country. He enjoyed public confidence and accord-
ingly, received a vast majority of the votes. In the Soviet period,
Georgia was one of the most prosperous republics. The population
was well-off and ready for a difficult start of the reforms, both
morally and materially.
What happened next proved the validity of these assumptions.
Gamsakhurdia’s approval ratings were lower in 1992 than in 1990, but
they still remained quite high. Let us assume theoretically that
Gamsakhurdia accepted the opposition’s initial demand and called early
presidential and parliamentary elections. No-one can say with certainty
that he would have lost those elections. Furthermore, analysis of the
number of people who spent years in the fierce opposition and boy-
cotted all the subsequent elections shows that maintaining status quo,
i.e. Gamsakhurdia’s staying in power, was quite possible.
In that period of economic downfall and total impoverishment of
the population in Georgia, it was precisely material reserves from the
Soviet-period that helped the people survive hard times. So, history
proved the validity of both our assumptions. Unfortunately, those
reserves were wasted, and today, 15 years later, we have to carry out
the reforms which should have been implemented in the Gamsakhurdia
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period and the following years and continue our struggle with much
fewer resources. Relations with Russia are an example of this. The
current tensions in Russo-Georgian relations are quite similar to what
was going on between Russia and the Baltic states in the early 1990s.
Because of this wasted time and missed opportunities, the
Gamsakhurdia period should be given a negative assessment. Formu-
lating Gamsakhurdia’s political views is difficult because they did not
exist. Gamsakhurdia did not have an coherent program; it is difficult
to describe his system of values and then find logic in his actions in
reference to that system. The entire period of Gamsakhurdia’s presi-
dency was a chain of mutually contradictory actions, where each
action was in conflict with the preceding one. Holding off privatization
and suspending economic reforms were good examples of this. The
Gamsakhurdia government was a team of people with different views
and, to some extent, different values, so it could hardly be described
as a team.
The declaration of Georgia’s independence can be considered the
greatest achievement of the Gamsakhurdia period. It has to be said,
however, that the real independence did not come from where every-
one expected it; independence was in effect an outcome of the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union. In addition to Georgia, independence
was achieved by the countries which did not at all strive to be
independent (e.g. the Central Asian republics). Unfortunately,
Gamsakhurdia failed to legitimize the independence which he won in
1991 and receive international recognition. To make a somewhat crude
comparison, the actual status of Georgia’s independence at that time
was roughly similar to the current status of independence of self-styled
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In both cases, no one except
those who declared independence recognized it (only Romania recog-
nized Georgia’s independence in 1991); state government bodies were
established which were also recognized by no-one. At the same time,
the central government’s (Moscow in the former case and Tbilisi in
the latter) influence on affairs in these regions was minimal.
Precisely the failure to achieve recognition and the beginning of
disunity of society should be considered the main failures of the
Gamsakhurdia government. The preconditions for the four main fail-
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ures that were discussed at the beginning of this article can be
demonstrated to have originated precisely in the Gamsakhurdia period.
At the same time there were several important new developments
during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency: a) elections and election campaigns
were held, and political statements and debates took place for the first
time in modern Georgian history; b) the first attempts were made to
take political debates to the legislature and give them a more-or-less
modern form; c) the first local elections were held.
Precisely the failures listed above were the reasons for the pre-
mature end of the Gamsakhurdia government: a) failure to achieve
international recognition. In addition to the independence which he
declared, his policy and his team also did not receive international
recognition and support. Gamsakhurdia failed to find a common lan-
guage with both Russia and the West; b) lack of comprehensive vision
formulated by the Georgian government. As noted above, the entire
Gamsakhurdia period can be described with one phrase: a chain of
mutually contradictory actions. Owing to this, not only were there no
reforms of the country’s governance and the system in general, but
no significant changes were effected in any sector. For instance, after
holding the local elections, the institution of appointed prefects was
introduced, which effectively took the reins of all local political power.
To these two problems should be added the lack of qualified staff,
mistakes in personnel policy, the division of society into “our support-
ers” and “others” and the drawing of a line of miscommunication
between them, and discord within the ruling team. All this caused the
end of the Gamsakhurdia regime in the 1991-1992 “Christmas coup”.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency
Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency can be divided into several sub-
periods: a) the period of establishment (1992-96); b) period of rise
(1997-99); c) period of stagnation (1999-2003). During the first pe-
riod, Eduard Shevardnadze had to share power with other leaders.
Initially, it was the Military Council (Kitovani, Sigua, Ioseliani), then
– the Mkhedrioni militia and its leader Jaba Ioseliani on the one hand
and pro-Russian forces and their front man Igor Giorgadze on the
other. When analyzing Shevardnadze’s decisions in this period, we
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should not overlook the factor of these people. Undoubtedly, the main
achievement of the period of establishment was the stabilization of the
country. Shevardnadze achieved this by sidelining his opponents. At
the initial stage, he eliminated armed formations of Gamsakhurdia’s
supporters with Russia’s help and reduced their influence on political
developments to a minimum. Then, in alliance with Ioseliani, he
sidelined Sigua and Kitovani, and later Ioseliani and his Mkhedrioni
shared their fate. This ended the rampage of illegal armed units in the
country, which, of course, should be considered the second major
achievement of the Shevardnadze government. Later on, Kakha
Targamadze and his Ministry of Internal Affairs occupied the paramili-
tary formations’ vacant niche in the political arena and business sector.
Shevardnadze started to slowly create a system which he was familiar
with. The system was based on a strong and corrupt Internal Affairs
Ministry, the existence of different small groups in the country, almost
everyone’s involvement in corruption and gaining of control over
everyone in this manner. The beginnings of the ruling party, the
Citizens’ Union, which was to create a political support base for
Shevardnadze, are also associated with this period. The main failures
of the first period of the Shevardnadze presidency were the launch of
combat operations in Abkhazia resulting in the loss of that region and
accession to the CIS. It also has to be noted that it was precisely in
that period that Aslan Abashidze and his clan tightened their grip on
Achara. The international recognition of Georgia and the launch of
several important programs by international organizations should also
be counted as a success.
The period of establishment was followed by a period of rise, in
which the economic indicators started to grow for the first time in the
history of independent Georgia. In 1996, inflation edged down to only
2-3 percent a month; compared to the previous year, the country’s GDP
increased by 14 percent. In the same period, small-scale privatization
was effectively completed. A real NGO and media boom started in the
country. The international community deemed precisely the rapid growth
of the civil sector Georgia’s main achievement. Georgia got involved in
important international projects (TRACECA, Baku-Ceyhan, etc.), which,
in experts’ opinion, could pave the way for stability and development.
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International organizations’ statistics provide good reasons to talk about
the development of small and medium-size business in that period. For
the first time in Georgian history, several major foreign investments
were made in the country’s economy. New people entered the political
arena who were able to shape the Western vector for the country’s
development and make it stable.
But simultaneously with these achievements, the country was faced
with grave problems which persisted throughout Shevardnadze’s presi-
dential tenure: a) corruption at all levels; b) the Internal Affairs Ministry’s
transformation effectively into a mafia-like punitive department; c)
disunity of the country and society, of which the most obvious and
flagrant manifestation were Aslan Abashidze and his rule in Achara; d)
inconsistent foreign policy. Pro-Western actions alternated with need-
less concessions and wheedling overtures toward Russia.
If the period between 1996 and 1999 made it possible to talk
about a balance of sorts between the positive and negative factors and
outcomes, the years that followed can only be described as downright
negative. The first clear signal of negative changes to come was the
totally rigged 2000 presidential election. The election made it clear that
the population deemed Shevardnadze’s capabilities exhausted. Because
of the lack of an attractive alternative, people simply did not go to
polls. The failure to meet the quorum of voters posed a dilemma for
Shevardnadze and his supporters: they had to either admit that the
election had failed to take place, draw appropriate conclusions, and
reschedule the vote, or meet the quorum by “throwing in” extra
ballots. They chose the latter. Eventually it became clear that
Shevardnadze’s presidency no longer had any positive aspects. The
positive changes which took place in the rise period diminished to the
minimum: a) the new people disappeared from the government and
Shevardnadze’s team and were replaced by retrogrades; b) attacks
against non-governmental organizations and the media became more
frequent; c) economic growth ended. It was obvious that the interna-
tional energy projects could only create a desirable economic climate,
but without the development of business in the country, they could
not make the economy stable. Businesses, however, found themselves
in a plight. Small and medium-sized companies could not withstand
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the pressure of monitoring bodies any more – they were either dis-
appearing or shifting two thirds of their turnover into the gray sector.
In different estimates, the gray sector of the economy was 50-60
percent of the total; d) the country’s foreign political vector was
increasingly leaning toward Russia.
As the positive factors were being offset, the negative ones moved
to the fore: a) instead of combating crime, the Internal Affairs Ministry
effectively acquired the function of perpetrating and abetting crime; b)
Achara in effect seceded from Georgia’s jurisdiction; c) corruption be-
came Georgia’s trademark. The international community again started to
talk about Georgia as a failed state. Public trust toward the government,
governmental institutions and officials plummeted. Precisely this was the
environment in which the 2003 parliamentary elections were held, the
elections which put an end to the Shevardnadze government. The
fundamental causes of the Rose Revolution were the abovementioned
problems and the people’s attitude. It also has to be noted that the
voters saw an alternative for the first time in the person of Mikheil
Saakashvili and his team. This, together with the coordination between
and good work of the non-governmental sector and the media, led the
population to decide against forgiving the government which lost its
popularity yet another rigged elections, whereas the international com-
munity not only did not support the Shevardnadze government, but
even, one might say, drove a nail in his system’s coffin.
Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency
Mikheil Saakashvili and his team came to power with huge vote
of confidence. This makes Saakashvili similar to the first Georgian
president indeed. But in contrast to the Gamsakhurdia government,
Saakashvili uses his popularity and public trust to carry out reforms
at an accelerated pace and make them irreversible. The incumbent
authorities have introduced several novelties to Georgia’s political life,
of which team spirit, a common vision and transparency of the
reforms should be noted. As mentioned above, under Gamsakhurdia
and Shevardnadze, there was no consensus on what the country’s
ruling elite strived for. In addition, the ruling team itself was extremely
disunited and diverse. It has to be said that the first steps have
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already been made to address this problem. There are not so many
discrepancies any more between the statements of the country’s lead-
ers as under the previous government. A team has taken shape within
the ruling party, whose members have more or less the same funda-
mental principles and values and share the same vision for the country’s
development. At the same time, extensively preplanned, designed, and
institutionally structured reforms are under way in a number of sec-
tors. Most importantly, reforms in different sectors share the same
pattern, vector, and have the same general objective. The incumbent
authorities are trying to make both decision making and decision
implementation as transparent as possible. Probably none of the pre-
vious governments has held so many news conferences, briefings and
meetings with different social groups as the incumbent authorities
have. It also has to be said that the number of “meetings for meeting’s
sake” has fallen dramatically; in other words, the meetings with no
real significance, which used to be held only to please someone or just
for the protocol, are not taking place any more. These sorts of
meetings were very popular during Shevardnadze’s presidency, but
none of them yielded any important results.
Reforms in the following areas should be considered positive re-
sults of the new approach:
a) Education. A fundamental reform at all levels has been launched in
the education system. The secondary school reform is qualitatively
changing school in Georgia as an institution. Giving the secondary
schools the status of legal entities under civil law and handing over
the budgetary instruments to them has increased their degree of
organizational independence and flexibility as well as responsibility.
Schools are getting more independent in planning and implementing
curricular activities too. The introduction of Supervisory Boards
should minimize the alienation which existed among the teachers,
parents and students. Avoidance of responsibility and self-isolation-
ism, which before were part of the schools’ everyday life, will be
uprooted. The functions of the director and director’s administration
are also changing. They will be a purely managerial unit, free of
ideological or any other duties. The secondary school will be trans-
formed into an institution for development at the grass-roots level
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of the skills of the self-governance and governance – the skills
which Georgian society needs so much.
The unified national exams have replaced the corrupt and defec-
tive university admissions system. Three years ago no one could have
imagined that it was possible to defeat the old system. It is important
to ensure that young people who join universities under this system
find a new educational environment there. In this respect, Georgia has
a lot of work to do, although the law has already outlined the legal
and organizational framework which will promote this process. What
was said above about the schools applies to higher education too. For
the first time in the Georgian history, the country has a chance of
getting involved in the European processes from the very beginning
instead of integrating into the already established systems. The Bolo-
gna process is under way, and it promises to greatly benefit Georgian
students and teachers.
The establishment of the Foundation for Scientific Development
and the withdrawal of the research institutions from the system of the
Academy of Sciences signaled the end of the first and most important
phase of reforms of the Georgian scientific research system. The
reform of vocational education was launched simultaneously. This has
effectively created the framework for the modern Georgian education
system, which is based on professionalism, transparency, market de-
mand, Western values and the principle of continuous education.
Precisely this education system should support Georgia’s development
into a successful nation.
b) Reform of the police. Together with the education system, the
police was the most corrupt system in Georgia for years. By the
end of Shevardnadze’s presidency, the police effectively monopo-
lized crime and violence. Not a single more-or-less significant
crime was perpetrated without high-level Internal Affairs Ministry
officials’ direct involvement or tacit acquiescence. Petty bribery
and extortion reigned at the lower tier. The reform has seriously
undermined this system. To the public, the most conspicuous part
of the reform is what they come into direct contact with, i.e. the
patrol police. Today no one argues any more that the experiment
proved successful and is already irreversible. Important changes
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took place in other departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
although these may be less visible to the public.
c) Military reform. For years, the Georgian Army used to be a
bottomless pit in which budget allocations and foreign assistance
would disappear. Despite years of funding, soldiers were hungry
and badly-dressed, barracks and weapons were in poor condition,
and officers did not receive their salaries. Discipline was lax and
lawlessness rampant. The quality of leadership in the army would
not have struck anyone for its high professionalism. The reforms
of the recent years have either reduced or resolved these prob-
lems. The Georgian Army can be described as a combat-ready
unit today. Major steps were made toward closer cooperation with
NATO, of which the best example is the beginning of the Inten-
sive Dialogue phase and recent statements by NATO officials.
d) Foreign relations. Georgia’s foreign policy has become consistent
for the first time. Our country has clearly formulated a pro-
Western vector and is implementing its policy accordingly. Georgia’s
first victories in the information war with Russia were manifesta-
tions of precisely this. The main thing now is to finalize the
process of formulating the comprehensive foreign policy blueprint
and setting the priority target areas for international assistance. For
the first time in the Georgian history, the government turned down
offers of international assistance on a number of occasions be-
cause they did not fall in with the above priorities.
e) Infrastructure. For the first time since early 1980s, the Georgian
government started to develop infrastructure. It is noteworthy that
this process is under way in all spheres, including transport, edu-
cation, tourism, utilities and finances.
Alongside achievements, we should also touch on problems. De-
spite the abovementioned team work, the progress of reforms is not
equally fast in all areas. Furthermore, in some sectors (e.g. health
care), the process has effectively not started yet. It is understandable
that the government cannot do everything at the same time, but there
are areas which will prevent the country’s progress unless they de-
velop. Judiciary reform is one these spheres. Despite changes, the
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government’s attempts to build a strong and independent judiciary
system have not yet given results, which slows down progress and
institutional development in other areas.
The opposition and state
In experts’ opinion, the absence of a strong and competitive
opposition is one of the major problems. The causes of this situation
fall under three different groups: a) “historical”: A strong political
party has never existed in Georgia. In most cases, parties were clubs
of like-minded people, their influence not going beyond their circle
of friends and relatives. The only exception was the parties created
around a charismatic leader. In that case, their underdeveloped party
structure and absence of ideology were made up for by large num-
bers of the leader’s supporters and, respectively, high approval rat-
ings. The second exception were so-called government parties, which
were head of state-centered and, accordingly, enjoyed extremely
strong financial situation, large membership base and good organiza-
tion. Add to these the possibility to use administrative resources and
it will become clear that, unless there was internal rift, they were
far ahead of their competitors. The present-day opposition has nei-
ther a charismatic leader nor supporters among the ruling team. So,
almost every party is no more than a club. b) Another important
reason is the lack of new ideas. The local elections demonstrated
this well. The election campaigns of all the opposition parties were
built around negativity. They criticized the ruling party but did not
propose any alternative to the voters. When the ruling party and its
leader enjoy strong and stable approval ratings, the opposition’s
critical election campaigns are destined to fail. Besides, endless in-
discriminate criticism irritates the voters. A logical question arises: Is
everything really being done in a wrong way, including things which
the people like – development of infrastructure, education reform,
patrol police, etc.? The opposition’s failure to supply an answer
causes alienation of the population. The validity of this assumption
is further confirmed by the steadily low approval ratings of the
opposition parties over the last three years despite periodic changes
of the government’s approval ratings (which fluctuate in both direc-
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tions). Citizens leave the camp of government supporters when the
authorities make mistakes or experience crises, but they do not join
the opposition. Each success of the government brings these groups
back to the pro-government camp. This process has been repeated
several times since 2003. c) The third cause of the opposition’s
unpopularity is the strong party in power. The ruling party has
managed to remain united throughout these years. Effectively, none
of the leaders, with the exception of Irakli Okruashvili, has left the
United National Movement or criticized it. This is why it would be
fair to say that the National Movement has survived the three post-
revolution years without losing their members.1 Against the backdrop
of their unity, the aforementioned successes seem even more attrac-
tive to the voters. The feeling of the government’s strength and the
opposition’s weakness is further enhanced by the fact that the op-
position proved unready for joining forces.
It also has to be said that, as the reforms continue, the number
of displeased people will probably grow because the reforms cannot
produce a sudden dramatic effect and economic and social issues will
stand to move to the fore. Precisely this will give the opposition a
chance of success. But I doubt that the opposition will be able to
seize on this opportunity if its composition and the aforementioned
status quo remain the same. It is more likely that a new group will
be created from among the discontented leaders and activists of the
United National Movement. As mentioned, the National Movement has
managed to remain united thus far, and it is hard to imagine that their
unity will come into question for the next 3-4 years.
It is theoretically possible that new leaders will emerge from the
local government and self-governance bodies, school supervisory boards,
or as a result of implementation of other local initiatives. However, I
cannot imagine that they will manage to unite. It is more likely that
they will join their preferred existing political forces, which leads us
to where we started: the opposition is weak and it is hard to imagine
that it will be of interest as a political springboard to anyone. So,
unless some group splits off from the ruling team, the new faces in
politics will join the ranks of the same National Movement.
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System stability
Of course, the above discussion does not mean that Georgia has
passed the point of no return.
The ongoing constitutional reforms demonstrate once again that the
Georgian political system is still a long way from stability. The very
fact that so many amendments have been introduced to the country’s
constitution in a short period of time already speaks of incompatibility
between the old constitution and the new political system. The fun-
damental political and legal reforms should be continued to resolve the
inconsistency, which eventually might result in the adoption of a
qualitatively new constitution. In the absence of any indications in this
regard, system stability is out of the question for now.
I would also add that the threat of destabilization is not inherent
in the reforms or inevitable. This is more of an issue of bringing the
system into line with the reality and improving it. It is also has to be
said that the process of establishment of the local governance insti-
tutions has just begun and will probably be revised many times in the
process of reforms. The judiciary reform is still under way. The
introduction of trial by jury may result in radical changes not only in
the judiciary system itself, but in Georgian society in general and
consequently, in political institutions as well.
Georgia has not passed the point of no return yet. Moreover, the
creation of strong institutional support has not been finalized yet for any
of the reforms in any of the different sectors. At this stage, almost all
the reforms are associated with the particular person in charge, and it
is hard to say what will happen if that reformer is replaced by someone
else. In order to ensure the stability of system, several “centers of
gravity” should be created simultaneously with the institutionalization
process, which will be autonomous enough on the one hand and have
coinciding development vectors on the other. The greatest progress in
this respect has been made in the education system, but, as noted, there
too the process has not been finalized yet.
Foreign factors in Georgia’s development
Foreign factors have always had influence on domestic processes
in Georgia, and this trend is unlikely to change in the near future.
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This can be accounted for in several ways: a) Russia’s continuing
attacks against Georgia should result in disclosure by the political
spectrum of its true affiliations. The attitude toward Russia will serve
as the dividing line which will cause redistribution of power in Geor-
gia; b) Together with pressure from Russia, Georgia’s pro-Western
orientation will strengthen. From this standpoint, the West is a guar-
antee of stability and security for both politicians and society at large.
It is important for Georgia to receive appropriate assistance from the
West as the balance of power in the country hinges on the presence
or absence of Western support; c) Statements by NATO officials on
possible expansion of the alliance by 2008 has set the next two years’
most important objective for the Georgian authorities. Integration into
NATO will be the litmus test in the public’s appraisal of the govern-
ment in two years’ time. If successful, integration into NATO might
outweigh the existing or future economic and social problems of
Georgia. At the same time, integration into NATO will be an indicator
of the right direction of the reforms in Georgia, and not only in the
military sector. The process of integration into NATO will be an acid
test for the government’s course.
If our assumptions are correct and the country stays its current
course, Georgia will be able to gradually develop liberal democratic
pluralism. The next 3-5 years will be important for the successful
completion of the reforms that are underway in the country. In final
analysis, the priorities of Georgia’s policy should be the following:
1. Implementation of the judiciary reform;
2. Development of local self-governance;
3. Completion of the education reform;
4. Creation of a knowledge-based economy;
5. Completion of the military reform;
6. Integration into NATO.
Notes:
1 With the exception of tragic deaths of Zurab Zhvania and Zhani Kalandia.
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Sociological view from the top of tree of
sociological perspective
On skimming through the 10 questions put to me by Ghia Nodia
for this project, I realized that I did not agree with the wording of some
of the questions. First I decided to write a text which would deal with
the subjects that the questions touched on, but I reconsidered, as in that
case, my participation in the discussion might follow either of the two
patterns: 1. My text might turn out to be so out of the general discourse
that no-one would read it (which was more likely); or 2. My text would
win over the participants in the discussion and no-one would answer the
questions of the originators of the discourse (this is less likely, but still
a possibility). This is why both intellectually and academically, the
decision to get involved in this interesting project had to result in my
unconditional acceptance of the rules of the process. Therefore, when
reading my answers, the reader will discover both an analysis of the
expediency of asking the questions in this manner and slight alterations
of the formulations of the questions.
And finally, the pattern I follow when supplying answers is a
sociological one. In other words, I do not discuss the motives or
desires, I discuss only structures. Accordingly, the reader should not
expect assessments of political developments or analysis of the inter-
national political situation from my answers; rather, they will find a
lot of detail about the existing, non-existent and incipient structures of
political social life.
1.
The form and intention of the question always indicate the form and
intention of the answer. The intended answer to this question should be
a list of achievements and failures. But at the same time, this question
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implies that someone (or some groups) had some plan or vision (or a
number of them) both at the moment of winning independence and at
different moments and in different political situations throughout the last
15 years. The problem is that these plans and visions were different from
one another and were not always clearly formulated, so if we try to find
out which objectives of which plan have been achieved, we will lead
ourselves to a quite complex typological labyrinth. If, however, we still
make an attempt to develop a general typology of these plans or expec-
tations, we will need to take into account the fact that expectations for
Georgia’s independence were, and still are, notches on a gauge which has
political romanticism on one end and political pragmatism on the other.
However, even this seemingly easy layout is not very informative either
in terms of the identity of those people who have and design these
expectations or the plans and their successfulness or otherwise: If we add
political movements and politicians to the gauge, those who are on
opposite ends of the gauge will turn out to be allies, whereas those who
are on the same end – radical opponents.1  This is why, when we discuss
achievements of independent Georgia, we should opt for a what-did-not-
exist-and-what-happened discourse.2 Reaching some consensus to launch
a discussion is easier with this approach.
Before independence, Georgia did not have:
1. A political system which allowed for the existence of many parties
and free elections;
2. Ethnic conflicts and breakaway regions;
3. Free media;
4. Self-governance;
5. Its own fiscal and monetary policy;
6. Free enterprise;
7. Civic institutions independent of the state;
8. Its own armed forces;
9. Its own education system.
Accordingly, Georgian culture changed as these new elements were
introduced into its system. Among the abovementioned new develop-
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ments, perhaps the ones which were introduced to our cultural and
social systems first, as soon as independence was declared – the
multi-party system, free elections, ethnic conflicts and the free media
– had the greatest effect. In their turn, and it seems that precisely for
this reason, the political programs and reference points mainly concen-
trate – and confront one another – around these four systems (or
subsystems) to this day.
2.
The Georgian political system of the last 15 years (at least until 2004)
can be described as the struggle of the political governance system against
those systems and structures which it itself fostered in the recent past.
The so-called structural dilemma first emerged under Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
Gamsakhurdia came to power through a free election, but the develop-
ment of his government generated resistance precisely to the multi-party
system and free elections. The same is true about the ethnic conflicts.
Despite the negative connotations of the term “ethnic conflict”, it too,
together with the multi-party system and free elections, fits into the “first
create, then resist” pattern which I just proposed.
Another dilemma which caused the fiasco of the Gamsakhurdia
government was the opposite of the Chinese syndrome: Gamsakhurdia’s
entourage was trying to preserve and control the Soviet-style economy3
by replacing ideology with patriotic and nationalist romanticism.
3.
Structurally, the difference between the Gamsakhurdia and
Shevardnadze governments was insignificant. The former created and
the latter sustained the ethnic conflicts, and society was radically
divided into feuding groups. The fundamental difference was the
timeframe: Shevardnadze’s presidential tenure lasted more than 10
years, whereas Gamsakhurdia managed to stay in power only for a
matter of months. The unconditional achievements of the Shevardnadze
government are:
1. Independent fiscal and monetary policy;
2. Free enterprise;
3. Civic institutions independent of the state.
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In addition, the Shevardnadze government preserved the structures
which were created under Gamsakhurdia (including the ethnic con-
flicts) in a relatively stable condition, which should also be considered
an achievement of his government.
If we compare the Shevardnadze and Gamsakhurdia governments
in terms of effectiveness of their achievements, we will see that
despite the 10-12 years of real political power, the systemic contribu-
tion of the Shevardnadze government to the Georgian social and
political realities is the same as the Gamsakhurdia government’s: both
created three systems/subsystems each (or rather, these systems were
created during their presidency), which eventually played an important
role both in the civil sector and in everyday life. However, as noted
above, the systems that were created under Gamsakhurdia (the demo-
cratic political system, free media and ethnic conflicts) are much more
influential even today than those that were created under Shevardnadze.
It has to be said that these three systems were so important that they
had to be created and would have been created under any president
in the domestic and foreign political situation of that period. The
participation (positive and negative) of Gamsakhurdia personally and
his team in the creation of the democratic political system (culture),
free media and ethnic conflicts is undeniable.
4.
Compared to its predecessor governments (I would refrain from
using the word “regime”), the Saakashvili government created the
same number of new systems as did Shevardnadze and Gamsakhurdia.
In particular:
1. Self-governance;
2. Armed forces;
3. Education system.
Saakashvili clearly leads in terms of the number of new systems
created. He created the same number of new systems in 2003-20064
as his predecessors did combined in 1991-2003. The difference be-
tween the creation/sustenance of the systems is that Saakashvili is
clearly trying not only to create new systems (at which he is success-
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ful), like his predecessors did, but also make amendments5  to the
systems that were created by the previous governments, for example
by putting an end to the ethnic conflicts. What changes this process
will bring about and what assessments it will receive is a different
matter, but Saakashvili is the first among the three presidents who
rejected at least one system that was introduced by his predecessors.6
5.
Again, from the point of view of a sociologist and using the theory
of introduction of new systems: The opposition is unable to offer to
the public anything that would be different from these nine systems.
It can only amend the existing systems and the systems proposed by
the government. This is why there are even instances of opposition
politicians supporting the other party to the ethnic conflict7  or hard-
to-understand objections against the sound principles that are imple-
mented in some systems. Even resistance to the settlement of the
ethnic conflicts can be noticed in the opposition discourse.
6.
I think that the only way out for the opposition is finding and
introducing a new system. This should be either radical protection of
human rights – although it is doubtful that such behavior will rally the
public around the opposition – or strong economic programs which,
at the systemic level, will demonstrate to the public the benefits of
a knowledge-based economy. However, the government might forestall
the opposition regarding the latter.
7.
Considering the present-day opposition parties’ actions and priori-
ties, it is doubtful that they will agree on any long-term project aiming
at the establishment of new systems. This is why it is more likely that
the incumbent ruling party will not have a strong opposition for a long
time to come. The emergence of a strong and efficient opposition
hinges on two components: 1. The opposition political group should
have a clear idea of which system it intends to destroy and 2. It
should have sufficient time and political timeframe to achieve its goals,
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in other words, they should agree to work long-term to achieve at the
end of this work – as a conclusion of the job done – the coming to
power. So, even if some existing opposition party has human and
financial resources to become the initiator of new systems, the incum-
bent ruling party will still not have a serious rival capable of winning
the majority in the elections for quite some time to come.
8.
It follows from the answer to the preceding question that, if the
ruling party manages to maintain the liberal democratic balance and
does not make its predecessors’ mistake8 , our political future can be
envisioned as the rule of the dominant political party for some period
of time (say, for the next two parliamentary elections) and then
development of liberal democratic pluralism.9  Naturally, it is important
to take into account economic development and foreign factors in
these assumptions. Each of these factors might prove to either pro-
mote or hinder the implementation of this scenario.
9.
To answer this question, we should list the new social and political
systems that were created during the last 15 years and assess the role
of domestic and foreign factors in their creation and in creating
obstacles for political governance:
1. The political system which allows a multi-party system and free
elections would not have been created had it not been for the
foreign factor, the dissolution of the Soviet Union;
2. Ethnic conflicts were initiated by foreign factors (the free media
– by domestic and foreign factors, self-governance – by domestic
and foreign factors);
3. Independent fiscal and monetary policy – foreign factors (strong
intervention of international financial institutions);
4. Free enterprise – foreign factors;
5. Civic institutions independent of state – foreign factors;
6. Independent armed forces – domestic factors. Of course, the military
sector is developing with foreign technical assistance, although our
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New systems 
Foreign 
factor 
determining 
creation 
Domestic 
factor 
determining 
creation 
Resistance 
from the 
government 
which created 
the system 
Remarks 
A political system 
which allows for 
the existence of 
many parties and 
free elections 
   There was resistance from 
both the Gamsakhurdia and 
Shevardnadze governments, 
which ultimately resulted in 
the forced termination of their 
powers. 
Ethnic conflicts 
and breakaway 
regions 
   There were no serious or 
significant attempts to settle 
the conflicts before 2004 
Free media 
 
   Hindering the free media also 
played an important role in 
premature termination of the 
Gamsakhurdia rule. 
Self-governance 
 
   Introduction of local 
governance started under the 
Saakashvili government.  For 
now, there are no noticeable 
government attempts to 
impede local self-governance 
Independent fiscal 
and monetary 
policy 
 
   The fiasco of the voucher 
system resulted in the need to 
involve international financial 
institutions and improve the 
situation 
Free enterprise 
 
   The Shevardnadze 
government established this 
system on the one hand and 
fought against it on the other, 
through the creation of 
clannish business entities. 
Civic institutions 
independent of 
state 
   The existence of civic 
institutions can be entirely 
attributed to foreign 
influences.  At the same time, 
the Shevardnadze government 
viewed this as an important 
threat 
Armed forces 
 
   The development of these 
systems was based entirely on 
the government's political will.  
Education system 
 
   Neither a strong armed forces 
nor a successful education 
system have yet been 
unconditionally recognized as 
guarantors of democracy and 
stability in the international 
arena.  Thus foreign influence 
on the development of these 
two systems was minimal. 
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political allies have always been ambivalent to the strengthening of this
system and responsibility always lies at the government’s door;
7. Independent education system – domestic factors.
This list can be presented as table with a column added for
actions by the creators of these systems that were aimed at destroying
these systems (see Figure 1).
As we can see, despite the growing international awareness of
Georgia, the influence of foreign factors on the creation of new
systems was much greater under the previous two governments. In
other words, foreign factors were decisive in the creation of the
democratic political system, ethnic conflicts, free media, independent
fiscal and monetary policy, free enterprise, and independent civic
institutions; whereas the impulses and activities which paved the way
for the creation of the local governance, military development and
education reform can be considered to be domestic factors. However,
this premise may be moot concerning local governance.
The table allows for one more hypothesis: The government is ousted
with employment of strong-arm methods after it starts to struggle against
the systems which it established (or which were established with its help).
It seems that we are dealing with strong opponents at the systemic level
here. In other words, what confronts the government is the people or the
side which created the particular system against which the authorities,
willingly or otherwise, are waging a struggle. In other words, the pattern
is simple: First the government starts to create a system, creates the
infrastructure, human resources, human and social capital of the system,
and then it starts a struggle against it. If the establishment of the system
was successful, the government has no chance in its struggle.
Here is the pattern which demonstrates this situation (Figure 2):
Government 
system 
Systems which they introduced and 
then tried to abolish Outcome 
Gamsakhurdia 
Democratic political system, free 
media, ethnic conflict and breakaway 
region 
Overthrown 
Shevardnadze 
Free enterprise, civic organizations, 
ethnic conflict and breakaway region  
Forced resignation 
Saakashvili 
Armed forces, education system,  
self-governance 
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This is what this hypothesis translates into when applied to
Saakashvili: Unless the ruling party initiates activities against the armed
forces, the education system and self-governance, its peaceful replace-
ment and relatively long stay in power until then are guaranteed.
10.
The logic of developments shows that in the years to follow, the
independent judiciary system (1) and knowledge-based economy (2)
should be established in Georgia.
Setting out a comprehensive large-scale program which will be able
to unite society around liberal democratic values is possible. Time will
tell who will implement this program or its constituent parts. The
country’s political future will depend on this (who and how).
Notes:
1 For example, Gamsakhurdia and his ideology were a manifestation of ex-
treme political romanticism, but his team members, who effectively managed to
revive the Soviet system, were clearly guided by pragmatic plans. The same
discrepancy is encountered when we seek to describe Shevardnadze’s and
Saakashvili’s ideologies: both fall under the description of radical pragmatism. At
the same time, Saakashvili’s pragmatism of 2004-2005 is in synch with Koba
Davitashvili’s and Zviad Dzidziguri’s (allies of Saakashvili during the Rose Revo-
lution and the following one-year period, now members of different opposition
parties) political romanticism of the same period.
2 The vague discourse of achievements is theoretically unstable: in that case, the
author should choose some system (say, liberal democratic) and start measuring which
of the benchmarks have been achieved and which have not. However, a heated (and
perhaps endless) discussion is likely – first on the system that has or should have
been chosen and then on those benchmarks.
3 Gamsakhurdia’s refusal to privatize land is an illustrative example of this, al-
though that time around, the explanation why it should not be sold was not the Soviet
argument of people’s common property, but the nationalist argument that it should not
go to foreigners.
4 In the three years from December 2003 to December 2006. [He took office
in January 2004]
5 Which in itself is an innovation already at the cultural level for Georgia. As the
most recent studies show, the traditional social structures are still strong, and accord-
ingly, the creations of predecessors are still culturally untouchable. Saakashvili’s ac-
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tions at the level of political activity set the precedent – and create a prospect – of
breaking with the untouchability.
6 Although after the relatively unsuccessful military campaign in South Ossetia in
2004, Saakashvili had a choice to keep sustaining all systems including the ethnic
conflicts, different domestic and foreign factors and the need to reach a decision
which would be appropriate in the given international political situation (especially
regarding the EU and NATO) made it impossible to continue the routine policy of
preservation of ethnic conflicts.
7 For example, the opposition’s cautious attitude toward the restoration of law
and order in Abkhazia’s Kodori Gorge or resistance to (or silence about) the emer-
gence of the alternative, pro-Georgian authorities in South Ossetia (breakaway region).
8 The mistake was mainly combating the system which it created itself.
9 From today’s point of view, however, this scenario might manifest itself in the
appearance of only one or two extra strong parties in the political arena.
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Introduction
The political processes of the last 15 years in Georgia can be
described and analyzed in a variety of different ways. One of the
possibilities is to set theories aside and view the developments by
describing all possible variables that might constitute the causes of
individual events. Using a different approach, it is possible to apply
a different theory to each separate event. The methodology I use in
this text is different from either of the above in that it employs a
selection of independent variables using one particular theory, the
network (relational) theory, according to which a network of social
relationships confines the actors’ actions to the limits of a certain
framework and consequently, determines political outcomes. The dis-
cussion below, therefore, is based on the assumption that both the
network structure and the actor’s position in the network are factors
that influence the actors’ actions and political results of these actions.
The independent variables were selected according to the context
of the issues which were asked in the questions. In addition, they are
sometimes linked with the criteria for assessment of the political
processes and events to be discussed. Naturally, many variables influ-
enced the processes at hand, but typically, I highlight one or two
variables which I believe have the highest explanatory value. This does
not imply underestimating the importance of other variables, but the
influence of the described factors is considered the greatest from the
standpoint of the network theory. Empirical research and data are
required to confirm this, which is why the discussion below should be
viewed as a set of hypotheses which are to be confirmed or refuted
by future studies.
Both the network structure and actors’ characteristics have their
respective quantifiable dimensions. Obviously, not all measurements
that are available in network analysis are applicable to the political
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questions to be discussed, and even if they were, the input of
empirical data would be required. This is why I will limit the use
of network theory to the three concepts that are useful in description
of the structural characteristics of the network and positions of the
actors: 1) The so-called small world concept is of interest in describ-
ing the network structure, as it implies that connecting any two
arbitrary individuals is not only possible, but also takes a finite
number of links in the social chain of acquaintance; 2) the notion
of structural holes can be used to compare the positions of actors
in the network and is synonymous with the number of non-redun-
dant ties of the actor; 3) the concept of social capital relates both
to the network structure and actor’s position – it is defined as the
amount of resources which are available to the network and which
the actors can use in their actions.
Benefits of weak connections
Building independent state institutions should be considered the
most important of the processes which have been under way in
Georgia in the last 15 years. It is known that this process is particu-
larly difficult and often gets dragged out in societies where the tra-
ditions of statehood did not exist or were interrupted for a long period
of time. The most important dependent variable in the assessment of
a country’s successes and failures is, therefore, the development of
state institutions, which includes two components: the establishment of
the institutions and institutional performance. In the process of state
building both the old and the newly emerging elite groups are vying
for power. The development of the institutions concurs with this
struggle, which makes predicting the outlines of the final shape of the
institutional system almost impossible.1  When institutions are estab-
lished, the problem of putting them into operation at full capacity
arises, which requires resolving the dilemmas of collective action of
multiple rational actors. Because institutions are nothing but a mental
network which is created between the societal actors as a token of
acceptance of some set or rules, studying the types of connections
between social groups becomes important for evaluating institutional
performance. As a variable which is the main determinant of the
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establishment of effective institutions, we should select a variable
which will also make it possible to measure interactions between
different social groups. Social capital meets this requirement and I
deem it the most important determinant of institutional effectiveness.
In particular, a positive correlation is likely to exist between the
amount of social capital and institutional performance.2  The concept
of social capital can be used to describe both the social network and
the position of the actor in it. At the actor’s level, social capital is
the amount of available resources which the actor can use for action.3
At the collective level, social capital has the characteristics of a public
good, in other words, it is non-exclusive and non-competitive. Its
availability to one member of the network does not reduce the amount
of it available to others, even if they do not plan to pay its price.
From this point of view, the source of social capital is generalized
trust which is shaped by repeated contacts and which increases the
probability of resolving dilemmas associated with collective actions.4
The availability of the network resources depends on individual
actor’s structural position. To compare actors’ positions, the concept
of structural holes can be used, which denotes the number of the
actors’ non-redundant connections. Numerous non-redundant connec-
tions are thought to give the actor competitive advantage.5  The con-
cept of structural holes also refers to the strength-weakness dimension
of relationships. The strength of relationships is determined according
to the context: in general, casual ties between actors which do not
imply obligations are considered weak while frequent connections which
imply commitments indicate the presence of strong ties. Weak ties are
a good means of exchange of information and innovations, because
precisely weak ties form the channels of exchange of resources be-
tween relatively closed subgroups.6  So, at the individual level, a large
number of non-redundant and weak ties should be considered a source
of social capital.
At the dawn of independence, Georgia inherited a society divided
into relatively closed groups. The political elite and other social groups
were mostly closed self-sufficient units. Ties within the groups were
strong and in large part based on commitments (kinship and other
types of strong ties). The network of the political elite was organized
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hierarchically, and persons at the top tier shared resources with lower
tiers in exchange for their loyalty. The alienation between the public
and formal institutions facilitated the strengthening of informal net-
works. But because all public activities were under the totalitarian
state’s control, using informal ties to create a large-scale network not
connected to the state would have been impossible. As a result,
society split up into strong ties-based small informal groups. Limited
ties between the groups (lack of weak ties) hindered the exchange of
information and innovations within the network and the mobilization
of resources. The development of generalized trust in a society of this
type is impeded because of a lack of generation of social capital.
Naturally, some of the actors within the groups had access to more
structural holes than other actors, but the influence of such actors
hardly spread beyond the groups.
The main benefit of independence was the increasing frequency of
weak ties, which facilitated the exchange of information and resources
between groups. Although the abolition of control from the totalitarian
state caused chaos for a certain period of time, the networks soon
rearranged themselves into a new pattern. The opening of the borders
and development of the civic sector and private business resulted in
the proliferation of horizontal ties both within the country and inter-
nationally, which paved the way for increasing the amount of social
capital. Precisely the amount of social capital is, in my opinion, the
main variable which explains the successes and failures in the field of
building state institutions. At the same time, growing social capital
makes society more flexible in terms of adaptability to the rapidly
changing environment.
As for the results which remain to be achieved, in my opinion,
one of these is maintaining the structure of the political elite un-
changed. During the last 15 years, the ruling elite was held together
by strong, commitment-based ties. A government bureaucracy that
would be guided in its actions only by the law and established rules
of the game, instead of social networks, has not come into being.
However, the incumbent political elite is made up of a relatively large
number of actors compared to the previous period. At present, the
political elite is connected with different social group by the propor-
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tionately larger number of structural holes than exist between these
groups themselves. And this, for its part, makes it possible for the
actors in the elite to control the exchange of different resources.
In my opinion, precisely these two network characteristics have
the greatest effect on the political processes in Georgia. The relatively
large amount of social capital in society makes it possible to resolve
the dilemmas of collective actions and lays the foundation for the
establishment of effective institutions. But an excess of structural holes
within the ruling elite creates a gravitational pull of sorts on social
capital. As a result, the authorities can mobilize resources to change
the vector of collective actions in the direction desired, whereas for
those who are not in power this is difficult. This may be part of the
explanation why people in power do not feel the need to take into
account the interests of social groups when building institutions.
Cheapness of symbolic capital
Gamsakhurdia’s political program can be formulated as attaining
independence through uniting society and employing disobedience.
Gamsakhurdia thought the rhetoric of national symbols was the best
way to consolidate society. The source of his power should also be
sought in symbols; people to whom these symbols were important
considered him the leader of the nation. An interesting test was
conducted under the first elected government after the Socialist era:
how would the Georgian voters react to a politician with great sym-
bolic capital. The result of this test was both the greatest achievement
and most formidable challenge of the Gamsakhurdia regime – on the
one hand, he managed to briefly unite a large part of the population
into a mental network, but on the other hand, he failed to transform
the mobilized symbolic resources into material ones.
Thus, the most important dependent variable characteristic of the
Gamsakhurdia period was the consolidation of society. Among the
independent variables, the strength and extent of overlap between the
ties that were established among the social groups was important.
Presumably, the extent of overlap among the groups and the growth
in the number of weak ties among the groups have had a beneficial
effect on the consolidation of society. Another important independent
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variable is the indicator of political consistency, which can be assumed
to have a positive effect on the consolidation measurement.
The unity of small groups at the ballot boxes and disappearance
of the Communist government without resistance deluded Gamsakhurdia
into thinking that uniting society was possible, whereas when this
illusion was debunked, he was pushed toward intolerance and extreme
nationalism. His government inherited not only a bleak institutional
legacy, but also the organizational structure of the political elite. The
ruling elite remained a hierarchical network united by strong ties
underpinned by commitments. If under the Communist regime, ex-
changing loyalty in return for material benefits was the most important
part of commitment-based ties, during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, both
the reward and the sanction became symbolic. Loyalists were awarded
the title of a true patriot, whereas opponents were tagged KGB agents.
The Gamsakhurdia regime as a network can be visualized as a
pyramid with a person who possessed large symbolic capital at its top
and the absence of both human and social capital in its mid- and lower
sections. The main weakness of the government should be sought
precisely in its structural composition; the failure to use weak ties with
other social groups and the actors’ unwillingness to utilize the structure
holes put him in an informational vacuum, which eventually evolved
into physical isolation as well. Naturally, the Gamsakhurdia government
included representatives of many social groups. But in most cases, the
actors who found their way to the government were the fringe members
of their respective groups. As a result, the entry of a representative of
a group to Gamsakhurdia’s inner circle meant for the government losing,
rather than gaining, the resources of that group.
The Gamsakhurdia government thought that secession from the
Soviet Union was a sufficient condition for independence. The eco-
nomic results of political independence and the necessity of building
state institutions were not considered at all. This was clearly manifested
in the inconsistency of public policy. For example, confronting the
Soviet regime and taking quite a mild position regarding the August 1991
putsch were completely incompatible. The same applies to establishing
the local governments and later limiting of the degree of local autonomy
by introducing the institution of prefects. The accommodating policy
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toward Abkhazia, when ethnic quotas were introduced during the elec-
tions to the Abkhaz legislature was also inconsistent against the back-
drop of intense nationalist rhetoric. In my opinion, however, this was
one of the rare exceptions when politics was based not on symbols, but
on taking the reality into account and making a compromise. That
agreement not only allayed the ethnic conflict, but also introduced the
institutional innovation of shared political power in Georgia.7
It is hard to say whether the thesis of the “strength of weak ties”
was realized, but the success of the 1991-1992 coup can be assumed
to be caused by horizontal ties between groups. Among the ranks of
the rebels and their supporters were representatives of completely
different groups, of which some belonged to the old communist elite,
others – to the intelligentsia, and still others to the criminal world. In
addition, the actors who found themselves in the camp of
Gamsakhurdia’s opponents were leaders of their own groups. The
establishment of horizontal relations among them, which was intended
for mutual support, not mutual commitments, also meant the estab-
lishment of ties between their groups. If we view the December-
January coup as a rivalry between two differently organized networks,
it will become clear that the hierarchical single-center network was
uncompetitive. As soon as the main node of the centralized network
was isolated, the strong ties between the actors who surrounded it
were severed. What was left as a result were several isolated micro-
networks of the first president’s supporters, of which some eventually
merged with other political movements, others fell apart, and still
others exist to this day.
Unbalanced balance
There are two ways assessing the Shevardnadze government. If
we compare it to the preceding regime, we will see many conspicu-
ous successes, like the improvement of law enforcement in the
country, curbing of the economic downturn, launch of reforms and
the country’s achievement of the status of fully-fledged member of
the international community. But if we assess the government in
terms of its coming up to public expectations and missed chances,
failures will outweigh successes.
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At least two periods should be distinguished evaluating the
Shevardnadze government, because his regime dealt with different
tasks at the different stages of its existence. In 1992-1995, the main
goal of Shevardnadze was concentrating power in his hands. This is
why the main dependent variable for that period is centralization of
power, whereas the main independent variables are types of ties within
the societal elites. Shevardnadze had to start his work in a society
which not only consisted of small groups that were united by strong
ties, but in which these groups confronted one another. Shevardnadze
took the role of a “broker” between the confronting groups and played
it too well. Relations among social groups were mediated by
Shevardnadze, which won him exclusive access to structure holes.8
Isolating the nodes of multi-centered power (Kitovani, Ioseliani, Sigua)
further raised the level of access. The political network again turned
out to be bonded by commitment-based relations, but the commodity
that was exchanged between the actors changed. Members of the
ruling elite, many of whom were at the initial step of the career
ladder, could use Shevardnadze’s reputation in their political activities,
and in return they were to prove their loyalty by securing votes in
the elections. The most glaring example of the venal exchange of
resources was rigging several elections in the Shevardnadze period.
Incidentally, the practice of election rigging was in my opinion caused
more by the structural characteristics of the network than by arbitrary
use of administrative resources by the bureaucracy.
Assessment of the successes and failures of the second stage of
Shevardnadze’s presidency (1996-2003) is interesting in light of re-
lations between business and the state. Still in transition, the state
faced two main challenges – freeing business from state pressure and
preventing the state from coming under the influence of private
interests.9  So, the degree of freedom of the economy and so-called
“state capture” indicator will be useful as dependent variables in
appraising the Shevardnadze government.10  As for independent vari-
ables, they should be sought in the structure of ties between state
and private actors.
On the one hand, the Shevardnadze government merged with big
business interests, but on the other hand, small business came under
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state pressure. This situation gave rise to a vicious circle: to get rid
of the predatory state, businesses were ready to pay bribes and buy
tax relief, which translated into smaller budget revenues and unfulfilled
social obligations. This forced the state to again resort to predatory
policies. The main prerequisite for launching and running a big busi-
ness was membership in the political elite or government bureaucracy.
Big businesses were “buying” favorable working conditions from of-
ficials, whereas the government turned a blind eye to tax evasion in
return for loyalty. The business sector which was built on these
principles was no different from the centralized government network,
in which the actor at the top of the pyramid controlled the distribution
of resources.
The structure of the ruling team also had a negative effect on
relations between state and private interests. Perhaps there never was
unity in the Shevardnadze team. The president himself had the goal of
staying in power as long as possible, and the young members of his
team wanted to establish themselves and become his successors by
using Shevardnadze’s name. But eventually it became clear that nobody
intended to hand down power to them. The president was implementing
the policy of balancing different political and business groups and prob-
ably was making preparations for remaining if not the president, then
at least the country’s informal leader, for the rest of his life.
Representatives of the younger generation of the ruling team re-
alized that competing with Shevardnadze for structural holes within the
ruling elite would prove unequal and destined for failure, so they
started to establish new ties where they would be out of Shevardnadze’s
control given his background – in the international and local non-
governmental sector and the media. Using these structural holes to
accumulate larger social capital than Shevardnadze proved to be a
very rational move because it was in both actors’ interests. The media
and nongovernmental sector enabled the young politicians to be closer
to their voters. The NGOs and the media, for their part, were
interested in having supporters in the government to protect them from
the predatory state. The alliance which was bonded by mutual inter-
ests proved quite strong and paved the way for a non-violent change
of government.
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Revolution of “social capitalists’’
In the November 2003 elections there was not so much a clash
of two political programs as of two political networks with different
structures. As already mentioned, the political elite which congregated
around Shevardnadze were bonded by commitment-based strong ties
organized into a hierarchy. These types of systems are vulnerable
because, owing to the high degree of centralization, there exists an
incentive to get rid of commitments by dismantling the top of the
pyramid, which destabilizes the system. The political network of
Shevardnadze’s opponents was multi-centered and boasted strong
horizontal ties, which made it stable. The diversity of the network
actors (international actors, civil society organizations, media groups,
business community) resulted in a diversity of resources and ideas.
The egalitarianism of the network facilitated the process of mobiliza-
tion of resources to achieve the common goal.
Yet another factor which contributed to the eventual success of
the political forces which organized the revolution was their leaders’
social capital, which helped build trust between politicians and civil
society organizations and introduced the norms of mutual support. The
civil society organizations became the driving force of micromobilization
during the November 2003 events. The effective media campaigns
added to the existing flaws of the Shevardnadze government, making
protests against the incumbent regime socially acceptable (although
there had never been any shortage of protests in Georgia).
The political regime which was established after the Rose Revo-
lution evinces positive and negative traits of both preceding regimes.
The aspiration toward social consolidation, legislative single-handed-
ness and nationalist rhetoric make the incumbent government similar
to the Gamsakhurdia regime, whereas attempts to win popular sup-
port by implementing an inconsistent policy – to the Shevardnadze
government. But the main difference from the preceding regimes is
that the incumbent government firmly stays a rightist course most of
the time. Effectively, the government is only now implementing the
10 principles of so-called “Washington consensus” which international
financial institutions have been directly or indirectly preaching to us
for a decade.11
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Privatization, investments in strategic sectors, the balancing of the
budget and an export-oriented economy are the basic principles which
neoliberal economists used to view as the foundation of economic
development of the Latin American countries. But the neoliberals have
been criticized many times for their attitudes toward the institutions
supporting the market economy.12
The new government chose an effective, if somewhat unjust, way
of addressing one of the two aforementioned challenges facing the state
in the transitional period. It forced the businesses which were integrated
with state into paying off budget debts and made businessmen buy their
freedom, often by conceding their wealth. But the avoidance to regulate
the economy and citing the high degree of corruption of the regulatory
institutions – for instance, the abolition of the anti-monopoly institution
– increases the likelihood that the state will come under the private
interests’ influence in the long run. At the same time, the issue of
freeing business from state controls remains pressing, and there is no
shortage of symptoms which attest to that. For example, the arbitrari-
ness of the financial police, unjustified destruction of private investors’
property and, most dangerously, attempts to revise property rights.
Overall, from the standpoint of quick planning and implementation
of reforms, the Saakashvili government is very successful. The re-
forms aiming to liberalize the economy, education reform, and im-
provements regarding corruption in the law-enforcement bodies are
good examples. The Achara and Kodori Gorge crises proved to be
successful tests for assessing the effectiveness of state institutions. But
the government has thus far failed to build an independent judiciary,
without which the development of the private sector will be very
problematic. Another flaw is related to the style of policy formulation
– the direction of the reforms is decided by a small political circle and
does not become a subject for discussion for interested social groups.
The fact that some civil society groups have merged with the authori-
ties is considered a sufficient degree of public consideration.
Punctuated equilibrium
During the last 15 years, the institutional development of the Geor-
gian state has been following the logic of punctuated equilibrium. Pe-
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riods of stability in the functioning of state institutions are followed by
sudden unrest and non-electoral change of government, which usually
results in a new institutional system.13  At first sight, the prospects of
the existing institutional system seem brighter. Its stability stems from
several different factors: popular support enables Saakashvili to sort out
minor discords within the ruling party painlessly, mainly by removing the
“troublemakers” from positions of power. The government’s objective
successes (which seem especially dramatic against the backdrop of the
preceding government) and the opposition’s inability to devise an advan-
tageous campaign strategy further enhance public support for the gov-
ernment. Yet another reason for the stability of the existing system is
the voters’ political culture, which is still underdeveloped and quite
susceptible to believing in conspiracy theories. As a result, the rhetoric
of restoration of territorial integrity and proper retaliation against the
northern neighbor’s intrigues still remains advantageous.
One of the fundamental reasons for the weakness of the modern-
day opposition parties is the lack of social capital, which derives from
the limited number of ties between the groups. This, in turn, can be
accounted for by the finite number of structural gaps in a small society,
which are mostly occupied by representatives of the government. A
good way of generating social capital for the opposition would be
repeated and multilateral social relations. But these types of relations
have already formed the incumbent ruling elite, whereas building new
ties takes organizing new groups, which is a long and expensive process.
At present, focusing on the results of the government’s policy
seems the most expedient for the opposition; in other words, the
opposition should offer analysis of the effectiveness of individual
programs, expose their flaws and propose better ways of their imple-
mentation. When the government tells the people how much money
was spent to implement a given program, the opposition should assess
the effectiveness of the spending and wage an appropriate campaign.
It is noteworthy that pursuing this strategy requires two prerequisites.
The first is the existence of both independent and political party-
affiliated think tanks, which will assist political groups in policy analy-
sis. The second is the voters’ political culture, which should be
accommodating toward relatively academic political debates. The ab-
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sence of these prerequisites is yet another reason for the opposition’s
limited competitiveness.
It would have been possible to think that Georgia has embarked
on the road toward the establishment of the dominant party system,
had it not been for several factors which make me presume that the
opposition will none the less grow stronger. Georgia’s foreign political
orientation causes the least controversy in the country. The time will
come soon when relations with Russia will also become a less pressing
issue for the political debates. This is why the opposition will essen-
tially have to look for its new messages in the domestic political arena.
One of the most significant successes of the incumbent government
is decreasing the level of corruption, so it would be difficult for the
opposition to achieve success with this slogan. The government man-
ages to neither encroach on ethnic identity nor allow violations of
human rights to become large-scale. Focusing on the protection of
social rights seems relatively advantageous for the opposition, espe-
cially as the mass privatization, public service job cuts, relative growth
of foreign investments and reduction of the role of state stand to
result in growing social displeasure. This will boost the demand for
leftist-type parties on the political market, and if there is demand from
the voters, a supplier will always be found. But it also has to be taken
into account here that the Georgian political culture does not stand out
for its egalitarianism, and the success of socially-oriented messages can
only be presumed if income inequality reaches extreme levels.
Let us presume that there is demand for a leftist party. Where will
the new political force emerge from? Presumably, by the end of the
president’s second term in office, an opposition force will split from
the incumbent ruling elite. This presumption is based on two obser-
vations. The first is the institutional heritage of rifts within the ruling
parties, enhanced by the president’s personality profile. The tradition
of getting rid of more or less independent players within his team is
bound to result in rifts within the party. In time, this policy might
drive the social capital which the party has been accumulating for
years outside the party. The second factor is the structure of the
ruling network, which is built according to the small world model.
Small world implies that contacts between any two individuals in the
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political arena is not only possible, but also takes a finite number of
intermediaries. One of the explanations of this is that a limited number
of actors establish numerous ties, whereas the majority of actors
maintain only a few relations. This is why establishing contacts with
the node with many ties raises the probability of establishing relations
with the actor choice. The significance of this for the political process
is that, as network theorists say, the “rich get richer and the poor get
poorer”, in other words, the node with a substantial number of
connections establishes even more relations and makes itself even
more different from others.14
If we visualize the ruling party as a network similar to the small
world, we will find that several actors in the network have equal
access to structural holes both in the country and in the international
arena. Naturally, the president is an exception because his structural
position is incommensurately advantageous compared to the others,
but because we presume that the end of his second term in office is
formally also the end of his tenure in power, I look at the ruling party
network separately from the main actor, the president. Following the
logic of a multi-centered network, the actors with a wealth of struc-
tural holes will in time establish even more connections. It should be
expected that by the end of Saakashvili’s presidency there will be
several equally competitive nodes in the political elite. The deepening
of relations with NATO and the EU will probably prevent external
actors from becoming supporters of a new revolution, which makes
it possible to presume that the political forces which will split off from
the incumbent ruling team will test one another’s strengths in elections.
Foreign factors
Foreign factors always play a special role in the development of
a small country, especially if the country maintains relations with many
countries. In Georgia’s case, the foreign factors fall under two main
categories. The first includes factors whose influence on political and
economic developments is noticeable. Among these factors is the
assistance of the developed Western democracies in the development
of both state institutions and nongovernmental and business sectors.
From this standpoint, cooperation with NATO and the EU has special
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importance, as it is a strong incentive for the government to carry out
reforms. For example, the implementation of the European Neighbor-
hood Policy Action Plan will be greatly beneficial for Georgia even if
the country remains the EU neighbor forever because its goals include
strengthening state institutions and improving accountability mecha-
nisms. The economic crises and embargoes in neighboring countries
belong to the same category as its results have tangible effects on
people’s lives. But this might prove useful for the country’s economy
in the long run. Finding and entering new markets will stimulate the
economy in two different ways. The economy will be diversified and
the quality of products will improve. Economic development would
take much longer (if it would take place at all) if the country relied
solely on the northern market.
The factors of the second category are imaginary and affect the
political processes only because the political actors think that they
have some effect. From this point of view, the Georgian saying that
even a tree will die if you keep telling it to dry out holds as true in
politics as in the economy: If you expect the worst, the probability
arises that things will go wrong. The imaginary factors should not be
interpreted only from the negative aspect. Claims that Georgia is
considered a haven of reforms and a model of democracy in the West
belong to the same imaginary category. However, imaginary as this
factor might be, it stirs up positive expectations among the political
and economic actors, which increases the likelihood of expectations
becoming reality.
If we review the dynamic of influence of the international factors
in the 15 years of independence, we will see that Georgia has
evolved from a recipient of assistance to a partner. It is quite likely
that cooperation will strengthen in the near future. The implemen-
tation of the European Neighborhood Policy will result in greater
similarity of the Georgian state institutions with the institutions in the
developed democracies. The deepening of cooperation with NATO
will create security guarantees for the country. The establishment of
a predictable political and investment environment should translate
into more foreign investment into the country. It is likely, therefore,
that in the long run, the privatized property will find its way into
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the hands of strategic owners, which is one of the preconditions for
economic development. But to achieve this, the further liberalization
of the investment environment, the introduction of the principle of
immunity of private property, and the establishment of the indepen-
dent judiciary is required.
Priorities of the ideal government
The main priority of the incumbent government is achieving eco-
nomic growth. Yet quite a few omitted variables can be found in the
equation of economic growth which the government leaders seem to
keep in their heads. There is no gainsaying the fact that privatization,
tax reform, the tackling of corruption in the law enforcement agencies
and the development of the education system are important factors of
economic growth in the long run. But ruling circles also seem to
believe that one of the main factors on which the success of the
reforms and economic development are predicated is the stability of
the executive branch of power.
However, the experience of the Central and Eastern European
countries attests to the opposite. Sustainable economic growth was
achieved precisely in the countries with stiff competition in the political
arena.15  It follows that the introduction of the institutions which will
ensure strong political and economic competition has to be the main
priority if long-term growth is to be achieved. The institutions in
charge of establishing a competitive economic environment should also
stifle the state’s desire to interfere with the economy in its attempts
to achieve political goals. At the same time, a good institutional
environment needs to ensure competition not only in the economic
sector, but also in politics.
One of the most important factors in the establishment of a
competitive political environment is ensuring vertical and horizontal
distribution of power. At the horizontal level, judiciary reform is to be
carried out, which is important for bringing about both political and
economic freedoms. To promote a competitive political environment,
the degree of representation of the representative bodies has to in-
crease through lowering the electoral threshold and introducing a bi-
cameral parliament.
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At the vertical level, fiscal decentralization is important, as this will
make financially solvent local governments possible. Local govern-
ments with financial powers will make for relatively more equal eco-
nomic development because a favorable fiscal policy will enable even
the constituencies in grave starting conditions to attract investments. A
strong local self-governance system will broaden the opportunities of
political participation too.
In the long run, fair competition will facilitate the regularity of
relations among the actors and the creation of overlapping networks,
which will create the preconditions for building up social capital and
developing effective state institutions.
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In this article I have tried to collate Georgia’s political evolu-
tion in the recent period with historical developments and to show
that nostalgia for “tsesrigi” (law and order) on the one hand and
dross of the nonpolitical and feudal which became ingrained in
Georgian culture on the other proved to be the controversial
legacy on which the new political system, which bore the marks
of personal qualities of some of the leaders, was built.
Despite the difference in conditions of the agrarian and
postindustrial eras, Georgia, like an embryo which goes through
the eons of phylogeny of its species in a very short time, has in
the last 15 years reiterated in reverse order the modes of state-
hood of the preceding millennium and negated the violence and
anarchy which took root through the negation of state power in
the 13th century by restoring its statehood in the 21st.
In the 13th century, Georgia’s political evolution was terminated
in the final phase, and the ship of statehood capsized. In the 21st
century, the surviving seafarers of the lifeboat that was cobbled up
from the flotsam of that ship get the opportunity to arrive at the
harbor for further improvements.
Nostalgia for “tsesrigi” (law and order)1
Remote though this comparison might seem, the historical analogy
of the situation which has taken shape today in building the Georgian
state can be found at the time of King David IV the Builder’s
unfinished project…
In the political history of our country, two ruling systems have been
intertwined from the very outset: state and demesne. David the Builder’s
kingdom first set a bridle on the demesne system and then subdued the
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church and city-states with a republican form of government, winning
the exclusive right to exercise political power and effectively met the
minimal Weberian requirement for the existence of state. The last
missing brick in building the Georgian state was nipping the chance of
the revival of the demesne system in the bud. This could be accom-
plished in the form of constitutional or, indeed, absolute monarchy, but
the Georgian state of the period proved unable to achieve such a
morphological perfection. Furthermore, the state ceded its positions some
time before accession to the throne of Queen Tamar.
Under Tamar’s rule, several systems of authority vied for primacy.
A talented politician and flexible diplomat, she managed to sustain
mostly peaceful and, in terms of state security, successful coexistence
of the incompatible systems of political power (monarchist, demesne,
republican and theocratic systems) throughout the 29 years of her
reign, but after her death, demesne lords exacted historical revenge
and dramatically limited the state’s rights to regulate social relations.
The country split apart into demesnes or feudal provinces.
Separatist feudal lords in essence maintained only a confederate
union with the kingdom at best.
Throughout the entire late Middle Ages, the state, reduced to the
territory immediately surrounding the royal palace, fought with the
demesne system to regain its old positions.
The instruments of exercising state power are law and justice. The
state maintains law and order by using these tools. The demesne
system was exactly the opposite. Although the feudal lords, together
with the military and economic powers, combined the judiciary author-
ity as well and set legal norms, they used to summarily violate their
own laws and ruled at will over what had by then become their
private estate and no longer was a territory which had been assigned
to them for governing. The lords’ officiary also acted arbitrarily, and
accordingly, violence established itself as a predominant norm or re-
lations.
From the point of view of social evolution, the country was at an
impasse which only the kingdom was trying to break, but besides
internal enemies, neighboring empires also hindered the fulfillment of
its plan to fully restore statehood. Ultimately, through the influence of
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all these internal and foreign factors, violence and complete anarchy
crystallized as a permanence which was handed down from one
generation to the next. The fact that the kidnapping and selling of
humans became the only profitable and successful business on the
entire territory of what once was called Georgia was the result of
precisely this situation.
Presumably, no social group or estate could have been pleased
with the situation that had taken shape, although despite numerous
selfless attempts, breaking the pattern kept proving unmanageable. So,
as a result of centuries-long bitter experience, the demand for “law
and order” became the most fundamental social demand of Georgian
society: for Georgian society most coveted goal was law and order,
i.e. the state.
In the conditions of an agrarian civilization, before it enters the
urban phase, the state may develop in two diametrically opposite
directions: it either becomes an absolute monarchy or yields to abso-
lute anarchy. In Georgia’s case, the latter option was realized and,
because opposites attract, absolute anarchy was then replaced by
absolute monarchy (tsarism) again.
The establishment of the Russian empire in the formerly Georgian
territory put an end to chaos and internal disorder, but society re-
mained disappointed. Organized violence replaced unorganized subsis-
tence. This time around, violence emanated from the state and its
officials. The fundamental purpose of state is the creation for its
citizens/subjects of an environment conducive to the realization of
their personal and social potential, which under the Russian absolute
monarchy was just as nonexistent as during the Georgian absolute
anarchy. So, the tsarist annexation of the Georgian states turned out
to be swapping the devil for the deep blue sea for the Georgians.
While the Georgian reality gave the option of slowly dying in the
chaos of an agrarian state, on the opposite pole absolutism was
committing suicide, which, incidentally, manifested itself, inter alia, in
the growing single-mindedness of Russian society in its struggle against
tsarism. The prospect of normalcy gleamed briefly with the February
1917 revolution, and, against that background, an independent country
called the Democratic Republic of Georgia sparkled all too transiently
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on the political horizon, but soon industrial absolutism (totalitarianism)
substituted agrarian absolutism.
For all this time, both tsarism and totalitarianism oppressed Geor-
gian society both socially and ethnically, which first (in the early 20th
century) imparted a socialist hue to the aspirations for liberation, and
then (late 20th century) molded these aspirations into the form of a
national movement.
But still, what type of state was to be built following the resto-
ration of national sovereignty?
Because the dismantling of totalitarianism became irreversible al-
ready in the Soviet era, the new Georgian state would not be able
to become totalitarian even in the worst case. In addition, the results
of the referendum on independence called for the restoration of state-
hood of the democratic republic, so it turned out that the Georgian
people wanted to reform the system in a democratic way, but the
Menshevik republic was a failed state (although Russia and several
other states did recognize it de jure) which succumbed to the dictate
of Russian Social Democrats and the only democratic component of
it was its façade. Neither would the Shevardnadze-era Georgia avert
the façade democracy later on, and would be christened a “Potemkin
democracy”,2 but before that, in the fuss of restructuring the political
system (perestroika), the leaders of the liberation movement, including
Gamsakhurdia, will try to restore national independence in abstraction
from the typological strength and weaknesses of the future political
system. Because democracy was yet to be built and independence was
yet to be won, the standard-bearers of the liberation movement made
the job easier and armed themselves with a tempting guiding idea:
“First independence, then democracy!”3
Gamsakhurdia – tragic herald of the agent era
The Gamsakhurdia period of the liberation movement, as well as
the initial period of Shevardnadze’s rule until August 1995, might well
be called the “agent era”.
The Russian propaganda machine has always used conspiracy theo-
ries to put public consciousness into the required frame of reference.
People who lay claims to belonging to the elite, or even simply indi-
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viduals who are more or less familiar with politics, fear interpreting
political processes from the standpoint of conspiracy theories to avoid
the harmful influence of deliberately adulterated thinking patterns, but it
has to be said to be fair that during the dissolution of the Soviet empire,
security services and their agents certainly did not twiddle their thumbs,
so their relentless efforts largely determined how the events unfolded.
Gamsakhurdia used to publicly accuse his political opponents of
being KGB agents, but did not care much about proving his accusa-
tions. His opponents deemed this a manifestation of demagogic pro-
jection whereby he externalized his own guilt. In general, Soviet
society indeed so abounded with spies of different calibers that the
upper tier of the organizational pyramid of the emerging liberation
movement’s efforts to prevent the ill-wishers from penetrating into
their ranks were in vain. Presumably, the most natural indicator for
identifying agents should have been assessments of the behavior of the
individuals in question by the criterion of who would benefit from
their particular actions (information leaks and thefts were of no con-
cern because everything that happened was public anyway). But
unexpectedly, a more reliable, if grotesque, indicator was found –
whether or not a person had a record of imprisonment! Criminal
mentality, which is so wide-spread in Georgian society, was reinter-
preted in a specific way in the circles of the new political elite:
Trusting anyone who did not have the sublime aureole of former
political prisoner is risky, and such persons should not aspire to
leadership. Although there were exceptions, they only proved this
rule.4 This standard dramatically reduced the already tiny strength of
the vanguard of the liberation movement.
The importance and significance that were attached to the agents
were growing in proportion to the increasing realization that, thanks to
mass anti-communist hysteria, the once formidable Communist Party
– the main lever of political governance in Georgia for the Kremlin
– had become a debilitated and useless tool. And this was natural too,
because Gorbachev himself, with perestroika, was undermining the
political hegemony of the Communist Party. But no party seeking to
replace the communists would have been able to evade the all-
pervasive demand for independence. So, the Kremlin could rely only
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on its omnipresent agents and the nomenclature of the autonomous
political entities in Georgia to regain a foothold; and the Kremlin
adopted the strategy of discrediting the idea of national independence.
Ever after his dissident-times fiasco (and in some people’s opinion,
even before that), Gamsakhurdia was considered a KGB-hired danger-
ous adventurist among certain activists of the liberation movement.
Gamsakhurdia’s actions, his rhetoric and provocative decisions sup-
ported this view repeatedly. In addition, Gamsakhurdia’s group was
initially not particularly influential compared to others, but the Com-
munist government kept emulating the tried and true practice of ar-
tificially creating a privileged stratum to cause a rift in the workers’
movement, and openly favored Gamsakhurdia. Complaints which oth-
ers pointed out to the authorities remained ignored, but as soon as
Gamsakhurdia would say the same later on, his demands were met,
which persuaded the masses of Gamsakhurdia’s capability and effi-
ciency. This expanded his influence quickly and dramatically, but
caused a rift within the liberation movement. Most of its activists
confronted the Soviet authorities and Gamsakhurdia at the same time.
Still, public support for Gamsakhurdia was growing.
While Gamsakhurdia promoted the Kremlin’s political interests (such
as the staging of the provocative rally near Tskhinvali, harassment of
repatriated Muslim Meskhetians, causing of the rift in the National
Forum (the inter-party body of the liberation movement) and ground-
lessly accusing leaders of the liberation movement of being affiliated
with the KGB), naturally, he did not encounter resistance from the
authorities, but when he declared Georgia’s independence following the
nationwide referendum, the Kremlin perceived this as perfidy.
Gamsakhurdia would be unable to vindicate that decision in the eyes
of KGB people who terrorized him. From that day on, the problem
of his personal safety became his major concern and he started to
think about consolidating his power. He hastily changed the political
system and introduced presidential rule. He could already sense that
he would fall victim to Georgia’s declaration of independence.
In the meantime, the old Soviet institutions were gradually re-
placed (at least at the top level) with new ones. Gamsakhurdia’s
“program” of building the Georgian state was voiced by his Prime
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Minister Besarion Gugushvili and, despite the terminological abraca-
dabra (“state capitalism”), admonished the openly autocratic govern-
ment. Democracy was over, it would come later at best, but the
Georgian intellectual elite (the political elite was formed precisely by
recruiting representatives of the intellectual elite) associated the country’s
liberation with democratic reforms. And this happened despite the fact
that no one had any clear-cut civil society project, and the only thing
that existed was the longing to transform our society into one of the
Western type. Later on, the public would see that this is no mean task
to accomplish, but rapturous faith in social engineering was what
Soviet citizens inherited from their communist past, and if the Soviet
utopia disappointed them, it did not mean that their social psychology
changed completely. At any rate, it is a fact that Gamsakhurdia’s plan
and the steps he took to carry it out angered the leading, most
influential part of society. Gamsakhurdia’s unpopularity among elite
circles derived not so much from his dissident-times fiasco as precisely
from his losing his bearings, which George Bush Sr. qualified as
swimming against the tide. The absence of support from the elite
greatly encouraged the initiators of Gamsakhurdia’s ouster.
Without outside (Western) support, the days of the young Geor-
gian state were numbered while the deficit of statehood, in other
words, the habitual millennia-old anarchic situation in Georgia, was
growing stronger.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union fell apart. But this did not mean that
the Kremlin decided to desist from controlling political process in
former Soviet republics. At the same time, the contumacious
Gamsakhurdia declared that the GKChP [State Emergencies Commit-
tee] coup attempt was staged by the government, which only deep-
ened the rift between him and the Kremlin; and finally, he refused to
join the CIS (he made a verbal statement on accession only after the
“Christmas putsch”, but it was too late), which was viewed as com-
plete disregard for the rules of the game which were set and stipulated
by Moscow. It seems that Gamsakhurdia had no hopes left of settling
his relations with the Kremlin.
Moscow strove toward kindling the ethnic conflicts and establishing
governable chaos by staging a coup aimed at securing the newly-
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founded state a place within Russia’s orbit. At the same time, the
Kremlin preferred to maintain the posture of an apparently disinterested
umpire and make its agents pull the chestnuts out of the fire for it, but
strong popular support for Gamsakhurdia proved to be the stumbling
block for the Kremlin. The limited resources of the leaders of armed
groups, who were hired for the “democratic revolution” scheduled for
Christmas, proved to be insufficient. Neither Kitovani’s so-called guards
proved adequate, nor did Ioseliani, just released from prison, and his
Mkhedrioni manage to properly organize the Christmas coup. Despite
the mock-militarist ostentation of these Georgian “king’s men” (accord-
ing to Ioseliani’s classic sermon, “democracy ain’t eating beans!”), their
units were falling back all the time, which forced the secret protagonist
of the Christmas fuss, Russia, to openly intervene in this business. On
the morning of the coup (January 6), the center of Tbilisi was flooded
with tracked hardware of the Transcaucasus Military District. The issue
was sorted out in the blink of an eye, and the armored vehicles
disappeared. Gamsakhurdia was ousted or, to be more precise, seized,
and he spent the remaining months of his life in Russia, in the captivity
of his KGB oppressors. The Kremlin made use of him, this time
around as a counterbalance to Shevardnadze, and did away with him
only after its main strategic plan was implemented.
In Ghia Nodia’s opinion, the toppling of the Gamsakhurdia regime
had two main causes: One was his obsessive personality, which verged
on mental derangement, and the other was moving to the fore of the
anarchist political culture in the opposition’s behavior.5 Soon after
Gamsakhurdia’s ouster, it became clear that an inclination to anarchy
of sorts was noticeable not only in the opposition’s actions, and bitter
historical experience taught politically unaffiliated ordinary Georgians
too how to join bandit brotherhoods and do as they please; centuries
of anarchy and violence (in the absence of the organizing influence
of state) gave rise to this sort of self-annihilating survival culture.
The prince
The agent era continued. The country was shrouded in the veil
of civil strife, and the redeemer in the person of Shevardnadze came
from Moscow; at any rate, many people pinned their hopes on
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Shevardnadze, who, however, did not meet expectations, at least in
the initial, Kitovani- and Ioseliani-associated period of his rule.
Of course, he catered to every whim of Moscow, but Yeltsin’s
trust for Shevardnadze went only as far as the Russian wisdom trust
but verify ordained. Assigning the “praetorian guards” from Moscow
as guarantors of Shevardnadze’s “security” was not enough; appetite
comes with eating, and to further expand its influence, the Kremlin
made Shevardnadze appoint its agents to ministerial or other important
posts. Shevardnadze lacked power from the very outset. Initially, talk
of any legitimacy of his government was out of the question. He had
only personal contacts and the support of foreign politicians. After the
fall 1992 parliamentary elections, when he formally combined the post
of the chairman of parliament with the position of the top official of
the executive (head of state), the real power still remained in the
warlords’ hands.
Armed gangs and criminals ran rampant in the country. The police
was in organized alliance with criminal kingpins. Such a situation took
shape in which even simply walking out into the street became dan-
gerous (let alone movement of commercial cargo or any kind of
economic activity). The economy was destroyed. Hyperinflation broke
out when Russia threw Georgia out of the rouble zone and the
provisional currency, the kupon, was introduced hastily. Its exchange
rate fell by the hour.
The employable and industrious were fleeing the country; the
energy sector collapsed, apartment blocks were without electricity,
roads impassable, production facilities defunct or pillaged; the rural
population went back to subsistence farming.
The chaos which enwrapped the country was also caused by the
absence of state and looked like a brief flash-back to the post-
industrial era of the historical experience of which the country failed
to emerge from the Middle Ages. And it was brief because Shevardnadze
soon led the country to the phase of “feudal lords’ confederation”.
By making heavy concessions to Russia6  and most importantly,
thanks to great assistance from the West, Georgia of the period of
stabilization under Shevardnadze settled down as a “weak state”, or,
as Shevardnadze himself used to call it, a “half-state”.
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The stabilization period was nonetheless a relief compared to
chaos: the crime situation was more or less sorted out; the rampage
of gangs was checked; the military was brought under control; eco-
nomic indicators started to improve, and a national currency, the lari,
was successfully introduced.
The first rudiments of civil society emerged in that period: non-
governmental organizations were created, the media were developing,
and independent trade unions were founded here and there. Direct
contacts with international organizations gave rise to a new culture of
relations. The introduction of personal computers and the Internet
caused the gradual replacement of the Russian language with English.
The beneficial influence of globalization eventually played the deci-
sive role in the breakthrough which took the form of the Rose
Revolution.
In the second phase of his presidency, Shevardnadze cozily en-
sconced himself in the center of the clientelist cobweb which he had
weaved mostly from his relatives’ interests and, en rapport with
modern equivalents of medieval demesne lords – the new rich of the
drugs, bank or energy mafias and Aslan Abashidze – ruled the corrupt
domain which they called a state and in which every courtier was at
work in coordination with Shevardnadze.
It’s easier said than done, but sorting the country out even in this
form could not be managed without a life-or-death confrontation with
the agents’ world. As soon as Shevardnadze, encouraged by the West,
decided to get rid of the agents in his entourage, there was an
assassination attempt against him! However, thanks to his luck and ex-
Communist Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, who looked as pale as he did at
that moment, he escaped from the burning car unharmed. Time would
pass, and Rcheulishvili, disappointed with Shevardnadze, would rally
people at a demonstration to shout for the world to hear: “Shevardnadze
– to the dustbin of history!”
Rcheulishvili’s foreknowing behavior did not really delight the public
back then, but his prediction did come true. And the irony was that
Rcheulishvili would be Shevardnadze’s supporter, and next time, he
not only would be unable to save Shevardnadze, but would find
himself in the dustbin of history too.
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The era of roses was to begin in Georgia.
But until then, Shevardnadze, the relentless careerist adorned with
the nickname “White Fox”, would remain the main protagonist in the
modern history of our country.
Political scientists are closely familiar with the metaphorical use of
“fox” – it was introduced by the classic of Renaissance, Machiavelli,
as one of the types of prince.
Yet another noteworthy paradigm of assessment of politicians belongs
to American thinker Eugene Jennings. He divided politicians into three
main categories: supermen, heroes, and princes.
Supermen are those politicians who challenge old values and the
obsolete social order and create the new values;
The heroes fight to establish the sublime ideals introduced by
supermen;
And the princes try to stay in power by fair means or foul. This
is their supreme and only ideal.
Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
or Woodrow Wilson were examples of supermen.
Nelson Mandela and Mikhail Gorbachev would be entered on the
list of heroes, although the latter could be described as a hero, in
other words, the introducer of ideals, only from the Western stand-
point, whereas from the Russian standpoint, the title of superman
would better suit him because the political ideals toward which
Gorbachev turned his rudder were completely unusual and novel for
Russia; and Jennings bestowed the lofty title of superman for those
who introduce new values.
One of the leaders of the national liberation movement, Merab
Kostava, most certainly belonged to the category of heroes. And
Gamsakhurdia, the author of “Georgia’s Spiritual Mission” would
think himself a man who introduced new ideas, i.e a superman,
but his “missionary values” were a laughing stock for the social
elite. In some people’s opinion, as a politician, he would better
fit into the definition of a hero of the national liberation move-
ment (some would say, an antihero), and it is no surprise that his
life ended tragically; tragedies become heroes, and heroes’ ends
are tragic.
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Shevardnadze was another matter altogether. He was a classic prince.
The term “prince”, it seems, was borrowed by Jennings from
Machiavelli. Machiavelli says nothing about “heroes” or “supermen,”
these are more of a product of the modern-day political experience.
Machiavelli knows only princes and divides them into two subgroups,
the “foxes” and “lions”. The nickname of “lion” applies to those
politicians who manage to remain in power by use of force and
perfidy,7 whereas the foxes stay at the helm through cunning, deal-
wheeling and permanent maneuvering.
Be that as it might, the so-called White Fox (that is to say, a
prince), held the reins of power in Georgia for 30 years; dizzy with
the ploys of the fox, our society deluded itself for the same 30 years
(from the Soviet-era “struggle against negative phenomena”), con-
stantly awaited “heroism” from the prince (reforms, i.e. the establish-
ment of new values), and once even tried to coerce the prince into
an act of heroism (the “young reformers’” attempt to win Shevardnadze
over). This should be viewed as a fundamental mistake by our so-
ciety. The prince cannot become a hero, for no man can do more
than he can.
When the vanguard of the Rose Revolution broke into the par-
liament session hall, even our Heavenly Father would not have been
able to keep Shevardnadze in his post, but he kept reading his
address, as if nothing had happened, and his personal security detail
had to use their muscles to pull him out the hall. As a Georgian saying
goes, a fox was dying, but still headed for henhouse. The already
former commander-in-chief of the Georgian Armed Forces did not
have a single soldier under his command by then, yet he declared a
state of emergency, which under other circumstances might have
resulted in a national tragedy, but fortunately, that time around, it went
down as a comical episode in history. The prince still fought to the
end and even managed to keep his quarters at the Krtsanisi Govern-
ment Residence.
By Jennings’ definition, the country is an arena for the prince, just
a means, and by no means an end. Of course, this was equally true
about both the Soviet Union and Georgia. “My most precious ‘object’
is called Georgia,” – the publishers made these words by Shevardnadze
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the title of a book of his thoughts and aphorisms (Tbilisi, 2000,
Sakartvelo Publishing House). The prince put the word “object” in
quotation marks, as if they were marks from his own claws.
It should not come as a surprise if, under Shevardnadze and his
predecessor, Russia’s agent policy proved to be the most fruitful
precisely in Georgia compared to other countries along Russia’s bor-
ders. In addition to all other benefits, Shevardnadze’s personality
profile precluded the implementation of a more successful policy.
Wherever decisive, daring action was necessary, the fox was cautious,
as is its nature. The period of stabilization during his presidency and
decisive steps against Ioseliani and Kitovani (as well as getting rid of
then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev’s godson in both literal
and figurative senses, Varden Nadibaidze) started only after these
much-respected corpses started to pose a threat to his physical exist-
ence. Having survived assassination attempts by sheer luck,
Shevardnadze changed beyond recognition and started to make daring
personnel decisions, but then went on to implement a policy of
intrigue, wheeling and dealing, and bidding his time.
The public alternated between hopeful and suspicious views of
Shevardnadze. He had always demonstrated selfishness, which is
characteristic for princes, but at the same time he was known world-
wide, which was what people factored in when they assessed him;
people reckoned with the fact that Shevardnadze was to be reckoned
with.8 Besides, compared to the eccentric Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze’s
international political experience and his personal contribution toward
the international recognition of Georgia’s independence, the country’s
accession to international organizations and the launch of international
projects made his kind of nomenclature feudalism more or less tol-
erable, especially as the recent experience of surviving a nightmare
made even his minimal stabilization look like a godsend for a while.
This notwithstanding, the situation was gradually changing – the
situation, but not Shevardnadze, he was the same. He had not done
anything new or unusual in the 2 November 2003 parliamentary
elections. He had lied and rigged the elections. But this brought the
people to the end of their patience. Zurab Zhvania sensed – the gut
feeling of an intelligent politician – where he could find the largest
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“social capital”. He spoke everyone’s mind when he said that people
felt insulted and angry. The fox had once again sunk the nation’s
millennia-old dream under lies, but to his great surprise, it did not
work. The fox, who had many times double-crossed his own people,
this time found himself pulled down from the political Olympus by
that very same people.
Birth of state from the spirit of truth
Among Shevardnadze’s achievements, one arouses a particularly
intense feeling of gratitude. In the days of the Rose Revolution, he
ensured the people’s unanimity and therefore, a clear formulation of
the public demand. His rule had become so anti-society and mafia-
like that the entire Georgian public rose up as one against the existing
“law and order”, which accounted for the success of the revolution.
The people’s will is a binding message for the government. The
Rose Revolution’s message was simple – “The Truth!” This message
was sent to the government long time ago; “Tell the truth! We all
ought to be saying the truth!” – the most popular hit song in the
aftermath of the 9 April tragedy dealt with the nation’s political ideal.9
The Georgian people sorely missed law and order, i.e. the state, but
a just, orderly state, not a Potemkin village. Accordingly, its leader
was to be a truthful politician, not a fibster who had completely rigged
the elections.
Shevardnadze simply did not believe in any political techniques
unless they were based on lies. Deceitful rhetoric and false statements
were a usual Soviet practice, and the rapid spread of anti-Communist
sentiments during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency also stemmed from the
public weariness of the Communist elite’s lies and longing for decent
(fair) politics. Communists briefly remained in power in the Gamsakhurdia
period, whereas under Shevardnadze, the Communist Party’s influence
already vanished, but the Communist tag had always been used as a
disguise for a chameleon which in effect was nothing but a ruling
nomenclature; to the nomenclature, communism as a political idea was
but a tool of promoting its plutocratic interests; as soon as communism
went bankrupt, the chameleon changed its color and, aping Eduard was
baptized as Giorgi, and Orthodox icons were hung in the offices where
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Communist Party General Secretaries’ portraits used to hang. The
Shevardnadze-era elite has never had any respect for communist or any
other ideals; the communist-era style of state government, i.e. the one
that was based on falsehood and corruption, was in their flesh and
blood even without any supporting doctrine. Of course, corruption was
bound to flourish under Shevardnadze, and it did.
Because of his hypocritical and venal policy, the people no longer
viewed Shevardnadze as their leader. By contrast, Mikheil Saakashvili’s
popularity arose precisely from his image of a politician who speaks
the truth. Demonstratively waving the photographs of the corrupt
ministers’ mansions at a government meeting proved to be more
efficient than brandishing a sword.
The Rose Revolution was a turning point in Georgian history. The
most important thing that it brought was changes at the leadership
level. The Shevardnadze-era elite was fundamentally incapable of
building a normal state. Shevardnadze was the mastermind behind the
feudal demesne (clannish and corrupt) governance system in modern
Georgia (he called his favorite “object” a “half-state”, after all, and
this was one of the rare cases when he did not lie), although his half-
state was still a state; in contrast to the feudal demesne system, whose
adepts were all in their estate, the nomenclature parasites of
Shevardnadze’s half-state were sucking blood (money) from the state.
Shevardnadze’s weak state, which, however, was still a state, had
many ready-made institutions, of which the new elite took advantage.
The country’s political and legal systems (the Constitution, laws, in-
stitution of the president, parliament, the National Bank, the Prosecu-
tor-General’s Office and the police, etc.) were not at all specifically
designed for corrupt governance. The state required not so much to
be built up as to be put into operation. But this would require a
complete replacement of all top officials, which happened after the
Rose Revolution. This was the main goal, otherwise, constitutional
changes and another revamping of the political system seemed the
most thankless task, although the new rulers (back then, it was still
a triumvirate), started precisely with these things.
Overall, building statehood in Georgia is an artificial process, in
other words, it begins from the top. One of the reasons for this is that
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the Soviet state institutions have effectively been dismantled, and the
new Georgia, as we saw, was born from chaos (that aside, the Soviet
system itself was somewhat artificial and created from the top down-
wards according to the doctrine that was conceived in an office). This
is why the will and inclinations of the elite (both political and civil
society elite, but first and foremost, of the political one) are decisive
factors in building the state. And the main thing here is overcoming the
Gemeinschaft culture which is so deep-rooted in the Georgian reality.
Otherwise we will go back to the era of lack of order.
At some ancient point in Georgian history, the state eroded and
started to go down the slope of involution. In modern times, statehood
is revived through the process which is opposite to the downhill
movement – in less time and in presence of the specifics of the post-
industrial era. In addition, if in the past the Georgian state was created
by the social and economic development of the Georgian communities,
now first state institutions are created before the development of social
or economic patterns. This is why the elite, not the people, play the
decisive role. For historical reasons, the Georgian people cannot place
with the government a detailed order for any specific political project
that would be tailored to adopt the Western or any other set of values
because socially and economically, the vast majority of the population
are undecided gullible dupes, whereas public demands are molded by
the political interests of already established groups. Therefore, not only
the political system, but also the modification of society in large part
hinges on the tastes and orientation of the political and intellectual
elite. In other words, in the paradoxical situation that has taken shape,
the ruling elite is in charge of not only satisfying public demands, but
also formulating them, at least to some extent. Fulfilling this task
leaves much room for social engineering, but the limit which should
not be transgressed is set by the people and clear-cut – it is so trivial
but, despite that, the Georgian people lacked and missed it so much:
Law and order, maintained by politicians, Leviathan, speaking the
language of justice, or, ultimately, a rule-of-law state. Meeting this
demand would unquestionably mean earning “surefire” social capital
which every government should treasure if it wants to successfully
carry out any political project.
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Threats
This is precisely where the threat to the Rose Revolution gov-
ernment emanates from. The new elite will squander the aforemen-
tioned social capital, the people’s trust, for no good purpose if
corruption takes root among its ranks too. The people did not enter
either integration into NATO or restoration of territorial integrity at
the top of their list of demands. By demanding Shevardnadze’s
resignation, the people rejected falseness, corruption and perverse
political ethics. However, signs of elite corruption have been notice-
able from the very outset in the new government too. For the
purpose of creating conditions for uprooting corruption, a necessary,
but insufficient measure was taken: high salaries are paid to the
upper level of establishment – members of parliament and ministers
– but what is a little odd about this is that it improved the situation
more at the lower levels.10 The centuries-old culture of Gemeinschaft
exposes the new Western-educated politicians with the ambition to
modernize society to strong temptation. The hackneyed issues of
state racket and lobbying of personal business interests is a wide
highway toward the creation of a new nomenclature; on the other
hand, thanks to the efforts of the civil society and political oppo-
sition, as well as partly out of their own free will, the ruling team
sidelined a couple of their corrupt members. The relentless govern-
ment reshuffles make the ministers’ overindulgence at least a little
less possible. In addition, the authorities have openly declared war
on the criminal kingpins; the education reform too, is a strong anti-
corruption message in addition to its other benefits…
Perhaps for now, the only thing which would be fair to say is that
in the Saakashvili period, state has mounted numerous offensives
against corruption and is exercising its monopolistic right to violence
with increasing success. It seems that the Saakashvili government has
no serious rival for power.
But there can be different types of power.
What matters is that the law and order which will be established
in the country are democratic. First, the Georgian people demand
(support) democracy (the Rose Revolution is perhaps not a completely
watertight argument in support of this, but nor is it entirely tenuous);
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second, global influences and the foreign factor push Georgia toward
Western-style law and order; in addition, paradoxically though this
might sound, Russia too is prodding us toward the country’s demo-
cratic evolution. Russia poses threats to the country’s national security,
making military and political integration into the West the only real
guarantee of Georgia’s security. Georgia as a country has only a
democratic future, or else it has no future at all. It is precisely the
erosion of democracy that is the gravest threat faced by the country.
Georgian democracy has too many flaws as yet, be it imperfec-
tions of the political structure (insufficient separation of powers and
lack of checks and balances) or weakness of the judiciary, deficient
electoral laws or underdeveloped civil society and support for an anti-
democratic institution – the Georgian Orthodox Church11 .
The issues of territorial integrity, inadequate integration of ethnic
minorities into the Georgian society, and in general, social consolida-
tion could also be added to the list of threats and flaws in the
development of the Georgian state, but these should suffice…
Notes:
1 “Tses-rigi” used to mean both “law and order” and “legislation” in the Georgian
language.
2 See Charles King, Potemkin Democracy, The National Interest 3. 2001
3 The Social Democrats, leaders of the political movement of the early 20th
century, had a contrary view. In their opinion, social problems were to be resolved
first, and then the free working people would resolve the independence problem on
their own.
4 For example, Nodar Natadze, later the chairman of the Popular Front, was an
exception. He had made a name for himself as a fearless dissident. Zurab Chavchavadze
was another exception; he had never been a political prisoner, but he established himself
among the liberation movement with the help of Tamar Chkheidze, who worked with
Chavchavadze as a team and delegated the authoritative powers of a political prisoner
to him. Zviad Gamsakhurdia himself was also an exception: he had chosen to turn
down in the past the glorious but hard-to-earn title of prisoner of conscience by making
confessionary statements to investigators and apologizing publicly, but thanks to a lack
of information or some other factors, the public at large set down his months in forced
exile at a shepherds’ hut in Kizlyar as his “spell in prison”.
5 See Ghia Nodia, “Putting the State Back Together in Post-Soviet Georgia”,
Beyond State Crisis? (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 2002).
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6 The concessions took indeed a heavy toll: Shevardnadze ceded Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and deployed Russian troops as peacekeepers there; agreed to joint
monitoring of the borders, etc.
7 Jaba Ioseliani might have laid claims to being a “lion”, but he still fell into
the White Fox’s trap. As for the “Acharan Lion” Aslan Abashidze, he was so
nicknamed because of his Turkish name (Arslan means “lion” in Turkish), otherwise
he was a fox like Shevardnadze. The pseudo-lion of the “second political center” of
Georgia, whom President Yeltsin gave the rank of general when Abashidze was
already in the post of the head of an autonomous entity within a sovereign state live
on TV(?!), ruled his share of Georgia in harmony with the White Fox. That these
foxes’ tails were knotted together was best exposed during the Rose Revolution.
8 Honorable Doctor of Boston, Harvard, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Providence and
Trieste Universities, winner of the Kant, Onassis, Nixon, Harvard, Wunsch and Israel
Democracy Institute awards and destroyer of Berlin Wall.
9 Soviet troops violently broke up a protest in front of the Supreme Council
building on 9 April 1989.
10 At any rate, both Zurabishvilis, Salome and David, whose departure from the
ranks of the ruling party and joining the opposition caused a stir, reproached the
government effectively for the same thing: David Zurabishvili cited as the main reason
for his “renegade” action the process of the transformation of the ruling team into a
new clan; and according to Salome Zourabichvili, “demons should leave Georgia”; by
demons she meant those corrupt officials who view their posts as tools for personal
enrichment.
11 The church is the most influential civil organization in the modern-day Georgia,
a country with a high potential for religious fanaticism. The trajectory of the country’s
future evolution depends in large part on how relations with the Church will be
regulated.
The Georgian and Russian Churches are similar, and not only because of their
co-religionism. Besides the dogmatic and theological issues, the influence of the Rus-
sian Church on the Georgian Church also spreads into areas of political values and
civilization identity. However, the Russian Church is antagonistic toward Western social
ideals, which is why strong anti-Western, and consequently, anti-democratic sentiments
are growing in Georgian society.
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1.
The two main goals which were set in Georgia shortly before the
dissolution of the Soviet Union were:
a) Sovereignty;
b) Democracy.
It is interesting that the realization came almost from the very
outset that there might not be harmonious interconnectedness at all
between these two goals (hence the slogan of the early 1990s, “In-
dependence first, democracy later”), but the decision that neither could
be given up came much later. Of course, the meaning of democracy
here was the broadest possible, encompassing not only the principle
of elected authority, but also protection of fundamental human rights
and liberties (liberalism), free market economy (capitalist economic
system), and in conjunction, all this was to become a guarantee of
Georgia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic organizations (pro-Western
orientation).
As for the cultural factors which played an important role in political
processes, negative social capital and non-civically-oriented political cul-
ture have to be mentioned, which left their mark in the Georgian politics
of last 15 years. The familism, which allowed the country’s population
to survive the totalitarian regime with relative ease (it can be said with
certainty that that regime wiped out the borders between public and
private with much less success in the southern culture of Georgian kind
than in the northern of the Russian kind: compare Italy under the
Mussolini regime and Germany under the Hitler regime, where the same
difference existed), turned out, as expected, to be a hindering factor for
the establishment of liberal democracy.
After the Rose Revolution, yet another important social change
was added to these cultural factors – the emergence of the new
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political elite, which set as its explicit goal the struggle against the
aforementioned cultural factors. So, one might call the answers to the
second and third questions complementary, because the main clash
today is taking place between the new political elite on the one side
and the old social practices and discourses on the other (using the
language of the modern social theory) or old political culture (talking
the language of modern political theory, which is less reflexive in
methodological terms, but is more widespread).
2.
The main achievement was the establishment of democracy in a
very narrow sense of the word. By democracy I mean elected author-
ity, which before, in the Soviet period, played only the role of a
façade. Of course, it was not liberal democracy. Moreover, the
Gamsakhurdia government can even be christened as a typical instance
of un-liberal democracy: It was a regime in which the people’s will,
instead of being limited by the principle of supremacy of law and the
constitution, was guided by the rhetoric of the charismatic leader.
The history of the Gamsakhurdia regime clearly demonstrated that
the logic of independence might not coincide with the logic of democ-
racy,1 especially if the demos which resides in the country is identified
with one of the ethnic groups and the rights of other ethnic groups
are ignored. The main failure of the Gamsakhurdia regime – the
kindling of the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which
was caused by ethno-nationalist political views – resulted precisely
from this.
3.
In political science, regimes of the Shevardnadze kind are called
“competitive authoritarianism” or “semi-autocratic”.2  These are re-
gimes in which decisions are made by small groups, but which, despite
this, still provide the opportunity to oppose them without the risk of
falling victim to repressions. In the Shevardnadze period, the structural
possibilities of such opposition arose in the form of civil society and
the free media. Rampant corruption and increasingly large-scale elec-
tion rigging were inseparable parts of this system.
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The cause of the revolution was the rigged parliamentary elections.
But it is known that one cause is not enough for a revolution. A
combination of several factors were required to make the revolution
successful: the free media and nongovernmental sector, which moni-
tored the elections and informed the public about the results, the
unpopularity of the government leader (Shevardnadze), the united
opposition, successful mobilization of the masses, among others.3
But the fundamental methodological problem facing the present-
day researcher who is trying to supply an answer to the question on
the causes of the November revolution was known very well to the
social sciences of the 20th century. This is a dilemma between struc-
ture and agency. On the one hand, there is a desire to rely, when
performing an analysis, on objective structures from whose existence
we can deduce the revolutionary situation, but on the other hand,
there is just as intense a desire to link every revolution with the will
of the people, whose scientific reification would be a problematic
undertaking and which yields varying results in different cases. In this
case, the answer to the question of why the November revolution
happened should be sought not in the structural conditions which were
antecedent to it, but in the population’s reactions to these structural
conditions. And this will itself can only be explained by historical
analysis of perception by the Georgian people of their freedom as an
important value and loyalty to the pro-Western orientation.
4.
The main project of the Saakashvili period is building statehood.
The main thing which the Shevardnadze government proved (and, as
another example, the Yeltsin government proved the same in Russia)
was that intuition, which has been known to political science for quite
some time now, does exist. The fundamental difference between states
is not ideology, and it does not even run through the border between
dictatorship and democracy, but through the difference between effec-
tiveness and ineffectiveness.4  The state has acquired its function,
which, according to Max Weber, is establishing a legitimate monopoly
on use of physical violence,5  in its full form only under the Saakashvili
government. It is no accident that among the first steps which the
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incumbent government took was precisely reforming the police and
military. As is known, the process of building statehood starts in full
accordance with the above definition by Weber.6
Noteworthy among the other achievements is restoration of the
central government’s control over Achara and Upper Abkhazia (the
upper part of Abkhazia’s Kodori Gorge), which is an important step
toward the restoration of territorial integrity. In addition, I would
highlight as a social and cultural development of special importance the
education reform, which encompasses not only the secondary, but also
higher education and which envisages producing not only human capital
which would meet the modern labor market’s demands, but also the
values which are necessary for citizenship of a democratic society.
The real (in contrast to the Shevardnadze regime, not merely declared)
fight against corruption, whose first successes are evident, and the
creation of the local governance system should also be noted.
5.
The main problem of the opposition, which would not be resolved
by the emergence of a charismatic leader either, is the absence of an
alternative political project which would rally large enough groups of
population. The criticism of the authorities by one portion of the oppo-
sition is rhapsodic and unsystematic, whereas the ideological positions of
the other part coincide with the authorities’ to such an extent that the only
difference between the propagators of this ideology should be sought in
their facial features, not in some values-related or ideological stances. The
strengthening of the opposition is also hindered by the government’s
objective successes in a sense that among the country’s current problems,
which have been prioritized by the elite a long time ago using the criteria
supported by the majority of voters, there are many issues which require
not separation of ideological positions (e.g. between the rightist and leftist
poles), but straightforward progress (e.g. uprooting corruption in the
education system, efficient tax administration, etc.).
We should expect the emergence of the strong opposition:
a) In case of stagnation of the incumbent government, which would
make it possible for other political forces to pick up the same
political project where the government left off;
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b) If the most basic problems facing the country get resolved, an
array of the less basic problems will become more noticeable, as
this would attach greater importance to ideological differences. In
that case, an alternative political vision might win a more-or-less
broad support base among the population.
6-7.
In view of the logic of the current situation, I cannot see the
possibility of the opposition’s strengthening in the near future, which
is why it would be difficult for me to speculate on the potential issues
which would unite the opposition. Presumably, in the future the
opposition will consist of both members of existing opposition parties
and a group which will break off from the incumbent ruling team. The
opposition’s main message will entirely depend on the situation in the
country at that moment and on how successful the government is.
8.
The establishment of a dominant political party system would be an
interesting prospect, but, as the experience of the previous two parties
(Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table and Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union)
shows, one factor which is important for the existence of the dominant
party does not exist in Georgia: longevity. Parties in Georgia are created
around, and entirely depend on, the leaders and their immediate entou-
rage.7  Accordingly, the probability of the National Movement’s survival
as an entity which will be able to generate leaders for several decades,
as was the case with the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan or Insti-
tutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico,8 is, in my opinion, not very
high. It is more likely that the destiny of this party will directly depend
on Mikheil Saakashvili’s political trajectory.
9.
Answers to the previous questions were one-sided in a sense that
they dealt with only endogenous aspects which unfold within the
country, without a link with the actors and processes outside. It is
clear, however, that one of the country’s main problems, the ethnic
conflicts, would be completely different had it not been for Russia’s
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role in kindling and sustaining them. Also, the democratization process
which is under way in the country depended, and still does, in large
part on assistance from the United States and Europe.
I do not expect much change in relations with Russia. The post-
imperial syndrome in relations with former colonies assumed such
irrational forms in even much more modern countries (like, for
example, the Netherlands or Great Britain)9  that it should come as
no surprise that the extremely negative attitude will probably remain
the determinant of Russia’s policy toward Georgia for a long time
to come.
The main novelty which is to be expected in the next 3-5 years
is Georgia’s accession to NATO. A substantial part of the population
supports this in Georgia (in contrast, say, to Ukraine). According to
the opinion poll conducted in August 2006,10  59.2 percent of the
population wanted Georgia to join NATO, and only 7.1 percent is
against it; 47.5 percent of the population expects security guarantees
from accession, and 29.5 percent expects restoration of territorial
integrity. The former expectation is indeed appropriate, and as for the
issue of settling the ethnic conflicts, accession to NATO would at least
facilitate a revision of the status quo, which is in Georgia’s interests.
10.
One step unanimously regarded as vital in Georgia today is a
fundamental reform of the judiciary system, which to this day remains
the most vulnerable area in the process of establishment of liberal
democracy in the country. Tackling the unemployment problem and
establishing a social security system also require major efforts. It is
noteworthy that the ruling party views all three areas as priorities.
But what I would like to briefly touch on here is not these
priorities, but the people who should staff a government that would
be completely acceptable for me. Only the generation which was born
free from Egyptian slavery entered the Promised Land. Translating this
into the language of social science, people whose socialization took
place when they were slaves are banned from entering the Promised
Land. The biblical story points out the decisive importance which is
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attached to the socialization process (in this case, the political social-
ization process, in other words, the molding of values, beliefs and
views which enable the citizens to support the political system of their
choice). It has to be said that the change of generations is one of the
significant guarantees for the stability of democracy in Georgia. Even
the famous premise by Lipset,11  who said that stable democracy is
only possible in a country whose GDP is above a certain limit, should
not be taken literally. The influence of material prosperity is not direct,
it is mediated precisely by the socialization process; when the individual’s
system of values is established, the decisive factor is the conditions
in which the socialization of the individual took place.12  Precisely the
material conditions which existed in the socialization period are the
factor of influence on the process of establishment of the value
system, and precisely they form the foundation for the civil culture,
which for its part is a prerequisite for a stable democracy.
Notes:
1 See the description of this conflict in Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, 1996).
2 Larry Diamon, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy, 13
(April 2003): 21-35; Stephen Levitsky, Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2003): 51-56; Michael McFaul,
“Transitions from Postcommunism”, Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005): 5-19;
Ghia Nodia/ Alvaro P. Scholtbach, The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political
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Georgia after communism
1989-2006
Timeline
1989, April 9 A large pro-independence demonstration in
Tbilisi is crushed by the Soviet troops leaving
20 people dead. As a result, the Communist
regime in Georgia is dramatically discredited
and pro-independence national movement takes
political initiative.
1989, July 16 There are skirmishes between the Georgian
and the Abkhaz in the Autonomous Republic
of Abkhazia. The immediate trigger is the
protest of the Abkhaz against  the opening
of a branch of Tbilisi University in Sukhumi,
the general background – Georgian opposition
to Abkhaz demands of increasing the level of
autonomy of Abkhazia or seceding from
Georgia.
1989, November 23 First violent clashes take place between Geor-
gian and Ossetian nationalist activists in the
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The lat-
ter demand the increase of the level of au-
tonomy of South Ossetia or joining the North
Ossetian Republic in Russia, while the former
oppose the existence of the Ossetian au-
tonomy.
1990, October 28 The Round Table, a nationalist coalition led
by former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, wins
the multiparty parliamentary elections thus
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ending the Communist rule; in November,
Gamsakhurdia becomes chairman of parlia-
ment.
1990, December 9 Regional elections that are held in South
Ossetia without an authorization from Tbilisi
elect a new regional council which declares
the creation of the South Ossetian Republic.
1990, December 11 The Supreme Council of Georgia abolishes
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Skirmishes.
1991, March 31 Referendum overwhelmingly supports indepen-
dence of Georgia.
1991, April 9 Parliament declares secession from the Soviet
Union.
1991, May 26 Gamsakhurdia is elected president by 87 per
cent of vote.
1991, September Elections to the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia
are held based on a power-sharing agreement
leading to the creation of a regional parlia-
ment that can only make principal decisions
if the Georgian and Abkhaz groups of depu-
ties come to an agreement.
1992, December 22 Fighting erupts between government troops
and opposition militias in downtown Tbilisi.
1992, January 6 Gamsakhurdia flees and power is taken by
the Military Council consisting of Tengiz
Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani, the leaders of
the National Guard and Mkhedrioni (the Rid-
ers), two victorious militias.
1992, March Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Communist
leader of Georgia (1972-85) and the foreign
minister of the Soviet Union (1985-90; 1991)
returns to Georgia. He is appointed head of
the newly created State Council.
1992, June 24 In the Russian city of Dagomys, an agree-
ment is reached on ceasefire in the zone of
the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, to be moni-
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tored by the three-partite Georgian-Ossetian-
Russian peacekeeping force.
1992, August After Georgian troops enter Abkhazia with a
declared aim to protect the railway and high-
ways, fighting erupts between them and local
separatist forces.
1992, October Parliamentary elections lead to the creation of
Parliament with no clear majority party but
generally supportive of Eduard Shevardnadze.
In a separate vote, Shevardnadze is elected,
uncontested, chairman of Parliament and head
of state.
1993, May Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani resigned
from their formal positions in the government
thus signifying the strengthening of Eduard
Shevardnadze’s influence.
1993, September The war in Abkhazia ends in the defeat of
the Georgian forces. The ethnic Georgian
population is being driven out of Abkhazia.
1993, October After Georgian troops leave Abkhazia,
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s supporters escalate
their insurgency in western Georgia aiming
to depose Eduard Shevardnadze’s govern-
ment. Shevardnadze seeks military assis-
tance from Russia and makes a statement
on joining the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS).
1993, November Supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in west-
ern Georgia are defeated.
1993, November Constituent assembly of the Citizens’ Union
of Georgia, the new ruling party headed by
Eduard Shevardnadze, is held in Tbilisi.
1993, December 31 Zviad Gamsakhurdia was found dead in a
village in western Georgia. The official ver-
sion is suicide, though his supporters allege
he was murdered.
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1994, March Georgian Parliament ratifies a decision to join
the CIS.
1994, May 14 A Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement is
signed between the Georgian government and
Abkhaz separatists. Russian troops serving
under the aegis of the CIS troops become
the peacekeeping force, with UN Observers
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) mandated to
monitor the peacekeeping operation.
1994, September A new program of economic reforms based
on recommendations of the International
Monetary Fund starts with liberalizing prices
for bread, public transport and fuel.
1994, December 3 Giorgi Chanturia, a popular leader of the
National Democratic Party, is assassinated.
1995, January Tengiz Kitovani is arrested while leading a
group of armed volunteers, ostensibly to re-
gain Abkhazia by force.
1995, August 24 New Constitution is adopted that in the main
follows the US model of separation of the
executive and legislative powers, though with
a somewhat greater role of the president.
1995, August 29s Eduard Shevardnadze survives an assassina-
tion attempt. Igor Giorgadze, the minister of
security with Russian connections, is charged
with masterminding the attempt in coopera-
tion with leaders of Mkhedrioni militia.
Giorgadze flees to Russia, more than 200
members of Mkherdioni are arrested. The
paramilitary organization Mkhedrioni banned
in September.
1995, September 15 Georgia and Russia sign an agreement on
four Russian military bases being stationed in
Georgia for 25 years. There is an under-
standing that Georgian Parliament will only
ratify the agreement if Russia helps Georgia
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solve the Abkhaz and South Ossetian issues.
The agreement was never ratified.
1995, September 25 A new Georgian currency Lari introduced.
1995, November 5 Parliamentary and presidential elections are
held. Shevardnadze is elected president,
while his party – the Citizens’ Union of
Georgia – becomes the majority party in
Parliament. Revival Union, a party of the
leader of the Autonomous Republic of
Achara, Aslan Abashidze, and the National
Democratic Party, are also elected to Par-
liament.
1998, February 9 Shevardnadze survives another attempt on his
life, this time blamed on supporters of former
president Gamsakhurdia with Chechen con-
nections.
1998, May Fighting breaks out in Abkhazia’s Gali Dis-
trict. Abkhaz troops suppress Georgian gue-
rilla groups, while the Georgian population
that had returned to the district flees again.
1999, April Georgia is admitted to the Council of Eu-
rope.
1999, October 31 New parliamentary elections lead to even
stronger majority of the Citizens’ Union in
Parliament. (Second round is held on No-
vember 14.) A bloc of parties led by Aslan
Abashidze’s Revival party, and the Industialists’
party also join Parliament.
1999, November At the OSCE summit in Istanbul, Georgia
and Russia sign an agreement whereby two
of the four remaining Russian military bases
in Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and Gudauta
(Abkhazia) would withdraw until July 2000,
while terms of withdrawal of the other two
bases (in Batumi and Akhalkalaki) would be
negotiated during 2000.
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2000, April 9 Shevardnadze is re-elected president.
2001 June/July Russia hands over Vaziani military base to
Georgia.
2001, October A group of Chechen fighters fleeing the war
in Chechnya traverse to Abkhazia and, with
support from local Georgian paramilitaries,
engage in short-term clashes with Abkhaz
troops. The latter successfully drive out the
intruders.
2001, October 30 A raid of the Security Ministry forces on
Rustavi-2, the most popular independent TV
channel which was often critical of the
Shevardnadze regime, leads to anti-govern-
ment demonstrations. Zurab Zhvania, the
reformist speaker of Parliament, resigns in
solidarity with the protesters. Shevardnadze
sacks the government but shortly reappoints
everybody save for the two most powerful
and popular ministers, those of internal af-
fairs and security.
2001, September Mikheil Saakashvili, the reformist minister
of justice, resigns from the Shevardnadze
government and starts the National Move-
ment, strongly oppositional to the govern-
ment.
2002, February A US government representative says there
are Al Qaida members in Pankisi.
2002 April The USA launches its “Train and Equip”
program to prepare Georgian troops for
counterterrorist operations.
2002, June 2 Local elections lead to humiliating defeat of
the ruling party.
2002, November Saakashvili becomes the chairman of the
Tbilisi city council.
2002, September 11 Russian President Vladimir Putin declares that
Russia may invade Georgian unless it takes
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care of Chechen rebels that hide in Pankisi
Gorge, which neighbors Chechnya.
2002, October Georgia starts an anti-terrorist operation in
Pankisi that leads to the re-establishment of
state control over the area.
2003, May Work begins on laying the Georgian section
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that
would take Caspian oil from Azerbaijan to
the Mediterranean coast in Turkey.
2003, November 2 Parliamentary elections are held with numer-
ous irregularities noted by local and interna-
tional observers. Large-scale protest demon-
strations continue for three weeks and lead
to the seizure of Parliament and the resigna-
tion of President Shevardnadze on November
23. The Supreme Court invalidates the elec-
tion results in the party lists; MPs elected
from constituencies retain their seats.
2004, January 4 Mikheil Saakashvili is elected president with
overwhelming support (96 percent of the vote)
in snap elections that were considered free and
fair by internal and international observers. Zurab
Zhvania is appointed prime minister.
2004, March 28 In the repeat partial parliamentary elections,
the United National Movement (created on the
basis of merger between Mikheil Saakashvili’s
National Movement and the United Democrats
led by Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania),
gets 66 per cent of the vote. The only other
group to overcome the 7-percent threshold was
the bloc of the New Right and Industrialist
parties.
2004, May 6 Mass protest rallies in the autonomous repub-
lic of Achara, supported by the Tbilisi gov-
ernment, lead to ouster of Aslan Abashidze,
an authoritarian ruler of Achara.
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2004, June Georgia is admitted to the European Neigh-
borhood Program (ENP).
2004, August Tensions in South Ossetia lead to occasional
fighting leaving more than 10 people dead.
The crisis ends after Georgian government
units take several strategic heights but with-
draw some of the troops.
2005, February 3 Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania is found dead
in an apartment in Tbilisi.
2005, May 9-10 US President George W. Bush visits Georgia
proclaiming it the “beacon of democracy”.
2005, May Agreement signed with Russia on the with-
drawal of the remaining military bases to be
completed by the end of 2008.
2006, September Georgia enters Intensified Dialogue for mem-
bership in NATO.
2006, July Emzar Kvitsiani, former governor of the
Georgian-administered Kodori Gorge, and his
militiamen from the Monadire (Hunter) para-
military unit start a mutiny in the Kodori
Gorge. Georgian police units take control over
the Gorge, Kvitsiani escapes.
2006 Nov/December The alternative government of South Ossetia
led by Dimitri Sanakoyev is established in
the village of Kurta following the 12 Novem-
ber elections in South Ossetia. It supports
autonomous status for South Ossetia within
Georgia.
2006, October 5 Municipal elections in Georgia lead to domi-
nation of United National Movement in all
municipalities of Georgia.
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